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ABSTRACT

H. ODERA ORUKA AND THE RIGHT TO A HUMAN MINIMUM:
A SAGACIOUS QUEST FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE

By
Mburu Kamau Michael
May 2018

Dissertation Supervised by Professor Ronald Polansky
This dissertation primarily aims at making contribution to the advancement of philosophy
from the practical point of view. It does so by analytically and critically studying H. Odera Oruka
(1944-1995), arguably one of the finest 20th century African philosophers. Thus, it identifies,
expounds, and critiques Oruka’s philosophical cum ethical commitment by situating him within
various philosophical discourses touching such important global issues as justice, human rights,
duty, ecology, and politics. It specifically advances Oruka’s argument for the right to a human
minimum, showing how that ethical principle can be applicable in addressing such traumatic
human conditions as inequality, poverty, inhumanness and ecological degradation. It also attempts
to borrow and apply some ethical values from Africa – such as ubuntu (or humanness) - so as to
clarify and philosophically defend the possibility of ensuring justice at the global level.
Key words: Odera Oruka, sagacity, right, duty, human minimum, ecology, global justice, ubuntu.
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CHAPTER 1
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1.1. Statement of the Problem
Philosophy can be etymologically defined as “love of wisdom”. That means philosophy, at
least from the practical point of view, is inevitably tied with issues of justice; where justice means
ensuring both egalitarian and ecological fairness. This is because wisdom or sagacity - the object
of philosophy - is a human quality that enables one to utilize knowledge of his or her tradition and
modernity for the purpose of making reasonable, mature, and objective judgments about life,
human relations, and the environment (Oruka 1991, 40). Thus, philosophy so defined as “love of
wisdom” is supposed to confer insight, knowledge, and ethical inspiration so that we humans are
able to relate “healthily” not only with each other but also with our environment. Philosophy, in
other words, ought to make us not only knowledgeable and critical but also reasonable and mature,
and hence ethically responsible as moral agents.
Unfortunately, that has not always been the case. Despite various ideologies prompted by
the rise in clamour for justice at the global level, socio-economic inequality and hence poverty –
the bedrock of human misery - remains a thorny issue. The scary gap between the rich and the
poor (be they individual persons or nation-states) sadly continues escalating as the few rich and
strong mercilessly exploit world resources to the detriment of majority of the poor and vulnerable.
According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), for instance,
the richest 10% of the world population earns 9.6 times the income of the poorest 10% combined
(Reuben 2015). Further reports indicate that between 2015 - 2017, over 800 million people in the
world were living in abject poverty, earning less than $ 2.00 per day (Roser & Ortiz-Ospina 2018).
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But such pathetic situation is, no doubt, a real threat to the security and quality of human life. It is
a grave form of injustice to humanity that needs to be addressed with urgency.
Indeed, socio-economic deprivation (often caused by greed), among other forms of human
peril, is an “evil” that cannot be ignored; it is a real threat to both humanity and the entire universe.
It adversely affects people’s rationality, creativity and ability to function as moral agents, thereby
jeopardizing human dignity1 and integrity. It also threatens global security and harmonious coexistence with Nature. Thus, we urgently need a philosophy that would address a rather difficult
but legitimate question: what do we fundamentally need as humans to eradicate poverty in the
world, thereby enhance people’s rationality, creativity, and ability to function as moral agents?
This is a question in search of the human minimum; it forms the basis of my study.
There are some other important questions that may inevitably come to mind if one were to
critically reflect upon the issue of poverty vis-à-vis the desire to have justice at the global level.
First, is it ethically justifiable for some few people to exuberantly exploit world resources, and
hence “suffocate” in luxurious affluence while millions of others languish in abject poverty? Put
differently, is the “world order” fair to the global poor? Third, what ought to be done to alleviate
this dire situation (socio-economic exploitation and hence poverty), thereby ensuring decent living
and hence possibility of “happiness” to the majority if not everyone?
Now these and other intriguing questions, to me, seem to boil down to one fundamental
ethical concern: don’t we (humans) have any duty to ensure that every human being in the world,

1

I use the term “dignity” here and throughout the project to denote that special “inner worth” associated
with human species by virtue of them being rational, and hence having capacity to function as moral
agents. It is that condition under which humans ought to be treated as an end in itself rather than means
(cf. Kant 4:435). Thus, it is the basis of valuing human life; it is also the basis of respect, entitlement or
rights, and empowerment of an individual person.
2

by virtue of being human, has at least the right to basic human needs met? That concern, in my
view, would set the stage for the possibility of having justice at the global level.
1.2. Hypothesis
In response to the above questions, this project seeks to advance a hypothesis that the right
to a human minimum, an ethical principle Odera Oruka ingeniously crafted, is the basic necessary
(though not sufficient) means to ensuring a genuine practice of justice at the global level. Adhering
to the ethical principle of human minimum, in other words, is what we would fundamentally need
at the global level to reduce socio-economic inequality, eradicate poverty, and so enhance people’s
rationality, creativity, and ability to function as moral agents. I will elaborate what constitutes the
right to a human minimum, and demonstrate why it should never be denied to any member of the
human species if we are to develop a much more “humanised” global society, i.e., a society in
which one would feel more secured, dignified, taken care of, and motivated to act as an ethically
responsible being irrespective of one’s domicile.
I further intend to show how the ethical principle of human minimum elicits what we might
call “correlative global duty” that binds every capable moral agent. My argument with Oruka will
be grounded on one basic sagacity that demand of us humans (who presumably are rational beings)
to be ethically responsible to the wellbeing of each other our geographical, racial, gender, or any
other sectarian affiliations notwithstanding. But that sagacity also prompts us to take good care of
our environment, even as we pursue what we think is justifiably due to us (as our rights). And that,
to me, would hopefully lead us toward a much better concept of global justice: one that does not
only emphasize egalitarian fairness in human relations but also ecological fairness with Nature.
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1.3. Commitment to Practical Philosophy
Henry Odera Oruka (1944-1995) is arguably one of the finest Africa philosophers in the
twentieth century. Born and raised in the Western part of Kenya before undertaking graduate
studies in Sweden and the United States, Oruka rose academically to earn for himself international
repute. As a critical thinker, astute scholar, proficient author and a distinguished don, Odera Oruka
was committed to making African philosophy a topic for global philosophical inquiry. He took
this as a first step toward seeking justice for his people. Like other contemporary African
philosophers – such as Hountondji, Wiredu, Masolo, Mudimbe, Gyekeye, Appiah, etc., Oruka’s
work has also opened new ways of philosophizing in modern Africa beyond the polemical question
of the nature and the content of African philosophy.
Odera Oruka is, no doubt, well known for his Sage Philosophy; a project that almost singlehandedly turned the University of Nairobi where he was based into a hub of “philosophic sagacity”,
a globally recognized school of thought. But, unfortunately less known (though in my view most
important) is Oruka’s practical philosophy, especially his ethical thought. He believed that any
philosophy worthy of its name ought to be sagacious, meaning it ought to be practically relevant
to the wellbeing of humanity and the environment. Hence, at the heart of his practical philosophy
was ethics, which he regards as a philosophical inquiry into the moral language and principles that
govern or ought to govern the conduct of human beings (who are supposedly moral agents) as well
as determine their role, value and dignity in a society (Oruka 1990b, 3).
1.4. Background to the Project
Odera Oruka’s proficiency in writing surprises many. At the time of his untimely death (he
was hit by a lorry in one of the streets of Nairobi aged 51years old), Oruka had published at least
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six books and co-authored three. In addition, he wrote over fifty academic essays, many of which
have been published in local and international newspapers, journals, and books. His writings, most
of which are quite enticing to read, were mainly focused on such practical topics as sagacity, ethics,
justice, humanism, liberty, politics, economics, eco-philosophy, etc.2
Now out of the six books he authored, Oruka is arguably best known for Sage Philosophy
(1990/91), a book many consider to be his most epic contribution to philosophy. It continues to
draw interesting academic discussions from scholars not only in Africa but also in America,
Europe, and Asia. As Graness aptly points out, Sage Philosophy has “opened a new perspective
on the Eurocentric history of philosophy and African history as such”, leading to “a new discussion
about the origins of philosophical thinking”. It is therefore “an important contribution to the
reconstruction of the history of world philosophy” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 247). Indeed, several
dissertations and many academic papers have been written and published on Sage Philosophy.
There is, however, another book by Professor Oruka that I consider invaluably resourceful
not only to my project but also to anyone committed to the issue of global justice, i.e., to advancing
socio-economic fairness to humanity without jeopardizing the environment. This work entitled
Practical Philosophy: In Search for an Ethical Minimum was published posthumously in 1997,
dedicated to future thinkers and those who work for justice and a better environment (Oruka 1997,
x). It is a collection of some of Oruka’s essays that had been previously published over a span of
twenty years: probably from 1976 to 1995.
As we learn from the introduction, these were the essays Oruka himself had selected and
was critically revising in view of publishing them as a book before his untimely death. And in my

2

For a complete bibliography of Oruka’s works, see Graness and Kresse 1997, 261-65.
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view, these were essays that Oruka thought would fittingly define his philosophy as a sagacious
inquiry into human predicaments. He seems to have envisioned a kind of philosophy that would
be more relevantly attuned to not only enlightening the mind of his audience, but also provide
practical possible solutions that would help improve the socio-economic wellbeing of humanity as
such without causing havoc to the environment.
1.5. Significance of the Project
Oruka’s Practical Philosophy is divided into four parts, namely, i) The Issue of Truth and
Truth in Faith; ii) Values, Ideology and Praxis; iii) African Philosophy and the Problem of Culture;
and iv), Philosophy, Ethics and the Environment. In this project, we focus mainly on the second
and fourth parts. As Oruka aptly writes, these two parts contain “essays that purport to be critical
of matters of ethics and values in social life and politics” (Oruka 1997, xi). They address pertinent
issues of poverty, underdevelopment, freedom, socio-economic injustice, inhumanness, and
environmental degradation, just to mention a few (cf. Oruka 1997 101, 106, 138, 243).
These are, no doubt, issues of great global concern; they are important to both humanity
and the entire world. As a philosopher with a practical inclination, Odera Oruka felt the need to
first address these issues as a matter of urgent moral imperative so as help improve the world for
better human existence. He likewise challenges other philosophers and thinkers to do the same. In
one of his fascinating essays addressing the issue of global irresponsibility he writes:
This concern [i.e., global irresponsibility] calls for philosophers to help reorganize and
rationalize the available knowledge in order to improve human understanding and the
welfare of mankind. And here lies the moral mission of philosophy. In our times it is more
urgent than the concern, say, to develop new methods of solving classical metaphysical
paradoxes (Oruka 1997, 99).
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This project aims at responding to that moral imperative urgency by critically analysing
some of the issues mentioned above. But that does not mean that we disregard metaphysics and
other “classical” branches of philosophy. Rather, we simply want to develop a philosophy that is
sagaciously concerned about humanity’s wellbeing in our quest for a global society, a society that
is essentially both egalitarian and communitarian oriented. Such a society, we argue, must be
inspired and guided by some ethical principles, such as the right to a human minimum.
As we shall see, the concept of human minimum is one of the central principles in Oruka’s
practical philosophy; it either explicitly or implicitly cuts across the issues mentioned above,
especially as he seeks a genuine practice of justice at the global level. Indeed, it was because of
his commitment to humanism or humanness (i.e., an ethical concern for the wellbeing of humanity
as such and the environment) that Odera Oruka believed every human person being entitled to
some basic needs: physical security, subsistence, and health care. These three basic needs together
constitute what Oruka dubs the right to a human minimum. He subsequently claims that global
society, insofar as it is as reasonable as it ought to be, has the ethical duty to ensure or facilitate
the enjoyment of that right (the three basic needs) to every member of the human species their
geographical, racial, gender, or any other sectarian affiliation notwithstanding. In fact, Oruka
would further vest that ethical duty to every capable individual person within the global society.
To get Oruka’s argument, it is perhaps important to briefly talk about ‘right’: what it is or
ought to be. Now right can be defined as that which one is justifiably entitled to insofar as one is
human. It is therefore “the rational basis for a justified demand” of something that is fairly due
(Oruka 1997, 85). And the enjoyment of that something - i.e., the substance of a right in question
- is what matters most. It is what confers the “moral worth” to a right in question. But rights are
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not of the same status. There are those considered inherent to human existence (such as the ‘right
to life’), and those considered rights prima facie, for instance the ‘right to freedom of speech’.
Now with that distinction in mind, we can posit that the most basic “thing” a human being
can justifiably demand and is entitled to enjoy insofar as one is human includes: (i) physical
security, (ii) subsistence and (iii) health care. These three “things” are fairly necessary (though not
sufficient) to sustain human life. Without one of them or all of them, human life becomes
fundamentally untenable. That is why Oruka refers to the three basic necessities together as the
right to a human minimum. It is a right that is so basic and “primitive” to sustaining human life at
the minimum level. That means the enjoyment of its substantive elements (the three basic needs)
every human is necessarily entitled to by virtue of them being members of the human species.
It follows, therefore, that the right to a human minimum is the basis of all other human
entitlements in principle empowers every human being, insofar as one is human, to make a justified
demand for the three basic necessities so as to lead a fairly decent life worthy of a human person.
And as an ethical principle, the human minimum is also the basis for establishing a necessary global
duty that ought to make every human person, every capable moral agent feels ethically inspired to
fulfil or enable others to enjoy the basic needs. Thus, as we shall see later, adhering to the demands
of the right to a human minimum is the first most basic prerequisite for establishing global justice
- understood not only in terms of ensuring ‘egalitarian fairness’ but also ‘ecological fairness’.
Put differently, the right to a human minimum, as an ethical principle, can be said to confer
a necessary global ethical duty to us humans (who presumably are the only rational beings on
earth) to take care of each other without overexploiting the environment. That would, however,
imply two things: (i) that we all strive to use world resources in a more responsible manner; and
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(ii) that we all strive to share or distribute world resources more equitably for the common good.
These two ethical values, I think, would lead us to a genuine practice of justice at the global level.
They would, in other words, lead us toward an egalitarian global society.
This is another crucial point that this project wishes to underscore. An egalitarian society,
we can say, is that society governed by some objectively chosen ethical principles that treat every
member as equal, with dignity and respect of a human person. Such principles take humankind as
an end in itself. In other words, they dignify life in every human being by ensuring a decent
livelihood for all. Thus, an egalitarian society always strives to improve the living conditions of
its members regardless of their sectorial differences. To put it differently, in an egalitarian society,
there is no room for exploitation; there is, instead, equitable opportunities for all members to work
together to improve their socio-economic wellbeing.
Nonetheless, that does not mean every member within an egalitarian society would have,
say, exactly the same amount of wealth, success or prosperity. Instead, it means every member is
equitably given the viable opportunity to realize their potentialities without some individuals or
group having what we might call “systemic privileges” over others. It also means that those who,
for some reasons, fail to meet their basic minimum requirements to live a decent life worth of a
human person are given the necessary assistance to do so. That means no one would be left behind
languishing in abject poverty, for instance, while some others “swim” in luxurious affluence.
It is on this ground that we, following Odera Oruka’s insight, wish to propose the right to
the human minimum as a surest means of establishing an egalitarian global society, a society that
will ensure a genuine practice of justice (i.e., egalitarian and ecological fairness) at global level.
Such an egalitarian global society, in my view, will also necessarily be communitarian oriented;
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meaning, members therein would feel closely connected to and interdependent with each other,
sharing both their anguish and prosperity as equal members of one human family, their apparent
differences and sectorial affiliations notwithstanding.
1.6. Justification of the Project
I have chosen to specialize in Oruka’s ethical thought for two main reasons. First, as hinted
above, Oruka’s Practical philosophy has not received as much scholarly coverage and recognition
as it deserves; yet, in my own assessment, I strongly think it is perhaps the most important part of
his philosophy in our contemporary world. Practical philosophy (as opposed to theoretical/
speculative philosophy), he says, “... addresses principles of ethics and the rules of their application
in the social, political, religious and legal life of humankind” (Oruka 1997, xi). Our contemporary
world, no doubt, requires such address. The second reason is based on the fact that Oruka’s
Practical Philosophy seems to reflect his mature thoughts. It captures such important practical
themes as humanism, global justice, ecology, consumerism, etc., which themes, I think, Oruka
would have wished his philosophy to further undertake had he lived longer.
Indeed, Oruka was convinced that philosophy has a special mission of enhancing the socioeconomic wellbeing of people without causing havoc to the environment. Philosophers, he would
say, have a noble task of not only critically reflecting on the issues facing humanity but also most
importantly coming up with solutions that would make life in society better in the future. Any
philosophy worth its salt, he urges, ought to be committed into creating a humane society. Oruka’s
famous maxim was that “philosophy must be made sagacious” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 253254); meaning, philosophy ought to be relevant in creating a society where everyone feels ethically
responsible toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’, a society that privileges no one and excludes no
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one. That would translate into a global society that is both egalitarian and communitarian oriented.
And that, to me, is what Oruka envisioned the right to a human minimum would help us achieve.
1.7. Methodology and the Scope
To achieve the aforementioned objectives, this study undertakes a critical analysis of some
crucial works of Odera Oruka. It also considers extensively other philosophical works that have a
bearing on issues of poverty, human rights, global justice, global responsibility, ecology, among
others. Thus, in its critical consideration of the relevant literature, the study employs the method
of “philosophical analysis”, confining itself to both conceptual and logical analyses (Gorovitz and
Williams, 1965, 79-81). While the former helps in the clarification of meaning of concepts as
situations may demand, the latter involves examination of presuppositions in arguments, and how
such presuppositions are used to justify certain positions and historical facts.3
1.8. Précis of the Chapters
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters. Chapter one, the current chapter, serves the
purpose of general introduction. In chapter two, we discuss Odera Oruka’s legacy in depth, thereby
exposing his commitment to philosophy from a practical point of view. The chapter is divided into
three related sections. The first section explores Oruka’s biographical information, traces his
academic achievements, and critically evaluates his life-style as a sage-philosopher.

As a cautionary remark, I wish to clarify that I do not intend to analyze Oruka’s Sage Philosophy
project, though I may occasionally refer to it; I do not plan to conduct interviews of my own either. But
that does not mean that I disregard or disapprove Oruka’s methodology of interviewing sages; rather, I
only feel that that technique may not work for the topics I am dealing with. Furthermore, there are already
dissertations and papers written and published on Sage Philosophy. In this project, therefore, I want to do
something different: promote and publicise Odera Oruka’s ethical thought in his Practical Philosophy, the
other side of his scholarly work that, in my view, has not been as sufficiently explored as it deserves.
3
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The second section addresses the issue of what philosophy essentially is, or ought to be. Here,
we shall ascertain why Oruka, who identifies himself within the Socratic tradition, envisioned a
kind of philosophy that is more practical than theoretical; a philosophy that is relevantly committed
to improvement of the welfare of humanity without jeopardising the environment. We will further
try to explain why Oruka strongly believed that other than being committed to the issue of truth,
genuine philosophers (and indeed every rational being) ought to be committed to and guided by
some ethical principles that bring about global ethical duty. Oruka took that as perhaps the most
basic and ultimate goal of philosophizing if philosophy was ever to be made “sagacious”, that is,
if philosophy was ever to become what it etymologically is: “love of wisdom”. And in the same
vein, the third section will attempt to show: how philosophy can be made sagacious, i.e., practically
relevant to solve people’s problems, thereby moving from theory to praxis.
Chapter three in turn focuses on Oruka’s incontestable commitment to defending, shaping
and developing philosophy in Africa. As part of seeking justice for the Africans, this chapter seeks
to publicize one of Oruka’s most distinguishable trademarks: philosophic sagacity; a trend he uses
to help liberate philosophy in Africa from ethnological (read mythological) and racist prejudices
from other parts of the world. In the context of his Sage philosophy project, and in response to a
distressing question on the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa, the chapter will try to
argue that philosophic sagacity is no doubt one of the most outstanding philosophical trends or
school of thoughts in Africa, just as it is also applicable elsewhere in the world.
The chapter, therefore, calls for a genuine retrieval as well as critical reconsideration of
traditional sagacity that would be instrumental in solving such contemporaneous issues as pride,
greed or possessive individualism, racism, and ecological degradation, thereby helping alleviate
socio-economic inequality and poverty in the world. Put differently, chapter three presents Oruka’s
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approach to philosophy essentially as a practical response to one of the most intriguing issues in
contemporary Africa: biased socio-politico-economic and intellectual deprivation/ suppression.
And hopefully, this will in turn portray Oruka as a diligent sagacious philosopher committed to
seeking justice not only for his people but also for humankind as such.
In chapter four, I shift gears to discuss Oruka’s “need-based” concept of human right, thereby
advancing a critique to the current human rights talk that appears predominantly influenced by
modern liberal philosophy from the West.4 This is a philosophy (by such modern thinkers as John
Locke) whose “liberty-based” idea of right tends to exhort unlimited pursuance of individual
entitlements but at the expense of ethical duty (or responsibility) that we humans ought to have
towards each other. It also tends to promote possessive individualism, pride and hence unnecessary
prejudice. We shall contrast that view with Oruka’s need-based account that seems to derive from,
or at least influenced by, philosophies in most pre-colonial Africa.
In the same vein, chapter four seeks to debunk a commonly held fallacy that the concept of
human right is a product of enlightenment and modern Western liberalism. Thus, apart from trying
to derive a possible definition of human right, the chapter also seeks a possible philosophical
justification of our thinking about rights. It also talks about the concept of human right from the
pre-colonial African perspective that mostly tends to emphasize the actual enjoyment of human
entitlement in relation to our (human) natural quest for justice and the common good. That means
the idea of right is also tied to such communitarian values as solidarity, generosity, care, tolerance,
responsibility, etc., which all help in setting “priority order” insofar as the actual enjoyment of

By the “West” here and throughout this project I mean European countries like Britain, France, Italy,
Germany, Greece, Portugal, etc., as well as their allies in North America.
4
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rights is concerned. The chapter concludes by submitting that Oruka’s “philosophy of right” ought
to be seen as trying to inject that sagacity into the current human rights talk.
This will usher in chapter five, whose focus is on critical analysis of Oruka’s argument for
the right to a human minimum. Here, we shall see how Oruka develops that ethical principle, which
he says is the most basic human right, arguing that it is not only the prerequisite for one to
justifiably act as a moral agent but also the basis without which there cannot be actual enjoyment
of other rights. We shall then see why, as an ethical principle, the right to a human minimum also
elicits a correlative global duty insofar as the enjoyment of some basic human needs is concerned.
And that duty, the chapter argues, is the rational justification for us humans having any other
ethical duty toward each other and our environment.
Oruka’s philosophy of the human minimum, therefore, is closely tied to issues of global justice
(as opposed to international justice); it strives to achieve for every human being what in principle
each one is justifiably entitled to insofar as one is a member of the human species. It helps us
realize that as humans (i.e., as rational-socio-ethical beings), we have some basic needs that we
are always necessarily justified to demand from each other: physical security, subsistence and
health care. But the question is: what is the rational basis of that justified demand? Similarly, it
would appear we have some necessary duty to fulfil or at least facilitate realization of what in
principle everyone is entitled to – at least the basic human needs. But again, the question is: what
is the rational basis of that necessary duty? The answer to these questions, the chapter argues, lies
in the idea of human minimum. It is the rational basis of our justified demand of our rights. It is
also the rational basis of our ethical duty toward the wellbeing of each other as equal members of
the global society. It is, therefore, the basic prerequisite ethical principle of ensuring the possibility
of practicing justice at the global level.
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In chapter six, we seek to apply Oruka’s ethical thought to advance a discourse that would
help ensure a genuine practice of justice at the global level. The chapter is divided into two related
sections. The first section critically analyses the idea of justice conventionally understood in terms
of ensuring ‘egalitarian fairness’, thereby emphasizing the need to practically de-territorialized
justice to a global level. Here, we maintain Oruka’s position that ensuring the enjoyment of the
right to a human minimum to the majority (if not all) in the world is the basic prerequisite for
establishing anything akin to global justice. Thus, we’ll define global justice tentatively as ‘the
totality of demands of justice that can reasonably be applied to both local and international human
relations so as to establish a global society that is both egalitarian and communitarian oriented’.
The second section focuses on Oruka’s “eco-philosophy”, a term he coined to emphasize
on the need to further de-territorialize the concept of justice, that is, make the idea of justice as
“global” in practice as it should be. But that would imperatively require having a different world
view, a new ethics that would not only motivate a spirit of equitable distribution or sharing of
world resources, but also consider the natural world (the environment) as invaluable constituent of
the global society. Thus, in contrast to Hardin’s lifeboat ethics (1980) mentality that tends to limit
the enjoyment of justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’, we propose Odera Oruka’s parental earth ethics,
the heartbeat of his eco-philosophy. Oruka’s ethics, we shall see, takes an eco-centric rather than
anthropo-centric approach to issues of global justice, thereby ensuring “ecological fairness”, which
is a necessary prerequisite of establishing egalitarian fairness. Oruka’s parental earth ethics also
emphasizes the “stewardship model” as opposed to “possessive-exploitative model” insofar as the
use of world resources is concerned. Thus, it challenges us humans to be more ethically responsible
when we use and distribute wealth and world resources. That ethics seems firmly grounded on
Oruka’s conviction that the earth is a “commonwealth” and a common heritage for all.
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Finally, in chapter seven (the general conclusion), we will try to critically consider Oruka’s
commitment to practical philosophy in terms of humanism that properly defines his ethical thought
and hence his unrelenting quest for global justice. Oruka understood humanism (or humanness as
he would sometimes call it) as an endeavour to uphold the quality and security of human life. It
seems to borrow much from the pre-colonial way of life in Africa where such important human
values as solidarity, generosity, care, etc. were emphasized. It is well captured in “parental earth
ethics” and other essays that talk about justice, human rights, politics, ecology, consumerism, etc.
Oruka’s humanism, however, is quite unusual. It emphasizes the “intrinsic good” of every
creature on earth. It recognizes human beings as rational cum moral agents without devaluing the
rest of natural world. It helps us understand what it really means to be human in relation to our
environment. It calls for an integral approach to the ecosystem, even as we humans strive to meet
our needs, thereby seeing the entire world as a global society, a sort of “organic unit” or a “family”
governed by principles of interdependence and ethical responsibility. It helps us realize that we
humans are not really the masters but merely privileged members of an ecological system.
In sum, Oruka’s humanism underscores the ethical duty that we humans have or ought to
have towards the wellbeing of other fellow human beings as well as other creatures on earth.
Hence, it can establish a more viable concept of justice at the global level. Cognizant of the fact
that every being on earth is interrelated and interconnected for the common good, it enables us to
define global justice not simply in terms of ensuring egalitarian fairness (which properly applies
to human relations), but also “ecological fairness” that includes every creature on earth.
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CHAPTER 2
ORUKA’S LEGACY IN PHILOSOPHY
One can be an expert in logical and cogent reasoning and still be an idiot on matters of life and
human relations. Wisdom, therefore, is not philosophy and vice versa (Oruka 1991a, 40).
2.1. Introduction
This chapter aims at discussing the legacy of the late Professor H. Odera Oruka, arguably one
of the finest philosophers in Africa. It is also meant to expose, espouse, and critically evaluate his
commitment to philosophy, particularly from a practical point of view. It is divided into three
major sections. In the first section we explore Oruka’s biographical information, trace his academic
achievements, and critically evaluate his life-style as a philosopher.
The second section will investigate Oruka’s understanding of what philosophy is, or ought to
be. Here, we shall see why, for instance, Oruka envisioned a philosophy that is more practical than
theoretical, a philosophy that is relevantly committed to improvement of the welfare of people
without compromising their environment. Furthermore, we will try to show why Oruka strongly
believed that other than being committed to the issue of truth, genuine philosophers (or philosophic
sages as he would call them) ought to have ethical duty as perhaps the most basic and ultimate
goal of philosophising if their philosophy is ever to become sagacious, that is, if their philosophy
is ever to become what philosophy etymologically is – “love of wisdom”.
Indeed, as we shall see, Odera Oruka was committed to, say, fighting against global injustice.
His practical philosophy attests to his task of philosophizing against social, political, structural,
economic, and theoretical deprivation and suppression of the minority. It also emphasizes his point
that philosophy is (or ought to be) tied to critical individual thinkers who in most cases ought to
challenge the status quo in order to seek practical solutions to human and ecological problems.
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This is what the third section will attempt to show: how philosophy can be made sagacious or
practically relevant to solve people’s problems. Here, we aim at moving from theory to praxis.
Thus, the chapter concludes by justifying Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy,
particularly his ethical thought and his unrelenting quest for justice at the global level.
2.2. Oruka’s Historical Background
2.2.1.

Biographical Sketch

Henry Odera Oruka was born on June 1st. 1944 in Ugenya, Siaya County, Western part of
Kenya. As he grew up in a large but humble family,5 Oruka showed exceptional interest in
education. He attended Jera and Sega Boys Schools for his primary education, before proceeding
to St. Mary’s High School Yala for his secondary and advanced level studies. Having excelled in
high school studies, Oruka won a prestigious scholarship from Uppsala University in Sweden for
a Bachelor of Science programme in the Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Science. He studied
Geography, Meteorology, and Geodesy, but on his own initiative and interest, he added Philosophy
as an optional course (Oruka 1997, 281). It was here also that Oruka met his mentor and a fatherfigure – Professor Ingemar Hedenius (a philosopher and prolific author well known all over
Scandinavia), who would become influential in shaping his philosophical trajectory.6

Odera Oruka’s father had ten wives, of whom his mother was second in rank, though Oruka was obliged
to call any of the other nine wives “mother” according to the Luo customs. Oruka’s childhood, however,
was not all that rosy. His biological mother died when he was barely eight, leaving behind three younger
siblings. This made Oruka drop out of school to take care of his siblings, especially the youngest (Okoth)
who was six months old, and whom Oruka says died almost on his lap one year later. This tragic event,
however, was a blessing in disguise, for Oruka was able to resume school, while he and his other siblings
survived as what he calls “multi-mothered mother-less children” of all the nine wives of his father (Oruka
1997, 282 and Odhiambo 1996, 13).
6
Philosophy studies at Uppsala, according to Oruka, were divided into two tracks: practical and
theoretical. He chose to specialize in practical philosophy (i.e., ethics, socio-political philosophy, and
legal philosophy), which he thought would be more useful for understanding the problems of Africa,
particularly for helping to liberate it and also sustain its independence (Graness and Kresse 1997, 212) .
5
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Upon graduation with a Bachelor of Science degree (a year ahead of his class), Oruka
surprised his sponsors when he opted to drop science for philosophy, a choice that inevitably cost
him his scholarship (Oruka 1997, 281). Nonetheless, he found his way to Wayne State University
in Detroit, MI., accompanying Professor Hedenius for a Masters degree in philosophy, which
degree he completed within a year. Under the supervision of Hedenius, Oruka wrote a thesis on
the concept of punishment in 1969, which he later refined and published under the title Punishment
and Terrorism in Africa in 1976 (Odhiambo 1996, 13).
After completing his Masters degree, Oruka once again accompanied Professor Hedenius
back to Uppsala University where, owing to his excellent academic record, he easily regained
admission for the doctoral programme in philosophy. He wrote a dissertation on the concept of
freedom, obtaining a Ph.D. in 1970. He would later develop and have this work published into a
book entitled Philosophy of Liberty: An Essay on Political Philosophy in 1991.7
Upon his graduation in 1970, the twenty-seven-years-old Doctor of Philosophy returned to
Kenya, where he was hired by the University of Nairobi as “special lecturer” of philosophy. That
title, as Masolo observes, really meant that he had no regular appointment, may be due to his young
age but mostly due to scepticism and bias of those who led the department (Graness and Kresse
1997, 233). Oruka himself sadly laments that when he was hired to teach at the University of
Nairobi, the department of philosophy was “suffocated” with religious studies. Majority of the
staff, moreover, were clergy and lay theologians who had little time for philosophy. In fact, most
of them did not believe that Africans have the ability to think logically, let alone do philosophy at

Life abroad was not easy for Oruka. He had to survive by doing such odd jobs as pushing trolleys in
paper factories. Meanwhile, his residence, as he lightly puts it, “was in a wrecked boat resting like a lame
duck in one of the gulfs of the Baltic Sea” (Oruka 1997, 283). Despite all these challenges, however,
Odera Oruka found solace in reading whatever philosophical material he could lay his hands on.
7
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the University level. To back up his point, Oruka cites one Rev. Bishop Stephen Neil (Oruka 1991,
16), whose bias against Africans was tremendously “revered”.
Surprisingly though, Odera Oruka rose in academic rank so quickly owing to his prolific
publication. By 1986, he had assumed full Professorship, thereby becoming one of the first two
African full faculty members of philosophy at the University of Nairobi (Nyarwath 2009, 2). It
was here also, and owing to his passion for philosophy, that Oruka initiated and spearheaded the
separation of philosophy from religious studies, a fierce administrative battle that was eventually
won and approved nine years later - July 1980.8 Consequently, he became the founder-chairman
of the new department of philosophy, a position he held for about six years. And with this new
arrangement in place, Oruka, together with other upcoming scholars like Masolo, was able to lay
a lasting foundation that would see the University of Nairobi transform into a hub of African
philosophy (Oruka 1997, 233). But unfortunately, he never lived long enough to see the full
fruition of this dream. On December 9th. 1995, at around midday, Odera Oruka was tragically
overrun by a lorry along Mbagathi road in Nairobi. He died shortly after aged 51 years old. 9
2.2.2. Academic Achievements and Awards
A quick survey at Oruka’s short life vis-à-vis his achievements and awards reveals a man
whose legacy will last long. At the time of his untimely death, Oruka had published at least six

Needless to say, considering the biased situation at the University of Nairobi then, Oruka also had to
“naturally” join such African scholars, as Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Micere Mugo and Okot p’Bitek from the
department of literature and history, who were already questioning the Eurocentric curriculum that was
just but a colonial heritage. While the former three championed Oral Literature from Africa, Oruka was
committed to his Sage philosophy project (Presbey 2016).
9
There is controversy surrounding Oruka’s death. While some say it was politically organized (for Oruka
was a fierce critic of the then Kenyan government led by president Moi), others claim Oruka was by then
at the verge of mental breakdown and was just roaming along the streets. But whichever the case, one
thing is certain: Oruka’s death was a huge irreplaceable loss to academia, though his legacy lives on.
8

20

books and co-authored three. In addition, he had over fifty essays and academic papers published
in local and international newspapers, journals, and texts. His writings were mainly on philosophy,
ethics, politics, economics, science, and environment.
Apart from his busy schedule at the University of Nairobi, Odera Oruka never tired of
giving lectures and talks outside Nairobi, especially in Africa, as a visiting Professor. He was ever
committed to teaching and promoting philosophy in Africa. And for that reason, Oruka has been
described properly as “a true son and a savant of Africa” (Odhiambo 1996, 12). But he also got
numerous invitations to attend international philosophical conferences in Europe, America, and
Asia, where he always emerged among the most impressive guest speakers (Ogutu 1995, 6). In
fact, just before his tragic death, Oruka was scheduled to go to Marist College in New York as a
visiting Professor for about a year (Odhiambo 1996, 19). And most notably, Odera Oruka held
prestigious positions, either as a member or a leader, in various local and international societies
and organizations. He also received numerous awards both locally and internationally.10
Now all these achievements and awards reveal Odera Oruka as a world-class philosopher,
an intellectual whose work cannot be ignored. As Barasa rightly describes him, Professor Odera
Oruka was known by his peers and junior scholars as an incisive yet disarming intellectual, a don
who could not suffer mediocrity, revisionism, or foolishness. As a philosopher, and more so a
refined logician, Oruka proved himself decent, wise, witty, objective, lucid, and accommodating
in his arguments (Graness and Kresse 1997, 21). He also always preferred the use of clear
communication, with avoidance of jargon to decipher truth. “I have always written simply.” Oruka
says, adding “I do not know how to use verbosity, and I hate philosophers who rain circumlocution

10

For a list of his awards, see Nyarwath 2012, iv; Ogutu 1995, 6; Graness and Kresse 1997, 21-22.
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on me” (Oruka 1997, 286). Finally, as a creative and artistic author, Odera Oruka often employed
irony, sarcasm, as well as “wiry chuckles” - perhaps to pour scorn on fools and awaken those in
slumber (Graness and Kresse 1997, 22). No wonder, then, his writings are very attractive to read.
2.2.3. Oruka’s Lifestyle
Despite his steady academic achievement, Odera Oruka was a modest person who always
preferred substance to style. He has been described as a person who “nursed a humble but often
thoughtful provoking concern about the enigma surrounding the destiny of humankind,
particularly among the poverty-stricken peoples worldwide” (Ogutu 1995, 10). Commenting about
his achievements and his vision for philosophy in Africa, Oruka honestly says that he has hitherto
been clearing obstacles on the way to philosophy, and that he does not consider himself having
reached the core of what he envisioned should be done. He writes,
If all were more or less well with the world, I would have spent the time and energy I have
employed in publishing in social-legal-political philosophy reading and writing in the area
of philosophy of science and theory of knowledge. I do not, however, believe that I have
reached the core of what I should do in philosophy. It has all still been an attempt to help
clear obstacles on the way to philosophy (Oruka 1997, 286).

Indeed, Odera Oruka was much concerned about three obstacles to philosophy; and by
extension to truth, wisdom, and justice. These obstacles are: (i) social-economic deprivation of the
disadvantaged, (ii) cultural-racial mythology and prejudice among the global society, and (iii) the
illusion of appearance in the human mind (Oruka 1997, 283). And of these three obstacles, quite
often Oruka vehemently argues that the socio-economic deprivation with its accompaniments –
hunger, oppression, etc. - is the greatest constraints to both mental development and creativity. For
him, “socio-economic deprivation is the fastest way to historical and scholastic nonentity” as it
has been evident in the African case and in other so-called “third world” areas (Oruka 1997, 283).
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His numerous essays and texts, then, can primarily be seen as attempt to give a philosophical and
practical response to that single most challenging obstacle.
Odera Oruka lived humbly. He has been described as a sober modern man who lived a
simple but quality life, despite his status and tremendous achievements (Graness and Kresse 1997,
21). The biggest car that Oruka owned, for instance, was a Peugeot 504. His office at the University
of Nairobi, we are told, was merely twelve meters square, with no personal computer, for he
preferred sharing the department’s computer lab for his prolific production. According to Barasa,
who was one of his closest research assistants, unlike the majority of African academics and elites
of his time whose primary pursuit and loyalty was easy material gains and power, Oruka’s public
life revolved around four major activities: learning, teaching, researching, and humbly providing
for his family (Graness and Kresse 1997, 20).
And Odera Oruka never forgot his modest background, though he fought strenuously to
emancipate his people from poverty and other social, political, and economic injustices. His
residence by the time of his death was in a humble Nairobi middle-class suburb, South C; yet, as
Barasa further tells us, Oruka always looked forward to visiting his rural home in Nyang’ungu
when his busy schedule allowed (Graness and Kresse 1997, 20). More so, Oruka was always ready
to share his fortunes with the less fortunate in society, especially the needy but bright children, for
many of whom he paid their school fees.
I wish to conclude this section by saying that Odera Oruka was clearly a noble person, a serious
thinker, a sagacious mentor, a path finder, and a committed philosopher; a man who practically
lived what he philosophized. Following the Socratic tradition, which he closely associated himself
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with, Oruka understood philosophy primarily as love of wisdom,11 which would inevitably lead to
pursuit of truth, justice, and hence strive for betterment of the wellbeing of humanity and their
environment. No wonder, then, Oruka’s philosophy seems to revolve around two major themes:
(i) practical philosophy, and (ii) philosophic sagacity (or sage philosophy).
In what follows now, I attempt to discuss and analyse the first of these two rather related themes
that properly define Oruka’s legacy as a philosopher. We shall start by looking at Oruka’s
understanding of what philosophy is or ought to be, before narrowing down to his special focus on
practical philosophy, and especially ethics. In the next chapter, we shall see how Oruka practically
responds to the daunting question about the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa, with
much emphasis on his philosophic sagacity as the new trend. And in so doing, we hope to expose
a real philosopher committed to wisdom, truth, and justice.

2.3. Oruka’s Commitment to Practical Philosophy
Oruka’s entire philosophy can be seen as having two overarching objectives: (i) to reconstruct
the sagacious practical dimension in philosophy, and (ii) to liberate philosophy in Africa from
ethnological and racist prejudices (Graness 2012, 13). The first objective, which will be discussed
in this section, involves Oruka’s emphasis on practical commitment as he exhorts philosophers to
try to come up with thought processes that could be applicable to contemporaneous challenges
facing humanity, thereby improving their welfare and that of the environment. And key among

Oruka often quoted the rhyme of one sage Stephen Kithanje of Meru, Kenya, who defines wisdom as
the ability to be conscious of where one is coming from (the past), where one is now (the present), and
where one is going in life (the future). But he also understood wisdom as the ability to think, reason,
respond to and act according either to one’s inborn insights or acquired knowledge and experience in
order to critically challenge a situation or manner of doing certain things, as well as strive to offer a viable
alternative solution to a contemporary problem. We shall further interrogate that view shortly.
11
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these challenges is socio-economic inequality and poverty. The second objective, which will be
treated in the next chapter, is well covered in Oruka’s book Sage philosophy; a project he initiated
to prove the existence and practice of a genuine philosophy in Africa.
The two objectives, however, are very much related and complementary. In fact, it has been
argued that Oruka’s entire work can be understood as basically “philosophizing against social and
theoretical deprivation and suppression of the African” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 241). To me,
that sounds like an excellent view that captures Oruka’s legacy in philosophy; a legacy that lies
especially in his commitment to the practical dimension of philosophy and his insistence that
philosophers, just like any other scholar, have an essential duty of social and practical commitment
that involves ethical duty. This section, and indeed the entire project, is precisely dedicated to
defending that position as it also tries to expose Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy, with
special focus on his ethical thought.
Now one pressing issue that preoccupied Oruka was trying to establish how philosophy does
or could contribute to the enhancement of the value, security, and dignity of human life (Oruka
1997, 143). And as we shall see shortly, Oruka challenges contemporary philosophers to take the
etymological definition of philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’ seriously, thereby to try and make
philosophy more sagacious by coming up with theoretical insights and ideas that can be put into
practice for the betterment of the wellbeing of people and the environment. It is regrettable, though,
that Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy is less known than, say, his sage philosophy; yet,
the former seems to be the direction that Oruka desired and envisioned his philosophy should take.
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The title of his posthumously published book - Practical Philosophy: In Search of an Ethical
Minimum (1997) - evidently attests to this.12
2.3.1. Philosophy Must be Made Sagacious
Reading a number of Oruka’s works reveals a philosopher who was convinced that philosophy
must be made sagacious. But that would happen if philosophers were to first of all try to combine
their speculative, critical, and analytical technique, skills, and methodologies with a sagacity (or
wisdom) that is practically oriented to the betterment of people’s wellbeing without neglecting the
environment.13 This is well established in his 1970 Ph.D. dissertation, Philosophy of Liberty
(published as a book in 1990), which is arguably the foundation of his socio-political philosophy.
His Sage Philosophy is yet another testimony to this fact. Indeed, as Kresse rightly observes,
Oruka’s various philosophical works can and should be seen as manifestation of his commitment
to the practical relevance and social significance of knowledge and wisdom (Kresse 2013, 26).
That means Oruka was strongly opposed to purely abstract speculative discourses (e.g., mere
rhetoric), even though he was not opposed to “theoretical” discourses that were applicable in real
life situations.14 In fact, Oruka did so well in trying to apply his theoretic/ philosophic knowledge,
skills, and techniques into praxis by critically questioning some common assumptions, thoroughly
clarifying concepts, and ardently using his insights to reconsider such human fundamental issues
as social, political, and economic predicaments. He tried to find solutions to some of these

This book is a collection of Oruka’s “practical” essays, which had been published elsewhere, and that
Oruka himself was revising in view of republication before his tragic death in December 1995. It is
dedicated to such practical issues as liberty, social justice, humanism, eco-philosophy, consumerism, etc.
13
Oruka attests to this fact in an interview he gave in 1995, barely three months before he died, where he
seems to espouse on the aphorism: “wisdom surmounts might” (cf. Graness and Kresse 1997, 253 ff.).
14
I use the term “theoretical” here loosely in reference to discourse written or otherwise proposed as
viable solution to some human predicaments. This is to contrast merely abstract speculative discourse.
12
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problems, as he also challenged other philosophers to do the same. He was convinced that
philosophers ought to employ sagacity or wisdom in their endeavours lest their philosophies
become irrelevant to others and the society. He says,
Great philosopher are path-finders, and path-finders disobey the routines of pedestrians when
they emerge to command the war of the search for knowledge unless they are tempered by the
rare quality of wisdom and sagacity (Oruka 1997, 203).

What Oruka appears to be doing here is to challenge philosophers (plus other scholars) to be
sagacious - that is, to be in touch with “reality”, to be practically relevant in trying to solve human
predicaments, and to acknowledge their limitations as well. He cites Hegel who, despite being
arguably one of the greatest thinkers in the West allegedly boasted to being the last philosopher,
and that his standpoint was the culmination of philosophy’s historical development,15 thereby
proving his deficiency in matters of sagacity.
Oruka’s own life-style, as we saw earlier, is a clear testimony of how a philosopher ought to
make philosophy sagacious, that is, make philosophy “an art of living” and “a way of life” (Hadot
1995, 28). He tried to live in accordance with the philosophy he propagated. But this required total
commitment to practical issues without, of course, neglecting theoretical perview. Thus, as Wiredu
rightly observes, Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy does not imply any form of shying
away from theoretical issues; it rather means that practical commitment, especially with regard to
his quest for socio-politico-economic justice, was the most crucially motivating factor in his entire
philosophy (Graness and Kresse 1997, 142). And to underscore this point, it will be helpful to first
consider Oruka’s understanding of what philosophy is or ought to be.

15

cf. Hegel (1975) Lectures vol. 1.46.
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2.3.2. What is Philosophy?
The question of what philosophy is or ought to be is no doubt central for Oruka, just as it is
with many other philosophers. There have been numerous theories and definitions of philosophy
throughout human history, with many of these philosophers hardly coming to a general consensus.
To some, for example, philosophy can be described as a rigorous systematic inquiry and writing
about any topic; that is, an extension of intellectual search for answers to such questions as: ‘what
is x?’, ‘why x?’, ‘how is x?’, etc.; where “x” could be a substitute of anything. To others, however,
philosophy is found within the realm of predicaments (or chaos) and in trying to find possibilities
or viable solutions to those predicaments. Deleuze and Guattari in What is Philosophy? adopt this
description, insisting that philosophy ought not to be mere speculation, reflection, or simply
communication of what is given “ready-at-hand” for the sake of it; instead, philosophy is supposed
to create “concepts” that are always new (Deleuze and Guattari 1994, 5), thereby bringing about
new possibilities, and hence, its relation to social, political, and economic development.
Now as we shall see shortly, Odera Oruka would have most likely agreed with the latter
description rather than the former. Commenting on the indisputable relevance of philosophy in
every society, Oruka observes that philosophy is “the basic framework behind all our [human]
practices” without which there would be chaos in society (Oruka 1997, 185).
2.3.3. Speculative and Practical Philosophy
Philosophy can be further considered as a discipline; in which case it is defined as a study, an
inquiry, or just a wonder that involves arguably the most deep-seated issues about life and reality
as such (that which is). Put differently, it is a study of such issues as natural phenomena, human
person, human knowledge, God, logic, morality, language, politics, etc. But that definition is too
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general; thus, as Oruka says, philosophy ought to be further divided into two branches, namely, (i)
speculative or theoretical philosophy, and (ii) practical philosophy. While speculative/ theoretical
philosophy “treats issues about the fundamental principles of knowledge and the metaphysics of
reality”, practical philosophy “addresses principles of ethics and the rules of their application in
the social, political, religious, and legal life of human kind” (Oruka 1997, xi).16 The former
involves such studies as logic, physics, metaphysics, epistemology, cosmology, theodicy, etc.; the
latter involves philosophical ethics, legal and political philosophy, etc.
It is in this regard that we, in this section, intend to emphasize Oruka’s commitment to the
practical dimension of philosophy and especially his ethics, without, of course, undermining the
speculative dimension. Our position with Oruka is that whereas speculative dimension is helpful
in, say, sharpening people’s brain, increasing knowledge, improving insight and broadening ideas,
it should nonetheless not be seen merely as the end of philosophizing. Rather, insofar as there still
are predicaments affecting humanity and the environment, speculative philosophy ought to be seen
and used as means to create practical philosophies that would help improve the life and the
wellbeing of people and their environment. This is what Oruka believed would make philosophy
sagacious; it would make it be what it etymologically is - love of wisdom.
However, we need to point out that by giving priority to the practical dimension, and
particularly ethics, Oruka does not intend to be reducing philosophy to ethics. Rather, he only feels
that philosophy should first and foremost be used to settle such practical and urgent issues as
combating socio-economic and environmental injustices, before engaging in other “luxurious”

Oruka, however, points out further that historically, that distinction, common in Europe and especially
Scandinavian Universities, is in line with Kant’s distinction between theoretical reason and practical
reason (cf. Kant 4:387-392).
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speculative exercises. In other words, he felt that ethical issues ought to be part of the central kernel
of philosophy if philosophy is ever to become practically relevant.
To that effect, then, and as we mentioned earlier, even though Oruka was well known for his
sharp logic, just as he had great passion for philosophy of science and epistemology (which all fall
under the speculative domain), circumstances forced him to practically spend his time and energy
first clearing what he considered to be three current and future obstacles to philosophy, wisdom,
and justice in general, namely, (i) social economic deprivation, (ii) cultural-racial mythology, and
(iii) the illusion of appearance (Oruka 1997, 283-286). Thus, Oruka reflected, wrote and published
extensively in social, ethical, economic, political and environmental issues. But he also expresses
the view that if he ever lived to old age, and “if all were more or less well with the world”, then
philosophy of science and theory of knowledge (or epistemology) would have been his “resting
ground” (Oruka 1997, 284). This point will become clearer as we proceed.
2.3.4. Philosophy defined as “love of wisdom”
As we said above (2.3.3), Oruka is known to have treasured and pursued the etymological
definitions of philosophy as “love of wisdom”. This definition, Oruka says, is perhaps the most
compelling and proper, though it unfortunately seems to be taken for granted, especially today. It
not only makes philosophy be seen not merely as an endeavour to seek knowledge for the sake of
it, but also challenges philosophers to apply such knowledge in real life situations. In other words,
it makes philosophy become what Hadot calls “an art of living” and “a way of life” (Hadot 1995,
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28), thereby making philosophy a life-long endeavour to pursue wisdom that would enable one to
“know thyself”17 better, and hence relate well with the ‘other’.18
And in my view, it is this endeavour to love and pursue wisdom that ultimately makes one
sagacious; it makes one try to practically apply what has been discovered (knowledge, insight etc.)
in one’s own life and in that of other people. Understanding philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’, then,
comes closer to what practical philosophy seems to be all about: striving to be practically relevant
and ethically responsible to both oneself and the ‘other’. Now to elaborate this point, it is important
to consider what wisdom is, and why it is worth pursuing.
The term “wisdom” (in Greek sophia) can be understood in two senses. First, in its broader
sense, it refers to a quality or an attribute of some intellectual beings such as humans, angels, deity,
etc. Second, in its narrower sense, wisdom refers to a quality attributable to humans only. Thus,
we talk of a wise person or a sage as the one who is able to make proper judgments in life based
on his or her account of the past, analysis of the present and projective goals of the future.19 Indeed,
as Oruka rightly defines it, wisdom (or sagacity) is that “quality which enables a person to utilize
knowledge of his traditions and human nature in general for the purpose of making mature and
objective judgment about life and human relations” (Oruka 1991, 40). Viewed from this
perspective, then, wisdom or sagacity confers both insight and ethical inspiration to a person so
that one may relate healthily with other people, conscious and mindful of the environment also.

This ancient Greek aphorism is often attributed to the Delphic Oracle, though it has foundation in other
cultures, especially in ancient Egypt. Socrates is known to have adopted it as the most basic principle in
search of wisdom and ethical life. For details, see Plato’s dialogues: Philebus (48c); Charmides (164d);
Phaedrus (229e); Protagoras (343b); and Alcibiades I (124a, 129a, 132c).
18
The term ‘other’ here refers to a fellow human being and the environment as such.
19
I will use the term “wisdom” interchangeably with “sagacity” in reference to this latter sense.
17
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But in a little bit more complex way, we can define wisdom as the ability to think, reason,
and act according either to one’s inborn insight or acquired knowledge and experience in order to
critically challenge a situation, a lifestyle, or a manner of doing things, and strive to offer viable
alternative solutions to some contemporaneous challenges facing humanity and their environment.
This, according to Oruka, is what makes one a philosophic sage - a human person who can
competently combine both theoretical insight and practical aspects of life for the betterment of the
wellbeing of humanity as such without jeopardizing the environment. And as we shall see shortly,
such a philosophic sage is also necessarily an ethically responsible person.
Viewed from this perspective, then, wisdom or sagacity appear closely related to prudence
(in Greek phronesis), one of the “intellectual virtues” that disposes us to perform certain tasks,
fulfil duties, and be more responsible in the best way possible under a given circumstance.20 Hence,
quite often, especially in the wake of human peril and suffering, a wise person (a sage) is expected
to depict the highest degree of competency, urgency, and adequacy in order to not only promote
human life but also safeguard human dignity, thereby significantly reduce possibilities of misery
in the eyes of many by offering the best possible but viable solution to their problems.
Thus, it is on these grounds that we, following Oruka’s insight argue that practical
commitment, especially in matters ethics, is the single most crucially motivating factor in
philosophy. It is arguably the end of any genuine philosophy, for it first and foremost prompts one
to quest for social justice, which is part and parcel of being sagacious and hence more responsible
as a moral agent. This, however, does not in any way imply that speculative philosophy is
irrelevant or not necessary; rather, it means that good philosophers (philosophic sages) ought to
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cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, book VI.
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carry out their theoretical and analytical work in a manner that will be practically relevant and
helpful to them and to the ‘other’. Oruka captures this point beautifully when he says:
So, a sage is wise; he has insight, but he employs this for the ethical betterment of the
community. A philosopher may be a sage and vice versa. But many philosophers do lack
the ethical commitment and inspiration found in the sage. ... A sage proper is usually the
friend of truth and wisdom. A sage may suppress truth only because wisdom dictates, [but]
not because of some instrumental gain (Oruka 1991a, 9).

It is apparently clear, then, that for Oruka (who closely associates himself with Socratic
tradition), ethical commitment is one of the central aspects of a good philosopher (philosophic
sage) and hence genuine philosophy. And he never relents in emphasizing the centrality of ethics
in philosophy. In his essay “Achievements of Philosophy” (Oruka 1997, 95-105), Oruka identifies
four missions of philosophy: (i) Truth, (ii) Aesthetic, (iii) Communicative, and (iv), Moral/ Ethical.
He, however, points out further that moral/ ethical mission is the most important one, for it makes
philosophy be in touch with the urgent and dominant needs of the people.
To complete its proper function, then, Oruka suggests that “philosophy has to extend its
function to the ethics of human life and the conditions for the improvement of the world for human
existence” (Oruka 1997, 99). This concern, he says, is what would actually make philosophy
sagacious and relevant, given that it “calls for philosophers to help reorganize and rationalize the
available knowledge in order to improve human understanding and the welfare of mankind”
(Oruka 1997, 99). Nonetheless, despite this emphasis on ethical commitment, Oruka quickly points
out that the other three missions, particularly those concerned with pure search for knowledge,
cannot and should not be ignored.
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2.3.5. Philosophy Understood in Two Senses
According to Oruka, philosophy (as love of wisdom) may also generally be understood in two
senses. First, in its broader and “loose” sense, philosophy refers to “a person’s or a people’s general
unexamined outlook on life” and reality as such (Oruka 1991, 26). Hence, we talk of people’s
culture, traditions, beliefs, and their general way of life or world-view as philosophy. But in its
strict and “proper” sense, philosophy ought to be understood as a critical evaluation of people’s
outlook or world-view, “and a free reflection on ideas and concepts as a mirror of reality” (Oruka
1991, 26). Now understood in the latter sense, there is often a general consensus that philosophy
is or ought to be foundational, scientific, critical, analytic, and systematically reflective. Also,
while the former sense (the “first-order” culture philosophy) is often driven by what Oruka would
later dub popular or folk sagacity, the latter sense (the “second-order” philosophy) has its base on
philosophic sagacity.21
In both senses, however, Oruka generally takes philosophy as a universal human activity that
essentially involves the use of reason to solve human peril, satisfy curiosity and wonder, just as it
also aims at increasing knowledge, wisdom and truth. Oruka’s position here is evidently contrary
to some thinkers in the West, whose rather unfortunate thesis is that philosophy is an essential
characteristic of European civilization. For Oruka, reason, which is arguably the driving force in
philosophy, is a human endowment and not a monopoly of any one culture or race (Oruka 1997,
183). Nonetheless, he insists that in its strict sense, philosophy proper qualifies to be considered
“scientific”, given that it involves critical thinking, reflective analysis, and logical inquiry and
explanation about reality (nature, humans, deity, etc). And it is this strict or “proper” sense that
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I come back to this point later, but for details, see Oruka 1991a, 45-55.
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Oruka was much interested in. He was interested in seeing philosophy as a product of critical,
reflective, and free thought process; always characterized by logical consistency, and often tied to
independent thinker(s) who in most cases challenge the status quo rather than being merely
complacent (Kresse 1996, 23; Graness and Kresse 1997, 61-62).
2.3.6. Philosophy as Foundational Discipline
Apart from understanding philosophy as ‘love of wisdom’ Odera Oruka is also known to have
endorsed and somehow praised the often-called “classical” understanding of philosophy as a
foundational discipline, the base upon which other sciences and human knowledge is built.22
Although this view was highly challenged especially during the age of Enlightenment, perhaps it
would be unwise to declare philosophy irrelevant even in such fields as empirical sciences,
mathematics and engineering. To presuppose that philosophy is a foundational discipline, Oruka
says, is “to take the stand that there is somewhere a solid correspondence between the world and
human thought about the world” (Oruka 1997, 208).
It also means that philosophy (indeed every science) has as its primary business the task of
digging out and explaining such a correspondence. In other words, Oruka felt that philosophy was
and is still the most reliable base and route not only in search of wisdom and knowledge, but also
in establishing criteria for truth and falsehood, as well as right and wrong. He writes:
Thus, philosophy is the base on which all social practices are built. When we are forced to
justify our lives ... our political system, ... our legal system, ... our marriage system, in the end
the ultimate justification will have to be philosophy (Oruka 1997, 185).

The term “classical” here refers to the Ancient, Medieval, and Scholastic era, when philosophy was
taken as comprising nearly all forms of human search for knowledge and truth.
22
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And on that note, Oruka was scornfully opposed to the so-called “postmodernism” as a trend
in philosophy. Postmodernism may be described as a philosophical “movement” that developed in
the mid to late 20th century as a radical departure from the Ancient, Scholastic and Modern
philosophies. It is typically characterized by an attitude of scepticism or distrust toward reason.
Thus, it is opposed to classical topics of metaphysics, epistemology, enlightenment, idealism, etc.;
thereby rejecting any possibility of objective truth. Instead, postmodernism asserts that knowledge
and truth are the products of unique systems of social, historical, and political discourse and
interpretation, meaning they are contextual and relatively constructed (Bertens 1995).
Oruka also regularly attacked extreme “logical positivism”, another late twentieth century
trend that claims philosophy has no foundational knowledge or truth to proclaim, and that these
should be left to the domain of empirical sciences (Oruka 1997, xii). He, for instance, criticised
such logical positivists and linguistic analytic thinkers as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Richard Rorty,
who seem to discredit metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics – arguably the bulk of what had
traditionally been included in philosophy per se. Thus, Oruka, for instance, faults Wittgenstein’s
conclusion that philosophy “is merely an extra-intellectual activity showing what is impossible to
express or explain”, just as he also takes offense with Rorty, for whom “philosophy is not a mirror
of reality, but only one of the activities in the conversations of mankind” (Oruka 1997, 167).
2.3.7. Philosophy as Dialogical Exercise
Despite being critical of postmodernism and logical positivism, Oruka was also alive to the
fact that philosophy also ought to be dialogical. That means apart from generally being a universal,
critical, reflective and free or independent human activity, philosophy also ought to be a kind of
self-enriching exchange. And as a self-critical discourse, philosophy ought not to be rigid and
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closed, but rather dynamic, lucid and open to dialogue. Put differently, any genuine philosophy
ought to be open to engage not only with other philosophies but also other disciplines so as to
satisfy humans’ desire for knowledge, truth and wisdom.
It is on this account that Oruka challenges philosophers to put forward their ideas, insights and
thought processes “not as absolute truths or authoritatively injected dogmas, but as tentative
proposals whose truths are open to reasonable consideration and discussion” (Oruka 1997, 171).
But for that to happen, it would require philosophers to have some ethical responsibility, and hence
instil some discipline and respect for each other.
Being dialogical in nature, philosophy also is supposed to be “a perspective of the whole or
part of the whole of the human predicament and an insightful suggestion on how to get out or
conform” (Oruka 1997, 206-207). And this perspective, he says, may be expressed either orally or
literarily. Hence, philosophy, according to Oruka, is “a conceptual logical discourse, a discourse
that is self-critical. It is a discourse better enlivened and preserved by the tradition of writing,
though writing is not necessary condition for philosophy” (Oruka 1991, 26; 1997, 184). Here,
Oruka does not wish to underrate the importance of literacy and proficiency in philosophy; rather,
he wants to underscore the fact that writing is not thinking while philosophy is about thinking and
and trying to find new possibilities or viable solutions to human and ecological predicaments.
Putting that fact into consideration, in my view, is very helpful, for it will not only ensure
healthy dialogue among philosophers (orally or literary), but most importantly also, it will make
philosophy become what it etymologically really is – ‘love of wisdom’. It will also help emphasize
the fact that wisdom or sagacity, the key object in philosophy, is not gauged by how proficient one
is in writing or talking; it is rather gauged by the quality of what one says and/or writes, that is,
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whether it is practically relevant to people and the environment or not. But again, for philosophy
to be practically relevant, it is imperative that philosophers have some practical commitment or
some ethical duty to instil some discipline, respect and concern for the ‘other’.
2.3.8. Philosophy and Humanism
And now having looked at Oruka’s understanding of what philosophy is or ought to be, it
is time to pursue further the argument we have been trying to implicitly make: at the heart of any
genuine philosophy, there lies some practical commitment that often inspire good philosophers to
be sagacious, be ethically responsible, and hence produce a philosophy that is practically relevant
to the lives of people and their environment. To grasp that argument, though, it is important to
highlight Oruka’s conviction that the ultimate and the most basic standard of moral good, which
seems to be the central object of a genuine philosophy, is or should be humanism or humanness,
by which he means ensuring “the quality and security of human life” (Oruka 1997, 138).
Indeed, Oruka believed that it is within the nature of a genuine philosophy to discern,
safeguard and promote “moral good” that would lead to a more humanised society where people
love and care for each other.23 That means it is an inescapable function of genuine philosophers
(and indeed every moral agent) to, among other things, have concern for a substantive quality and
security of human life over and above mere existence. Put differently, it is within its natural
mandate for philosophy to search for a remedy to human problems, especially where humanism
seems to be in danger or decline (Oruka 1997, 138).

Indeed, as Masolo rightly observes, most of Oruka’s work seems to be raising the issue of ethics of care
to the level of global justice (Masolo 2012, 25).
23
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However, in saying that philosophy ultimately ought to concern itself with moral good and
humanism does not, as Oruka says, amount to confusing philosophy with such disciplines as
religion, technology, and politics that also in a way concern themselves with the human problem.
He also believes that for philosophy to carry out that mandate (i.e., championing moral good and
humanism), it needs to be not only critical but also dialogical in nature. That would make it
effectively safeguard and promote the value and dignity of human life, discouraging the prevailing
and impending inhuman practices in the world. Such a philosophy, Oruka argues, should take
cognizance of science, technology, religious beliefs, and “the reality and nuisance of political and
mystical powers” (Oruka 1997, 139). But philosophy should not be subservient to these realities
and nuisance; rather, “it must apply its critical and dialectical reason to them and tolerate nothing
that is against the quality and security of human life” (Oruka 1997, 139).
2.3.9. Philosophy and Ethical Commitment
One aspect that properly defines Oruka’s legacy as a philosopher is his unrelenting ethical
commitment. It is what underscores the sagacious or the practical dimension of his philosophy. As
a person, he felt ethically bound to contribute to the wellbeing of humanity and the environment
irrespective of geographical, racial, or any other sectarian demarcations. In fact, Oruka believed
that this is how any genuine philosophy ought to proceed, it being a universal human activity and
hence independent of racial or regional boundaries. Oruka elucidates this point further saying,
In the last analysis, philosophy is not a language analysis, not the exercise enjoyed in a
logical dialogue, and not a special insight of the world reserved for some race or gender.
Philosophy is a perspective of the whole or part of the whole of the human predicament
and an insightful suggestion on how to get out or conform. This sort of perspective can be
found in anybody … In every community, there are always people who specialize in
offering or studying such perspectives (Oruka 1997, 206-207, emphasis mine).
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According to Oruka, such few people in every community who specialize in offering
insightful perspectives on how to resolve human predicaments are properly referred to as
philosophic sages. He defines a sage as “that sort of person a culture produces who is able to mirror
and reproduce logical and intuitive steps of the metrics of the culture” (Oruka 1997, 207). Such a
person could be formally educated and literate or uneducated and illiterate. All we require to have
a philosophic sage, Oruka says, is “the ability to help coin a path for escape” or find justifiable
solutions when one’s culture (society) is at risk (Oruka 1997, 207). My position is that for that to
happen, it is imperative for the said philosophic sage to be ethically responsible as a moral agent.
Thus, Odera Oruka challenged his contemporary philosophers to embrace this ethical
committment, thereby making their philosophies more practical and relevant, given that the world
considered as a global society was and is still experiencing human perils and unwarranted
sufferings. And as a typical philosophic sage, Oruka himself tried to fulfil this task by generously
sharing his insightful thoughts through writing, teaching, and mentoring especially the youth. He
wrote extensively and gave talks on such ethical topics as justice, human rights, liberty, ecology,
economics, politics, among others.
All these talks and writings clearly demonstrate his unrelenting ethical commitment. It is
quite rather unfortunate that much of these writings remain unexplored as they ought to. Our task
in the subsequent chapters of this project will be to engage some of Oruka’s practical philosophy,
especially his ethical thought. And as we shall see, Oruka’s practical philosophy is not just another
speculative work on such topics as mentioned above. Rather, his is a philosophy pointedly
characterized by a special interest to the real life of the people, especially in Africa. He explains
why and how he got so much involved with practical philosophy in an interview conducted on
10/27/1993 at the University of Nairobi where he says:
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At that time (sixties and early seventies) main-stream philosophy in Scandinavia and
U.S.A. was mostly logical positivism and linguistic philosophy. But I was more interested
… in philosophy that would be useful for understanding the problems of Africa, for helping
to liberate it and also sustain its independence, and for that matter, I became naturally
interested in ethics, social political and legal philosophy (Kresse 1996, 22).

Thus, it was after critically observing and being conscious of the predicaments his people in Africa
were going thought that prompted Oruka to philosophically respond as a sage: trying to find some
way out of such evils as poverty, human rights abuse, and neo-colonialism (Graness 2012, 8).
Oruka therefore held the view that philosophy ultimately has this sagacious cum normative
(regulative) role to not only inform, critique and intellectually challenge people, but most
importantly also transform their lives by trying to practically improve on their welfare (Oruka
1997, 218). For him, as we pointed out earlier, the speculative aspects of philosophy (like logic,
metaphysics, epistemology, etc.) ought to be seen and used primarily as means to produce practical
philosophy. But this presupposes philosophers having some ethical responsibility, just as it implies
the normative ethical dimension of philosophy. In fact, it is this normative ethical dimension of
philosophy that, to Oruka, differentiates between what he calls the sage proper (philosophic sage)
from the mere philosopher (speculative theoretician or rhetorician).
In another interview carried out on 08/16/1995 (four months before his tragic death) at the
University of Nairobi, Odera Oruka emphatically reiterates this point saying,
The mere philosopher [theoretician] one could call him a scientist of the mere thought in a
broad sense, he looks for thoughts, he looks for principles that guide nature, for principles
that guide society, he looks for knowledge. The mere philosopher looks for pure knowledge
and tries to express knowledge, but the sage [proper] cares about knowledge, and he adds
to knowledge morality, the moral spirit. He aims at the ethical betterment of the community
that he lives in. So to me, the sage [proper] has these two policies: he has the science, the
knowledge plus ethical obligation for himself, for the community and for the world
(Graness and Kresse 1997, 254, emphasis mine).
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Here, we can see Oruka scornfully attacking mere speculative philosophers or theoreticians in
favour of a philosophic sage who, on top of having scientific knowledge also has ethical obligation
as tools for the betterment of his or her life and the lives of others in the world.
To emphasize his point, Oruka singles out Socrates from his contemporary rivals in the
ancient Greece and Asia Minor - the Sophists. While the former represents a philosophic sage or
a sage proper (given that Socrates was concerned primarily with pursuing such ethical virtues as
truth, justice, courage, and above all wisdom), the latter fit the bill of being mere philosophers,
given that they went around teaching people how to twist ideas to simply win arguments regardless
of the truth.24 The sophists were interested in mere rhetoric for money, fame, and honour. Socrates,
on the other hand, was committed to defending the truth to a point of death; and he always
emphasized ethical commitment to everyone in the community, a commitment geared towards
gaining practical knowledge necessary for the betterment of all. Indeed, at his defence before the
Athenian jury, Socrates is recorded saying:
And while I have life and strength I shall never cease from the practice and teaching of
philosophy [love of wisdom], exhorting anyone whom I meet after my manner, and
convincing him, saying: ‘O my friend, why do you who are a citizen of the great and mighty
and wise city of Athens, care so much about laying up the greatest amount of money and
honour and reputation, and so little about wisdom and truth and the greatest improvement
of the soul ...? (Plato Apology, 29 d-e).
Here then lies a philosophic sage with admirable ethical commitment, the one whom Oruka
proposes for us to emulate. Socrates is said to have diligently obeyed his conscience that inspired

Cf. Plato’s dialogues: Sophists, Gorgias, Protagoras, Laches, etc. It is important to note that in most of
these dialogues, while the sophists claim to possess knowledge, Socrates, the sage proper, only claims to
be “lover of wisdom”. For Socrates, wisdom or sagacity is the ability to beware of the limits of one’s
knowledge (Apology 21d, 22e). Indeed, the only thing that Socrates seems to know with certainty is the
fact that he does not know; hence, the so-called “Socratic ignorance” that prompts one to pursue the
ethical imperative to use one’s limited knowledge for the sake of the common good.
24
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his ethical commitment, which arguably made him the wisest of all people in Athens. It is the same
commitment that Oruka, who situates himself within Socratic tradition, was trying to promote in
our contemporary era. He envisioned a philosophy that would be more practically relevant in
solving our socio-politico-economic predicaments. Thus, like Socrates, Oruka had passion to make
human life better, more dignified, and therefore more enjoyable. And in his writings, Oruka also
challenged other contemporary philosophers and scholars to do the same.
Of course, not everyone, especially today, would agree with Oruka’s view. Some might
accuse him of reducing philosophy into this one sagacious ethical (normative) dimension. Bertrand
Russell and other logical positivists, for instance, might single out symbolic logic as the most
essential part of philosophy. But that, in my view, would not invalidate our argument so long as
that logic would find its practical relevance. Put differently, Russell’s position would not invalidate
our claim that speculative aspect of philosophy, and human knowledge as such, should be used as
means to solving human predicaments before engaging in some “luxurious” intellectual exercises.
Indeed, as Odera Oruka would say, it is unfortunate, and regrettably so, that philosophy
understood as ‘love of wisdom’ seems to have been lost in the technical and analytic language
during the last few decades. He laments that the contemporary era (especially since the mid
twentieth century) seems to have lost the sagacious normative dimension of philosophy with its
practical relevance and ethical commitment.25 Consequently, as Graness aptly argues, philosophy
seems to have been reduced into a mere “expert knowledge”, a sort of “science in the ivory tower”
often characterized by specialized and complicated jargons (Graness 2012, 1). It is in this view,

This is a dimension of philosophy that by and large leads to genuine humanism or humanness; that is,
an ethical dimension that largely emphasizes centrality of human life and its non-negotiable dignity.
25
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therefore, that we propose Oruka’s legacy, particularly his advocacy for ethical commitment, to
be seen as a philosophic call to retrieve back to that sagacious normative dimension of philosophy,
thereby ensuring a genuine humanism and authentic practice of justice at global level.
2.4. From Theory to Praxis: how to make philosophy sagacious
We have been at pains trying to justify why Odera Oruka felt that philosophy must be made
sagacious; meaning that philosophers ought to use their speculative, analytical, and critical
techniques, skills, and methods to come up with a philosophy that is practically committed to the
betterment of people’s wellbeing and their environment. We have also tried to argue that Oruka’s
life as well as his philosophical works can and should be seen as manifestation of a philosopher
committed to alleviate some socio-politico-economic predicaments, thereby elucidating practical
relevance and social significance of knowledge.
At the same time, we have several times pointed out that while Oruka was opposed to marely
abstract speculative discourses, he was not in any way opposed to theoretical discourses that were
applicable in real life situations. In fact, this was precisely what Oruka was trying to do: applying
his philosophic knowledge, skills, and techniques into praxis by critically questioning some
common assumptions, thoroughly clarifying concepts, and ardently using his theoretical insights
to reconsider such human fundamental issues as socio-economic inequality and deprivation. He
tried to find solutions to these problems, just as he also challenged other philosophers to do the
same. He was convinced that philosophy could be made sagacious if and only if philosophers could
embrace some ethical duty in their endeavours lest their philosophies become irrelevant.
In this section, let us look at some ways in which philosophy can practically be made
sagacious (i.e., practically relevant to the betterment of people and their environment), which is
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what Oruka’s legacy seems to advocate. There are two questions that we need to respond to. First,
what does sagacious normative dimension of philosophy consist of? And second, how can it be
achieved? Both questions, however, are relevantly related; they not only seem to be challenging
us to see what social justice would entail, for instance, but they also challenge us to develop what
we might call “an intercultural approach to philosophy” that would ensure genuine practice of
justice at the global level.26 Indeed, the two questions seem to relate well with our guiding question
in this project, namely, what do we fundamentally need to do as humans to ensure global justice?
To the first question, then, we say that the sagacious normative dimension of philosophy
refers to that ethical aspect of philosophy that by and large leads to humanism or humanness; it is
an ethical dimension of philosophy that largely emphasises promotion of human life and its nonnegotiable dignity so as to enhance the common good. It consists mainly in the ethical commitment
of philosophers to become sagacious (or wise) by trying to apply their speculative knowledge,
skills, ideas, and insights so as to create philosophies that would be relevant and beneficial to
solving humanity’s predicaments. In other words, it consists in philosophers’ commitment to make
philosophy more practical, where theory and praxis overlap for the common good. As Oruka would
say, genuine humanism or humanness is often manifested in someone’s actions (say, in writing or
arguing), and is always directed towards the betterment of the overall living conditions of people,
regardless of their geographical, racial or any other sectarian affiliation in the name of building an
authentic global justice for all (Graness and Kresse 1997, 254).

This is a new orientation in philosophy that, as Oruka points out, neither privileges any culture,
philosophical tradition or method, nor imposes a hierarchy of any sort; it is a kind of new orientation that
is open to various ways of philosophizing, provides freedom of thought in every culture, as it tries to
understand, interprete and integrate various philosophical traditions into the “world discourse” so that
there is much better understanding than misunderstanding (Graness and Kresse 1997, 246-247).
26
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As we said above, to be a sagacious philosopher means having the ability to put insightful
knowledge and experience of a practical nature into some good use. That means philosophers by
no less means have a special ethical obligation to make their philosophies more practically relevant
and socially acceptable so as to enhance the wellbeing of their people, and hence surmount what
Oruka calls “the disappointing present” - by offering solution to the current problems. To put
differently, the ability of philosophers to think critically has to be made fertile for the betterment
of their society now and in the future.27
The point we are trying to make is that for philosophy to become sagacious, it ought to
inevitably be a product of philosophic sages, that is, thinkers who can distinguish between the two
dimensions of philosophy (speculative and practical) and to put much emphasis on the practical
aspects. This follows Oruka’s insight that wisdom, which he equates with sagacity, is not
intellectual sophistication and vice versa; for one can be an expert in logical and cogent reasoning
and still be an idiot on matters of life and human relations (Oruka 1991, 40). The following quote
perhaps will sufficiently clarify the point.
Philosophy is an art of reasoning and provides a critical intellectual weapon and
methodology for analyzing and synthesizing the basic problems of man, society and nature.
[But] in dealing with the problems of man and society, philosophy is moral and social. And
the problems and definition of moral good and the ideals of humanism fall within the real
moral and social philosophy (Oruka 1997, 140).
Here, Oruka is trying to draw attention to the two dimensions of philosophy - theoretical
and practical – that makes it become both an art of reasoning and a way of life. But he seems to
give priority to the latter, especially ethics (moral and social philosophy), in tackling human and
societal problems without collapsing the two. He seems to be saying that the two dimensions ought
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By philosophers here we mean the philosophic sages whose ultimate goal is to promote humanism.
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to overlap in a balanced way to bring about much-needed viable solution to human predicaments.
Thus, Oruka would later say that the main function of moral philosophy is to “apply rigorous
analytic and synthetic reasoning to the basic moral and social problems and help explain or define
moral good, moral evil, and the requirements of a humanist social order” (Oruka 1997, 140).
It appears, then, that it is the normative ethical dimension that makes philosophy become
sagacious, meaning the major task of genuine philosophers (philosophic sages) is to get to where
both theory and praxis overlap in a balanced way for the common good. Elsewhere, in an interview
conducted in October 1993, Oruka reiterates this point saying that philosophic sages ought to have
such ethical commitment even in a deeper way than other professionals (Kresse 1996, 30).
And now turning to the second question (i.e., how we can achieve the sagacious ethical or
normative dimension of philosophy), we propose adopting Odera Oruka’s approach to philosophy,
namely, philosophic sagacity. This is a trend that insists that the wisdom (sagacity) worth pursuing
would have to be first and foremost philosophic; that is, critical, well-founded, clear, and flexible.
To that effect, therefore, we propose that philosophy can be made sagacious in three ways. First,
by finding philosophic sages who, like Socrates, are entirely committed to philosophic wisdom
and truth within our societies today and giving them a platform, a chance to air their voices, and a
wider coverage, thereby exposing their thoughts in response to the current human predicaments.
Second, we can make philosophy sagacious by applying the theoretical knowledge (i.e.,
the ability to think, reason and insightfully argue) to our contemporary ethical, social, economic,
and political issues. This in effect is a huge challenge to philosophers to try and collaborate with
scholars from other disciplines rather than remaining aloof in their field. Indeed, it appears that
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without such sagacious co-operation with other disciplines, no envisioned solution linked to the
welfare of all in our globalized society today would be achieved. 28
The third way in which philosophy can be made sagacious and hence practically relevant
would involve philosophers initiating and promoting open, candid, and truthful philosophical
discourse with each other on various issues affecting humanity and the environment at the global
level. This is in line with Oruka’s conviction that philosophers ought to be open to dialogue and
critique if they are to advance and enrich each other. Philosophers also need to study and embrace
or accomodate other philosophies of the world. Asked to comment on how African thinkers could
make contribution to “world philosophy”, Oruka emphatically replied:
Through the kind of discussion they are doing already and also through discussing not only
specifically African problems but also the problems which are philosophical anywhere. I
think ... African philosophers should even discuss German philosophy and be sent to
contribute to German Philosophy, discuss Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy and
interact with those philosophers, have debates, have seminars with them (Kresse 1996, 26).
Such an exchange, however, ought to be done in such a way that it accommodates most
world philosophies on an equal level. This will not only promote “intercultural philosophy” 29 but
it will also ensure a genuine quest for justice at the global level, a quest for justice that is culturally,
economically, socially, politically, and historically sensitive.
It appears, then, that Oruka would most likely advocate for an intercultural philosophy or
simply a “philosophy of all cultures” today; he would champion for a philosophical forum whose

For practical ways in which philosophy can collaborate with other disciplines, see Oruka’s intriguing
essay: “Philosophy and other Disciplines”, in Graness and Kresse 1997, 35 ff. Here, Oruka discusses the
relation and use of philosophy to other subjects studied at most universities. He defends the view that
philosophy “is always for life and not life for philosophy”, meaning philosophers ought to take a lead in
offering practical solutions to societal problems, thus challenging those who prefer to study it in isolation.
29
See footnote no. 26. Here, I need to point out that this orientation has been pursued and practiced for
over twenty years now, resulting into the journal Polylog based in Vienna (cf. polylog.org.).
28
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goal is to establish global exchange and healthy interaction on equal level. Here, philosophies in
Africa would intellectually engage philosophies in Europe, America, Caribbean, and in Asia. The
aim is to establish a much stronger intercultural philosophical tradition as a human heritage. And
in my view, such philosophical discourse will be one of the best forums for establishing justice at
the global level. It fits well with Oruka’s stance that philosophy needs to be critical and dialogical
in nature if it is to succeed in carrying out its mandate of pursuing humanism and moral good; that
is, safeguard and promote the value of human life, as well as discourage the prevailing and
impending inhuman practices in the world (Oruka 1997, 139).
But one may object that different cultures and specific forms of fundamental beliefs might
create obstacles to having a meaningful and mutual philosophic discourse, given that philosophical
content is, to a large extent, determined and shaped by one’s cultural beliefs. To overcome these
obstacles, we suggest with Oruka to either bracket what he calls “cultural fundamentals”30 (though
this might be difficult thing to do) or better yet make them as transparent as possible. That would
make dialogues freer and fairer, as people mutually understand their cultural prohibitions and learn
to respect them (Oruka 1997, 194). It would further help us overcome the temptation of “totalising
our own cultural specifications as the universals”, which, unfortunately, is what essentially defines
our history. The tragedy of colonialism and imperialism, Oruka says, could be singled out as “a
classic case of a given culture’s specifics totalised as the universals”, thereby hampering effective
cultural and other forms of development in Africa (Oruka 1997, 195).
While receiving his second doctorate degree (i.e., Fil Dr. honoris causa) from Uppsala
University in Sweden on June 4th 1993, Odera Oruka reiterated the same point (i.e., the possibility

These are “concepts, attitudes, styles, and [psychological] expectations specific to a given school of
thought” that tend to cause “obstacles to smooth intellectual dialogue and exchange” (Oruka 1997, 194).
30
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of having meaningful inter-cultural exchange in philosophy and other forms of thought processes)
more vividly saying:
All philosophical theses ... are rooted and driven by their cultural origins; hence, the first
requirement for any useful philosophical dialogue is that all cultural origins be bracketed
or at least must be made transparent and unpolluting during the dialogue (Oruka 1997 176).
Indeed, if only we could succeed in either bracketing or making our different cultural
fundamentals as transparent as possible, then we would create a conducive environment where
participants would mutually and respectfully interact and express their philosophical thoughts with
the same rights of expression in a situation that is free of some powerful domination that often rule
the international political and economic exchanges. This would create, as Oruka says, “a new and
fresh thinking in the philosophic path-findings and cross-culture debates” with an ultimate goal of
solving human predicaments (Oruka 1997, 199). Perhaps that may sound ideologically attractive,
but, I think, it is also realistically possible with some effort.
In our subsequent chapters, we will see how Oruka’s practical philosophy challenges us to
embrace such an intercultural approach that promotes freedom of thought if we are to ever succeed
in establishing a genuine practice of justice at the global level. His ethical concept of the human
minimum, which is a right to a minimum qualitative standard of living for all humans, will inspire
us to regard the world as our “common good” or a common homeland governed by the principles
of interdependence and responsibility for the ‘other’. Consequently, we shall see Oruka proposing
an ethics that is more eco-centric rather than anthropocentric, an ethics that challenges us humans
to take the complex inter-relatedness and inter-dependence of being into a serious consideration.
His ethics – parental earth ethics, in other words, offers motivation for socio-economic fairness
as well as environmental concern, hence “ecological fairness” with Nature.
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2.5. Conclusion
Professor Odera Oruka can be described simply as a brilliant, incisive, and down to earth
African philosopher who worked his way through to build a long-lasting legacy. His entire life,
though short, was nonetheless full of invaluable qualities and great achievements. He spent his
entire life so vibrantly and tirelessly in pursuit of knowledge, truth, and wisdom in a manner that
neither privileged anyone nor excluded nobody. In this chapter, we have tried to expose Oruka’s
rather difficult yet tenacious academic journey; one that is characterized by countless number of
challenges, but one that ultimately made him a distinguished scholar, a respected don, an
accomplished author, and an inspiring mentor-friend.
Because of the love he had for Africa, Oruka was known as one of a few internationally cited
African intellectuals who stayed “home”. As an astute intellectual, despite many everyday-life
hardships on different fronts (social, political, economic, etc.) in Kenya where he was based, Oruka
was astonishingly ever productive in terms of publication and intellectual output. More so, as a
prolific writer, Oruka did not limit his philosophy to academia, for he regularly wrote newspaper
articles also, thereby extending the philosophical questioning process and problem solving to a
wider audience. He was also open to dialogue and critique, always standing for what is reasonably
acceptable rather than being swayed by the urge to be politically expedient and correct. What an
exemplary person we had, what a legacy! His is an inspirational story, especially to many young
people in Africa where equal opportunities are not often assured and forthcoming.
Oruka’s enormous work in philosophy can be seen as having two major overarching objectives:
(i) to reconstruct the sagacious normative dimension in philosophy by trying to make philosophy
more practical and relevant to humankind and the environment; and (ii), to liberate philosophy in
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Africa from ethnological and racist prejudices that dominated his time. To achieve these two
objectives, Oruka first sought to address arguably one of the classical, if not perennial questions,
namely, what philosophy is or ought to be, before seeking its relevance in life. This approach
ultimately helped him to prioritize and emphasize on the ethical duty of a moral agent, thereby
demanding practical relevance from philosophers and other scholars as well.
Indeed, as we have seen in this chapter, philosophy from Orukan standpoint has two
complementary dimensions: speculative and practical. Thus, from speculative point of view,
philosophy can be understood as a critical, deductive, and reflective thought process; always
characterized by abstract reasoning, logical consistency, and often tied to individual thinkers. But
such critical thought processes, Oruka insists, must have a sagacious normative dimension,
meaning that knowledge, skills, and insights from speculative abstract reasoning should first of all
be seen and used as means of creating philosophical discourse that aim at contributing to the
betterment of the wellbeing of people and their environment. The latter is the practical aspect of
philosophy that Oruka seems to prioritize and emphasize more.
The two dimensions of philosophy, however, should not be seen as enemies to each other;
rather, they ought to be complementary. Speculative philosophical disciplines such as logic,
metaphysics, epistemology, etc., are very crucial in sharpening the mind and gaining insight and
knowledge, but that knowledge should be translated and possibly transmitted to others in ways
that can be practically helpful in life. Hence, a good philosopher, a philosophic sage as Oruka
would say, ought to be not only logically refined, lucid, and critical, but also objective, decent, and
accommodative in arguments. In other words, he or she should resolutely work hard to pursue and
communicate the truth rather than try to decipher it with verbosity and circumlocution. Most
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important, a good philosopher also ought to be responsibly committed to try and resolve
predicaments affecting humanity as such and the environment.
Thus, we have also seen that for Oruka, who situates himself within the Socratic tradition,
philosophy is or ought to be essentially understood as ‘love of wisdom’. This means that it is and
should be inextricably tied to both conceptual and practical ways of solving humanity’s
predicaments, thereby promoting their dignity and ensuring social justice. Put differently, we have
seen that philosophy thus conceived as ‘love of wisdom’ ought not to be just another “science in
the ivory tower”. Instead, philosophy ought to ultimately promote humanism or humanness (i.e.
concern for the ‘other’) in a way that would ensure genuine practice of justice at global level. In
this way, philosophy can be seen at best in service of humanity as people try to put theory into
praxis so as to improve on their wellbeing. This, however, does not mean that we tolerate laziness,
idleness, greed or mendacity in the name of humanness. Oruka, for instance, would not endorse
the idea of giving free money to some strong and able persons who could work for it in some other
honest way, given that this would degrade the very notion of humanness; just as greed, corruption,
and possessive individualism do.
To that effect, we have discussed at length Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy,
highlighting the ethical dimension as the end or the ultimate goal of philosophising. We have seen
the sagacious ethical responsibility that Oruka felt philosophers should embrace – one that aims at
not just abstract speculative discourse, but most importantly making better the lives of people and
their environment. This has helped us clarify one of our major claims: at the heart of any
philosophy worth its salt, there is always some practical commitment that quite often inspire
philosophers (indeed every human person) to be ethically responsible.
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Thus, we have seen that for Oruka, one thing that is unavoidable for normal adult human being
is to be ethically responsible. That involves, among other things, being concerned about the
wellbeing of oneself and the ‘other’. To be exempted of this responsibility, Oruka says, one must
be either an infant, an idiot, or otherwise incapacitated. But ethical duty must also be taken both
in terms of what we do and what we do not do as moral agents. Thus, the big question should be:
what am I doing (or not doing) as a human being, a moral agent, to improve not only my own life
and dignity but also that of other humans especially the less privileged without jeopardizing the
environment? In my view, this is no doubt one of the greatest challenges that Oruka’s philosophy
poses to us today. It is a challenge that we seek to address further in this study.
Odera Oruka is well known for his Sage philosophy, a project that he ingeniously initiated and
wrote about as a response to some misconstrued bias against Africans – that Africans are incapable
of having or doing philosophy given that reason and logic are foreign to them. But he also wrote
extensively on other socio-politico-economic issues affecting humanity, especially in Africa. His
work seems to be a typical product of a philosophic sage, given that he used his intellectual skill
and vast knowledge to write a philosophy that is practically relevant to the betterment of the
wellbeing of humankind and the environment. It is rather unfortunate that many do not recognize
or appreciate that the late Odera Oruka was such an important practical philosopher.
In our subsequent chapters, we will focus on exposing Oruka’s practical philosophy. And to
begin with, the next chapter will specifically discuss Oruka’s contribution to the shaping and
developing of philosophy in Africa. Here, we shall embark on publicizing perhaps one of his most
distinguishable landmarks - philosophic sagacity. In the context of his Sage philosophy, and in
response to a rather distressing question on the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa,
philosophic sagacity becomes a genuine trend (or means) of retrieving and critically reconsidering
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traditional or classical wisdom that would be instrumental in solving some contemporaneous
issues. It springs from the idea that wisdom or sagacity involves being aware of the past so as to
make proper judgments for the present and the future. Thus, we will see how Oruka was able to
successfully master the tension between tradition and modernity. And in this way, Oruka is able
to rescue philosophy in Africa from ethnological and racist prejudices.
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CHAPTER 3
ORUKA’S COMMITMENT TO PHILOSOPHY IN AFRICA
Philosophy is conceptual and logical discourse ... the difference between African philosophy and Western
philosophy does not lie in the use of reason, which is a universal human trait (Oruka 1991a, 26).

3.1. Introduction
In our previous chapter, we focused on the legacy of Odera Oruka where we tried to expose,
espouse, and critically evaluate his commitment to philosophy from a practical point of view.
Among other things, we discovered that Oruka envisioned a kind of philosophy that is more
practical than theoretical, a philosophy that is relevantly committed to the betterment of the welfare
of people and their environment. In this chapter, we will, on the same impetus, explore Oruka’s
incontestable contribution to the shaping and development of philosophy in Africa, which is
another way of espousing his commitment to practical philosophy.
As mentioned in chapter two, Oruka’s entire philosophy can be seen as having two overarching
objectives, namely, (i) to reconstruct the sagacious practical dimension in philosophy, and (ii) to
liberate philosophy in Africa from ethnological (or mythical) and racist prejudices. The current
chapter will focus on the second objective, which is well covered in one of his most famous works
- Sage philosophy. This is a project that Oruka ingeniously initiated to demonstrate that there really
exists a genuine philosophy in Africa, thereby dispelling some biased views about Africans.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section displays the historical and contextual
background that informed or prompted Oruka’s response to the then contentious issue of the nature
and the existence of philosophy in Africa. The second section considers philosophic sagacity in
depth as a new outstanding trend in philosophy. Here, we shall see Oruka’s approach to philosophy
as a practical response to one of the most intriguing issues in contemporary Africa, namely: social,
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economic, political, and intellectual deprivation and suppression. And hopefully, this will portray
Oruka not only as a sage but also a diligent philosopher committed to seeking justice for his people.
The two overarching objectives mentioned above are inextricably tied together. This is
another point we want to underscore. Indeed, we’ll see that Oruka’s commitment to philosophy in
Africa is in tandem with his understanding of what philosophy is, or ought to be: a way of critical
thinking in pursuit of truth about the most fundamental principles of human life and their relations
with the environment. According to Oruka, then, philosophy (understood as ‘love of wisdom’)
seems inescapably tied to some ethical commitment and social responsibility. Thus, he challenges
contemporary philosophers to embrace that commitment and responsibility to bring to the fore
practical dimension of philosophy, thereby enhancing the wellbeing of their people without
jeopardizing the environment.
Now it is from that perspective, we shall try to argue, that Oruka’s commitment to defend,
shape, and develop philosophy in Africa attests to his general task of philosophizing against social,
political, economic, and theoretical deprivation and suppression. Indeed, as Richard Bell rightly
observes, philosophy in Africa, among other things, ought to be tied to the experience of the lived
reality of the people, which is made up of the pre-colonial traditions, its colonial history, current
harsh circumstance, and human struggles (Bell 2002, 35).
Oruka’s philosophy seems in pursuit of that agenda. His approach to philosophy (i.e.,
philosophic sagacity), we urge, is also practically relevant today beyond Africa. It emphasizes that
philosophy worth its salt ought to be tied to individual critical thinkers rather than being
misconstrued into some community-based pseudo philosophy (ethno-philosophy), which
nonetheless only perpetuates such oppressive structures albeit in different form. It also underscores
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that genuine philosophy ought to be sagacious; meaning it ought to be practically relevant in
solving contemporaneous issues affecting humankind and the environment. Thus, the chapter will
conclude by justifying Oruka’s commitment to such critical issues as human rights, ethical duty,
humanism, communalism, and above all global justice.
3.2. African Philosophy: A Turbulent Path
The issue of the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa has, until recently (1990s)
gone through what one might aptly call a turbulent journey.31 This journey is marked by several
significant historical phases, with some arrogantly if not ignorantly denying any possibility of
having philosophy in Africa, while others vehemently trying to defend its rightful position. As a
result, there have been a number of trends or schools of thought in pursuit of this course. According
to Oruka, for instance, this issue first went through what he calls “the myth of pre-philosophy”, a
stage in which African mind and culture were generally claimed to be extremely alien to logic,
reason, philosophy, and civilization (Oruka 1991a, 45). Ironically, though, representatives of this
phase include such famous philosophers as Hume, Kant, Hegel, among others.32
As a reaction to the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’, there arose a second phase, that is, the “ethnophilosophical phase” in the works of such scholars as Tempels, Mbiti, and Kagame. But as we
shall see shortly, although this second phase tried to assert the nature and the existence of
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The issue was problematised since the early 1960s through late 1990s with intensive debate meant to
handle such topics as: What is philosophy? What is African philosophy? Did the Africans in their typical
traditional cultures ever philosophise? Should African philosophy, if any, overlap with other philosophies?
Who qualifies as an African philosopher? etc. (Oruka 1997, 160).
32
Of course, their derogative works, had been carefully concealed from academia until mid-20th century
when their racist overtones, arrogance, and ignorance were exposed. For an intriguing coverage, see C.
Neugebauer, “The Racism of Hegel and Kant” in Oruka 1991, 247-257 and Odhiambo 2009, 1-19.
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philosophy in Africa, it nonetheless found itself lazily conceiving of it as a communal affair (with
no individual philosophers) that uniquely defined the African mind.
That necessitated the rise of yet another phase, the “professional phase”, which saw individual
Africans who had been professionally trained as philosophers in Europe and elsewhere grappling
to articulate issues about African philosophy. But in this endeavour, the professional school of
thought unfortunately alienated itself from (or took for granted) the existence of indigenous
African thinkers. And it was precisely due to this and other challenges that Odera Oruka came up
with a new trend he dubbed philosophic sagacity. This trend as we shall see, tries to capture both
indigenousness and professionalism in African philosophy. To get this point clearly, therefore, let
us first consider these phases in depth.
3.2.1. The Myth of Pre-Philosophy (The First Phase)
The ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ represents a time when African mind and culture was, out of
bias or ignorance, considered inadequate: extremely alien to logic, reason, philosophy, civilization,
and scientific inquiry. This position, which Odhiambo calls the “conventional conception of the
African mentality” holds that anything African could not be philosophical, and likewise, anything
philosophical could not be African (Odhiambo 2009, 1, 43). It appears in some disparaging works
of such Western philosophers and scholars as Kant (Philosophical Anthropology), Hegel (Lectures
on the History of Philosophy), Levy-Bruhl (The Notebooks on Primitive Mentality), Westermann
(The African Today), among others. According to this literature, Africa could only be described as
primitive, static and “dark”; which sadly situates Africans as pre-logical, pre-scientific, preliterate, and hence pre-philosophical (Neugebauer 1991, 54).
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Kant’s bias and blatant racism, to start with, though unknown in the mainstream academia, is
incontestable. Kant seems to defend the monogenetic racial theory: humanity descended from an
original “stem species” that began in one part of the world; different races, however, emerged as
members of that species migrated to different parts of the world with different climates, which
triggered their predisposition to produce the physical features (and especially the skin color) they
needed to survive in these new environments. And for Kant, once climate and environment trigger
human predispositions to produce racial differences, that process is irreversible (Boxill 2017, 45).
Thus, in his lectures on Philosophical Anthropology, Kant discerns four races of human species
according to colour-line, namely, white (European), yellow (Asian), black (African), and red
(Native American) in that pecking order, which order is determined by decreasing mental and
general capability (Oruka 1990, 251). Excepting the first (i.e., white) race, Kant claims that the
other three races inherently suffer from mental defects. Commenting about the black race, for
instance, in “Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime” Kant writes:
The Negroes of Africa have by nature no feeling that rises above the ridiculous. Mr. Hume
challenges anyone to adduce a single example where a Negro has demonstrated talents, … the
difference between the white and black races seems to be just as great with regard to the
capacities of mind as it is with respect to color (Kant 2:253).
In yet another essasy entitled “Of the Different Races of Human Beings” (1775), Kant further
observses that “The Negreo, who is well suited to his climate, [is] strong, fleshy, supple, but who
given the abundant provisions of his motherland, is lazy, soft and trifling” (Kant 1775/2007, 8297; cf. Kant 2:438). And to rectify such defects, Kant says the Negro is fit for special training,
which trainng he recommends to be done by thoroughly thrashing the Africans, preferably with a
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split bamboo cane rather than an ordinary whip owing to the thickness of their skin.33 And behold,
Kant erroneously justifies slavery and colonial imperialism, a move that, unfortunately, would
contradict what he is famously known for: a morality based on the categorical imperative.34
It is important to note also that Kant generally regards the concept of ‘race’ in terms of “class
distinction” prevalent not only in human beings (hence the pecking order above) but also in other
animals. And such class distinctions, he says, are inevitably inherited by nature. Thus, mixing of
races, according to Kant, should entirely be avoided; it can only cause misfortune and damage.35 I
wonder how such racism in Kant can be defended or reconciled with his “mainstream” thoughts.
Hegel’s bias is equally scary, as he disparagingly describes Africa in a rather general and
derogative way. In his Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, for instance, Hegel describes
“Africa proper” (by which he means the sub-Saharan region) as a continent enclosed within itself,
with no signs of development, and whose dominant principle is “cultural backwardness”. He says,
In Africa proper, man has not progresses beyond merely sensuous existence, and has found it
absolutely impossible to develop any further. Physically he exhibits great muscular strength,
which enables him to perform arduous labours; and his temperament is characterised by goodnaturedness, which is coupled, however, with completely unfeeling cruelty (Hegel 1975, 172).

Hegel apparently divides Africa into three regions: (i) the land to the south of Sahara (Africa
proper); (ii) the land to the North of Sahara (Europe-Africa); and (iii) the region of the Nile and
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See Immanuel Kant’s Menschenkunde oder Philosophische Anthropologie (1831), edited by Starke, p.
352 ff, quoted by Eze Chukwudi (ed.) 1997, 116. For original quote, see Kant, “Physische Geographie”,
Zweyter Band, Konigsberg 1802, in Der Neger, Hrsg.: E. Henscheid, Frankfurt/ Main 1985, p: 7-22.
34
See the second formula that states: “So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the
person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant 4:428).
35
Cf. I. Kant VIII, p: 121, and IV, p: 271 in: Kant-Ausgabe der philosophischen Bibliothek, Hrsg.: K.
Vorländer; cf. also R. Eisler, “Kant-Lexikon”, Berlin 1930, p: 439.
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Ethiopia (Asia-Africa). He however says that Africa proper “is the characteristic part of the whole
continent” (Hegel 1975, 173). Hegel then denies in Africa not only philosophy but also history,
morality, religion, culture and civilization (Hegel 1975, 174). And by extension, he also denies
Africans two major concepts in his philosophy: reason (or spirit) and consciousness.
Now to support his outrageous claims purporting that black people are inherently inferior to,
say, white people, Hegel further argues that North Africa (especially Egypt and Carthage), whose
civilization is no doubt a classical marvel, is not part of Africa; its inhabitants are not Africans but
Europeans in character. But that is obviously untrue. There also were many other civilizations in
ancient Africa that Hegel arrogantly ignored to investigate. Thus, as Christian Neugebauer rightly
points out, Hegel’s purported description of Africa clearly unmasks his main source about Africa:
ignorance and racial biasness (Neugebauer 1991, 54). At best, Hegel relies on embellished stories
and travel diaries to disparagingly define Africans as static, primitive, dark, savage, illogical,
philosophically innocent, and culturally homogeneous (Bernasconi 1998, 43-46). He writes,
The negro is an example of animal man in all his savagery and lawlessness, and if we wish to
understand him at all, we must put aside all our European attitudes. We must not think of a
spiritual God or of moral laws; … we must abstract from all reverence and morality, and from
everything which we call feeling. All this is foreign to man in his immediate existence, and
nothing consonant with humanity is to be found in his character. For this reason, we cannot
properly feel ourselves into his nature, no more than into that of a dog (Hegel 1975, 174).

Consequently, the much-celebrated German philosopher concludes his introduction of the
Lectures by stating unequivocally that he is not going to include Africa in his analysis. For him,
world history (by which he means a progressive development of the consciousness of human
freedom) properly speaking begins in China (or Persia) and ends in Europe (Hegel 1956, 180).
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It is for these and other racist remarks that Odera Oruka critically observes that the ‘myth of
pre-philosophy’ can be seen as an attempt to establish two things about Africa: (i) the impossibility
for having any philosophic dialogue; and (ii), an obvious (i.e., conventional though not accurate)
nonexistence of a tradition of any organized philosophical systems in Africa (Oruka 1987, 47). In
this regard, also, the myth seems to naively regard philosophy only in the “usual” sense as the
heritage of the West, thereby treating it as a typical or a natural European activity foreign to other
races and continents like Africa. But to think that logic, reason, science, philosophy, religion and
civilization are exclusively European enterprises, as Kresse points out, no doubt, amounts to a
serious scientific if not philosophical blunder (Kresse 1996, 23). Nonetheless, and perhaps on a
positive side, it was after the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ was exposed that debates on the nature and
existence of philosophy in Africa took another better twist, ushering in the second phase.
3.2.2. Ethno-philosophy (The Second Phase)
To offset the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’, some scholars have made frantic attempts to show
that African societies – ancient or contemporary – are neither innocent of logic, reason and hence
philosophy, nor alien to civilization. This school of thought dubbed ethno-philosophy, marks the
second phase in search for the nature and existence of philosophy in Africa.36 But as we shall see,
despite its apparent noble motive, ethno-philosophy ends up describing African philosophy merely
as “traditional-communal-thought-system” often found in fables, proverbs, songs, and other

36

Paulin Hountondji, one of the leading African Philosophers and a fierce critique of this school of
thought, claims to be the one who coined this term ethno-philosophy (Hountondji 1983, 34). However, in
a more recent publication Hountondji acknowledges that the term had been employed almost three
decades earlier by Nkuruma in his doctoral thesis undertaken (but uncompleted) at the University of
Pennsylvania (Mosley 1995, 175). It is not very clear though whether Nkuruma uses the term ethnophilosophy in the same sense as Hountondji does, that is, in reference to “a collective thought” often but
erroneously attributed to African philosophy (Gyekye 1995, xvi).
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linguistic features (Oruka 1987). Thus, it is reflected in such expressions as ‘Bantu philosophy’,
‘Agikuyu philosophy’, ‘Luo philosophy’, etc; which “philosophies” as Gyekye aptly observes,
subscribe to a “monolithic set of ideas and beliefs”, hence unanimity (Gyekye 1995, xvii).
Ethno-philosophy, furthermore, starts with a strong anthropological assumption that
African philosophy is and must only be different from, say, European philosophy. But that
assumption, of course, is fallacious. Ethnophilosophical trend, therefore, spectacularly fails to
solve the real problem at stake: tackling the misconception about the nature and the existence of
philosophy in Africa. Indeed, as Oruka rightly observes, ethno-philosophy seems to only succeed
to embody what he calls “the myth of a unique philosophy”, another kind of myth that requires a
communal consensus as it fuses (or confuses) mythologies with philosophy (Oruka 1991, 45). In
other words, ethno-philosophy only identifies with the totality of customs and common beliefs of
a people (Oruka would call this folk philosophy), thereby forming a sharp contrast with a deductive
philosophy developed by a critical mind and consistent logic of individual thinkers.
The point we are trying to make here is that following Oruka’s insight, and contrary to the
ethno-philosophical approach, philosophy (whether African or otherwise) ought to be a product of
critical, deductive, and reflective thought process, always characterized by logical consistency and
often tied to independent individual thinkers who in most cases challenge the status quo. But at
the same time, such philosophers ought to embrace and integrate some ethical commitment and
social responsibility so as to make their philosophies relevant and practical to the betterment of
humanity’s wellbeing and the environment. I come back to this point later, but first, let us first
look at some examples of ethno-philosophy.
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3.2.2.1. Placide Tempels and “Bantu Philosophy”
One of the key proponents of ethno-philosophy is Rev. Placide Tempels, a Belgian Catholic
priest who did missionary work from 1930s through 1960s among the Luba people in today’s
Democratic Republic of Congo. In response to the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ that we discussed
above, Tempels sought to defend a contrary position, urging that speculative thought and reasoning
was indeed a permanent and prevalent feature of pre-colonial Africa. Thus, Tempels contends that
to deny logic and ontology (and hence philosophy in its strict sense) to the Africans or any other
“primitive” group of people is an unrealistic and untenable position.
In his small but widely read book entitled Bantu Philosophy, Tempels claims that Bantu
philosophy comprises of some basic principles that underlie the African behaviour, beliefs, and
customs. These principles, which revolve around the concept of vital force, are crucial given that
they govern Africans in their day-to-day lives. Thus, according to Tempels, Bantu’s behaviour,
ontology, wisdom, psychology, ethics, religion, and “restoration of life” are all centred in the value
of vital force - a reality that, though invisible, yet is supreme and permeates every Bantu (Tempels
1945, 49). And behold the Bantu philosophy!
It should be surprising and intellectually baffling, though, that Tempels could claim almost
single-handedly to have discovered Bantu (or African) philosophy; one that is uniquely communal,
permanent and stable system of beliefs, though consistent with some peculiar and inferior logic
based on one primordial concept of vital force (whatever that may be). And it is this “philosophy”,
Tempels says, that has perennially been handed over from ancient to the modern Africa. It is what
defines the African mind despite the fact that the very African mind could neither formulate nor
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articulate. It is a kind of philosophy that required an outsider to define and articulate it for the
world to know all about its nature and existence.37
Now it is in this regard that we maintain how difficult it is for any reasonable person to see
how Tempels could possibly succeed in attacking the myth of pre-philosophy, let alone enhancing
helpful debates on the nature and existence of Philosophy in Africa. His major claims are obviously
controversial if not outright false. According to Oruka, Tempels committed two “intellectual
crimes” by first claiming that “the Bantu were not themselves capable of theorising and articulating
their own ‘philosophy’, and second, he confused people’s Weltanschaung with philosophy as an
academic discipline” (Oruka 1997, 164).
Yet, perhaps on the positive side as Odera Oruka further notes, “Tempels was ahead of the
European anthropologists and missionaries who found no philosophy worth its salt in African
culture; a culture which to them was a product of ‘a primitive mentality’” (Oruka 1997, 164). Thus,
Tempels has incontestably been accredited as the first European scholar to have published a work
that prima facie seems to systematically debunk the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ despite the fact that
he does this in the sense of finding, as Oruka elsewhere rightly puts, “rationality in the irrational”
(Oruka 1990, 16). Now whether Tempels deserves such an accreditation or not might be debatable,
and the scope of this study may not allow me to delve into that debate. But it remains reasonably
clear to me that Tempels, just like most ethno-philosophers, was gravely mistaken to generalize
his anthropological findings that he then lazily baptized Bantu (read African) philosophy.

I concur with Gail Presbey, who, along with Paul Radin, critiques Tempels’ approach as highly
“presumptive and wrong-headed insofar as Tempels presumed to describe Bantu philosophy on behalf of
Bantu speaking people” (Presbey 2016, 5).
37
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Scholars in African philosophy, however, remain divided on this, with some praising
Tempels as being arguably the father of African philosophy (Masolo 1995, 46). Others have aired
their discomforts while appreciating his contribution. Commenting on Tempels’ text, for instance,
Odera Oruka, scornfully observes that it is “full of intolerable paternalism of a vigorous Western
missionary who is eager to save the souls of the Bantu people” but nonetheless ends up crafting an
idiosyncratic “philosophy” that denies them knowledge proper, except that knowledge which is
mystical and sporadically magical (Oruka 1995, 21).
This, to me, sounds a valid criticism against Tempels’ methodology and intentionality; for
Tempels only grants to Bantu people the knowledge of vital force that happens to hierarchically
permeate being: God, Spirits, ancestors, humans, animals, plants, and other stuff in that pecking
order (Tempels 1945, 23-35, 55-59, 61-64). But obviously this cannot be the only knowledge that
Bantu people, leave alone Africans, are capable of, neither is it the only kind of knowledge that is
idiosyncratically unique to them as Tempels would like us to believe.
3.2.2.2. John S. Mbiti and “African Philosophy and Religion”
Another scholar who has immensely contributed to propagate the ethno-philosophical
approach to African philosophy is a Kenyan-born theologian John S. Mbiti. In his rather famous
text entitled African Philosophy and Religion (1969), Mbiti sets out to emphasize the unity of
African religions and philosophy. As he categorically puts it in the introduction, one can hardly
separate philosophy from religion in Africa, since “Africans are notoriously religious,” and it is
religion more than anything else that governs or drives their life (Mbiti 1969, xii).
Mbiti consequently conflates traditional African religions with African philosophy, thereby
describing the latter as simply having to do with how Africans ordinarily but uniquely respond to
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life in their different daily activities. What follows then in the remainder of his book is an analysis
of such topics as time, kinship, family, birth, child naming, initiation, marriage, death, prayers,
sacrifices, magic, etc. And in thoroughly treating these topics, Mbiti seems to portray Africans as
not only unique but also strangely mysterious.
With regard to the concept of time, for instance, Mbiti suggests that time in the African
mind is not similar to, say, the Western concept of time that has three significant phases: past,
present, and future, with time moving from the past to the future. According to Mbiti, Africans are
philosophically unique since their concept of time has two dimensions, namely, a long-past and
the felt-present; with hardly any future (except that which covers about six months to two years).
He uses Kiswahili words zamani and sasa to describe the two dimensions (the long-past and the
felt-present) respectively, saying that the latter (sasa) covers all that is present plus the short future
of about six to two years (Mbiti 1990, 17-24).38 Time in Africa, Mbiti also adds, moves from
present to past, given that time in Africa is measured in terms of events.
The idea of time moving from present to past is significant in Mbiti’s philosophy, though
it remains highly dubious. For him, the past (zamani) is the permanent “storehouse” for all events;
it is “the ocean of time in which everything becomes absorbed into a reality that is neither after
nor before” (Mbiti 1990, 23). Thus, events move from sasa and disappear into zamani. The latter,
therefore, as Oruka observes, seems to be “the period of myth that gives the sense of foundation
to all things in the sasa period” (Oruka 1997, 188). And it is from this concept of time, one would
say, that Mbiti understands African philosophy as “the permanent and unquestionable foundation
of beliefs that give sense to every aspect of life and the history of the people” (Oruka 1997, 188).

It is surprising that Mbiti chose not to use the Kiswahili word usoni, which literally and properly
translates into “infinite future”. But that would water down his whole analysis of time.
38
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Thus, like in Tempels, African philosophy from the ethno-philosophical point of view becomes in
Mbiti a permanent if unanimous body of beliefs that the whole community lazily absorbs. 39
3.2.2.3. Why Ethno-philosophy is a flop
As we hinted above, despite its attempts to debunk the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’, ethnophilosophy as a school of thought seems to flop for various reasons. First, it tends to see philosophy
in Africa as a collective enterprise, a communal participatory thought process, thereby lacking in
the basic characteristics (e.g., individual intellectual astuteness) ordinarily attributed to other world
philosophies (Odhiambo 2009, 65). In other words, ethno-philosophy tends to present philosophy
in Africa as merely a lived communal worldview. Ethno-philosophy, therefore, can be described
as “the study of collective forms of culture as manifestations of African philosophical systems”
(Ivan and Masolo 2000, 4); at best only giving us what is supposedly assumed in everyday life.
Ethno-philosophy has further been accused of serving the interests of colonialists and
imperialists whose intention is to dominate and exploit Africans, having classified them as
uniquely inferior. It basically aims at presenting and defending traditional African worldview as a
thought system, albeit within a particular culture. Upon careful scrutiny, however, it becomes
apparent that this trend only succeeds in portraying philosophy in Africa as unique, idiosyncratic,
and distinct from, say, Western philosophy in a pejorative manner. This is because at best, ethnophilosophy is only exercised as a collective wisdom of a people, one that is almost uncritically
shared by everybody in the society. The end result, then, is not philosophy in the proper sense of
the word. Hence, as Oruka rightly says, whereas Western philosophy is identified with reason,

Others who subscribe to ethno-philosophical approach include: Kagame (1959); Horton (1987); and
Griaule (1965). For details, see Odhiambo 2009, 43-64.
39
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logic, and science, African philosophy in the eyes of ethno-philosophy is defined by the opposite
of these attributes, which ultimately creates “a subtle form of master-slave distinction between the
two races” (Oruka 1991, 20).
As a communal thought system, ethno-philosophy also seems desperately impersonal; it is
not identifiable with any individual thinker, which again works against the Africans and their
interests within the global society. Hence, Oruka describes it as “the philosophy of everybody; it
is understood and accepted by everyone. It is at best a form of religion. But would in other cases
function perfectly like a taboo and superstition” (Oruka 1982, 48; cf. Oruka 1990, iv-v). This point
has had support from other contemporary scholars who lament sadly that philosophy in Africa has
been unfortunately presented by ethno-philosophers as atypical; that is, as “a remarkable unanimity
with no dissenting voice ... a philosophy without philosophers” (Odhiambo 2008, 96; 2009, 73).
Another criticism levelled against ethno-philosophy pertains to its methodology. In its
endeavour to get to the underlying basic principles of reality and behaviour of the people in Africa,
ethno-philosophy employs a methodology similar to that which cultural anthropology ordinarily
uses, namely, ethnology. This, according to Oruka is a method employed in cultural anthropology
to study “a people as a collective and unified one-willed organism” (Oruka 1991, 19). The
information acquired is then craftily described in a philosophical language. The end-product,
however, as Hountondji aptly observes, is neither anthropology nor philosophy proper but a
conglomeration of both, or more euphemistically ethno-philosophy. For him, such a process mostly
succeeds in producing “ethnological works with philosophical pretensions” (Hountondji 1983, 34).
Evidently, then, ethno-philosophy falls spectacularly into the same pitfall it so desperately
sought to avoid. Just as the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ tends to confine philosophy to the West,

70

ethno-philosophers embark on writing something about philosophy in Africa, but, as Odhiambo
says, they do so not without a remarkable naivety. They try to argue, for instance, that African
culture and its philosophy are a uniquely lived experience, and not a myriad of concepts to be
idealized or rigorously rationalized by critical mind. In other words, they see philosophy in Africa
as “an inseparable part of the concrete, of culture as Africans feel and live, and not an entity to be
isolated and discussed [critically]” (Odhiambo 2008, 98). But in so doing, they also almost
unconsciously demonstrate that philosophy understood as a detailed, critical, rigorous, intellectual
exercise has no place in African culture, both traditional and modern.
Elsewhere, Oruka affirms this point, cautioning that the contentious issue is not that there is
and perhaps there must be a distinction between African philosophy and, say, Western philosophy;
for indeed, “the historical, cultural, and environmental conditions and choices in the two systems
are reasonably different. But, whatever the difference, it does not qualitatively lay in the use of
reason” (Oruka 1991, 26). Hence, for Oruka, the greatest disservice to development of philosophy
in Africa is to deliberately or otherwise deny Africans the use of reason, which is a universal
human trait, and instead attempt to “dress it in magic and extra-rational traditionalism”, which is
what ethno-philosophy basically does (Oruka 1991, 26).
Here, Oruka seems in tandem with Lévi-Strauss whose “structuralism” acknowledges reason
in all people’s thought process despite their cultural and environmental difference (Lévi-Strauss,
1976). Gyekye also seems to agree with Oruka when he astutely argues that philosophy (by which
he means ‘intellectual inquiry into fundamental questions about human experience’) is essentially
universal human activity; meaning the propensity, the desire and the capacity to wonder and hence
to raise fundamental questions about nature, supreme being, human existence, etc, can be found in
peoples of different cultures even though the responses given may vary (Gyekye 1995, xiv, 10).
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3.2.3. Professional African Philosophy (The Third Phase)
Owing to the above criticisms levelled against ethno-philosophy, some professionally
trained African philosophers emerged to assert that African philosophy should be seen from the
professional/ academic perspective. This trend, which forms the third phase in search for the nature
and existence of philosophy in Africa, insists that any African philosophy worthy its name should
be not only individually based, but most importantly engrained with critical, complex but coherent
arguments (Wiredu 1980, 34).
Key proponents of this school of thought include: Wiredu (Philosophy and an African
Culture, 1980), Bodunrin (The Question of African Philosophy, 1981), Hountondji (African
Philosophy: Myth and Reality, 1983), and to some extent Odera Oruka. As Odhiambo rightly
observes, these are professionally trained African thinkers who have one remarkable characteristic:
they strive to employ techniques and methodology commonly but perhaps erroneously associated
with Western philosophy only (Odhiambo 2009, 74). Also, while they generally concur that
African philosophy should be independent, dynamic, critical, and discursive, yet they in most cases
hold some interesting, divergent, and even sometimes incompatible views, especially when the
question boils down to the exact nature of philosophy in Africa, or when the question involves a
particular contentious issue. They try to lift the discourse to a “universal level” before turning to
specific existential conditions and priorities affecting humanity in search of truth (Bell 2002, 27).
A good example can be seen in reference to an intriguing debate between Oruka and
Wiredu on the concept of truth. Whereas the latter in the essay “Truth as Opinion” holds that truth
is nothing categorically set other than an opinion (Wiredu 1972), the former in his paper “Truth
and Belief” opines that truth must be absolute and foundational to knowledge, otherwise if truth
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were merely opinion, discourse would be vitiated by subjectivity, which would result in anarchy
and chaos (Oruka 1975). Wiredu then responds to Oruka in a paper “In Behalf of Opinion” (1976),
before Oruka’s rejoinder in “For the Sake of Truth” (1988). Unfortunately, that exchange could
not last long following Oruka’s untimely death in 1995. Thus, Wiredu regrets that he was still
planning on how to respond to Oruka in yet another essay, which most likely would have ignited
another intellectual battle. It seems the two had created a habit of challenging each other in almost
every topic they wrote about. However, their divergent views, fierce criticisms, and perhaps
misreading each other only made their friendship grow deeper and stronger (contrary to the opinion
of many). Wiredu affirms this point when in tribute to his fallen comrade writes:
I recall that our friendship [with Oruka] grew even as our philosophical disagreements
gathered momentum. I have pleasant memories of the long discussions Oruka and I had
whenever we met, which was quite frequent. In these discussions, we took up points of
disagreement much oftener than points of agreement, and we both found that rewarding;
certainly, I did (Graness and Kresse 1997, 141).
I bring out the passionate encounter between these two arguably most prolific philosophers
in Africa then to show how the so-called “professional” school of thought envisioned philosophy
in Africa ought to be: a robust formal (written) intellectual encounter characterised by systematic
complex arguments and counter arguments by two or more critical minds in relation to a particular
philosophical issue. Thus, as a trend basically meant to debunk the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’, the
“professional” school of thought, then, seems to have the intention to articulate and defend African
philosophy in the strict and technical usage of the term. 40

As a caveat, though, it is important to note with Oruka that representatives of this trend are referred to
as “professional”, not because of their superior or otherwise individual intellectual astuteness, but simply
because they hold the position that whatever African philosophy is, it must satisfy the criteria of
professional philosophy: critical, independent, and discursive reflection (Oruka 1991, 20).
40
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3.2.3.1.Why the “professional” approach might fail
Despite all its noble intentions, the professional approach to African philosophy, unfortunately,
also has some shortcomings. First, having been trained mostly in the Western traditions, the socalled “professional philosophers” are often accused of inappropriately deploying Western
techniques, logic, and methods to do African philosophy. They tend, in other words, to use Western
“spectacles” to see African philosophy, thereby missing an invaluable chunk of African-ness. The
end-result of what they qualify African philosophy becomes in essence, as Oruka says, “a scholarly
exercise rooted in the West” (Oruka 1990, 16-19).
Furthermore, even though the professional approach would grant the existence of African
philosophy in its proper and strict sense, it nonetheless limits itself to modern or contemporary
Africa, giving a false impression that traditional Africans were inherently incapable of technical
philosophy (Odhiambo 2008, 97). In sum, the professional trend can be accused of going “too far
in risking African philosophical identity to the Western bias”, that is, using Western philosophy
as the measure of philosophizing in Africa. It also seems not to go far enough in limiting the
discussion to the specific issues affecting the African context (Bell 2002, 28).
3.3. Philosophic Sagacity: A “New” Trend
Following our discussion so far regarding the nature and the existence of philosophy in
Africa, it is now clear, I think, that the two trends (ethno-philosophical and professional approach)
fail in one way or another to adequately address the issue, thereby debunking the ‘myth of prephilosophy’. Hence, it becomes imperative to think of another approach that would clarify the
matter. And that is where the ingenuity of Odera Oruka comes in as he seeks to craft another trend,
a kind of “hybrid” or go-between trend that would overcome the challenges of both ethno-
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philosophy and professional philosophy without losing their invaluable contributions. As we shall
see, this “new” trend, which Oruka dubbed philosophic sagacity, proves to be very helpful in
shaping the understanding of the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa. It is also
applicable elsewhere in the world, leading to a possibility of having an intercultural approach to
philosophy, a prerequisite towards establishing a genuine practice of justice at the global level.
3.3.1. Philosophic Sagacity enroute41
Now in response to the ‘myth of pre-philosophy’ that had scornfully denied any philosophy
in Africa, and owing to the challenges of ethno-philosophical and professional approach, Odera
Oruka as early as 1974 came up with a new approach that would seek individuals within traditional
African societies who were considered not only morally irreproachable but most importantly
sagacious in a rather philosophic, critical, or didactic sense. The idea was to have a serious dialogue
with these sages (normally in their own mother-tongue) and then systematically record their
thoughts on such important issues as the nature of the Divine, the concept of human person, the
meaning of freedom, democracy, justice, equality, time, death, afterlife, etc. The recording of such
thoughts became for Oruka a concrete evidence of philosophy in Africa, which philosophy could
later on be critically analysed and academically engaged with other philosophies. Philosophic
sagacity, therefore, is a trend that aims at rescuing African philosophy in the technical sense of the
word seen through African “spectacles”, that is, seen with little or no Western influence.
Philosophic sagacity started with two rather ambitious but related projects that Oruka
together with some of his students and colleagues at the University of Nairobi carried out in Kenya.
The term “philosophic sagacity” can be viewed in two rather related ways: first, as a trend or a school
of thought; and second, as a quality or an intellectual capacity of an individual - a philosophic sage. In
this section, we will mostly advance the former connotation rather than the latter to demonstrate Oruka’s
practical response to the contentious issue of the nature and existence of philosophy in Africa.
41
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The first project entitled “Thoughts of Traditional Kenyan Sages” was carried out in 1974. Its aim
was either to substantiate or invalidate the claim that traditional African people were innocent of
logical and critical thinking, and hence seemingly removed from any philosophical discourse. As
Oruka tells us, it sought to address the following question:
Would it be possible to identify persons of traditional African culture capable of the critical,
second-order type of thinking about the various problems of human life and nature; persons
… who subject beliefs that are traditionally taken for granted to independent rational reexamination, and who are inclined to accept or reject such beliefs on the authority of reason
rather than on the basis of a communal or religious consensus? (Oruka 1991, 17).

The project was conducted in the form of dialogues with Kenyan sages across the country.
Many of these dialogues have been published in Oruka’s classical text - Sage Philosophy. But as
Oruka further notes, while some sages were found merely to reiterate cultural beliefs and moral
systems, others were critical, independent-minded, and very insightful. The former are folk sages,
whereas the latter are philosophic sages whom Oruka was mostly interested to expose to the world.
In 1976, Oruka launched yet another project, this time bringing in some national and social
dimensions. This project entitled “The Philosophical Roots of Culture in Kenya” was presented to
the Ministry of Culture and Social Services, though it was never officially published. The two
projects constitute what Oruka would later call “Kenyan philosophic sagacity”. This is because,
whereas the 1974 project sought to identify philosophic sages in Kenya, the 1976 project was
geared towards engaging their thoughts for the sake of finding lasting social cohesion and national
prosperity (Odhiambo 2008, 94-95). Hence, for Oruka, philosophic sagacity is not just another
school of thought for mere speculative abstract discourse; it is rather one practical trend meant to
offer viable alternative solutions to some contemporaneous predicaments affecting his people.
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There has been controversy regarding exactly when philosophic sagacity, as a trend, made
its grand-maiden entry into philosophical arena, with some claiming 1978 while others holding on
to 1981. I follow those who maintain that it was in 1978 when Odera Oruka officially proposed it
to the international community during a conference to commemorate the achievements of A. W.
Amo (1703-1759)42 in Accra Ghana (Odhiambo 2008, 92). During that conference, we learn that
Oruka presented an intriguing paper entitled “Four Trends in Current African Philosophy”, where
he identified four trends in (or approaches to) philosophy in Africa, namely, ethno-philosophy,
nationalistic-ideological philosophy, professional philosophy, and philosophic sagacity.43
In his conclusion, having analysed both the strength and the weaknesses of the other three
trends, Oruka passionately appealed for philosophic sagacity as the ideal trend to approach African
philosophy, showing how it overcomes most of the criticisms levelled against the other trends. The
following year, Oruka is said to have read a slightly revised version of that paper during the 16 th
World Congress of Philosophy in Dusseldorf, Germany, where he once again defended
philosophic sagacity. The paper, however, was only published in 1981, which perhaps makes some
have the false impression that the term “philosophic sagacity” found its entry into the philosophical
arena then (Odhiambo 2008, 92). Oruka would later develop and publish this paper as a book
entitled Trends in Contemporary African Philosophy (1990).

Born in present-day Ghana in 1703, Anton Wilhelm Amo was brought to Germany by the Dutch West
Indian Co. in 1707 as a child slave. He was, however, lucky to access education, becoming arguably the
first black African known to have attended university in Europe where he exhibited great intellectual
capacity. He studied law, medicine, psychology, and philosophy. He later taught at the universities of
Halle and Jena and published several philosophical works. He returned to his native land in 1753, where
he died later on in 1759 (Mabe, 2014). For more details, see Asante and Abarry 1996, 424 ff.
43
Oruka would later on add two more trends: (i) hermeneutic philosophy, which consists of philosophical
analysis of concepts in a given African language to help clarify meaning and logical implications; and (ii)
artistic or literary philosophy (Oruka 1991, 5).
42
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3.3.2. Philosophic Sagacity or Sage philosophy?
There has been temptation to conflate ‘philosophic sagacity’ with ‘sage philosophy’ as if
the two are synonymous. But, as we shall see, this amounts to misreading Oruka, given that the
former is a derivative of or just one aspect of the latter.44 As hinted above, Sage philosophy is an
ambitious project that proceeds from the premise that there are individuals within various African
societies who exhibit some rare but philosophic insights, rigorous arguments, and viable positions
while addressing some deep-seated issues related to nature, life, existence, deity, etc., both at the
communal and universal planes. The assumption, as Barasa holds, is that if such individuals were
engaged in a dialectical manner on their own or through midwifery provocation by a professionally
trained philosopher, they can with ease reveal a great deal of insight, which may be harnessed for
enlightenment and betterment of the wellbeing of their people (Graness and Kresse 1997, 20).
Thus, besides being a trend or an approach employed to identify, philosophically provoke
or engage, as well as sort out such enlightened individuals, philosophic sagacity can also be
considered as an intellectual quality or product of philosophic sages. That means not every sage as
such can exhibit philosophic sagacity as product of their thoughts. This point might become clearer
if we take a keen look at Oruka’s understanding of sagacity.
According to Oruka, sagacity can be considered in two senses. In one sense, sagacity
consists of thoughts, beliefs, and convictions of people considered and acknowledged as wise by
their respective communities. The condition for one to be considered wise in this case involves
having or showing some deep insights and good judgments in one’s endeavours. But in yet another

For a detailed account on how the two terms appear in Oruka’s work, see Odhiambo, 2002 19-30. It is
also worth noting that the phrase “African Sage Philosophy” is now commonly used in reference to the
body of thought produced by persons considered wise in Africa (cf. Masolo 2006).
44

78

sense, sagacity refers to a body of basic principles, aphorisms, and tenets that underlie and justify
beliefs, customs, and practices of a given culture (Oruka 1991, 34.) We therefore notice that
sagacity – the object of sage philosophy - can be split into two: popular (or folk) sagacity, and
philosophic (or didactic) sagacity. Oruka clarifies this point when he describes sage philosophy as,
[T]he expressed thoughts of wise men and women in any given community [which is also]
a way of thinking and explaining the world [in a manner] that fluctuates between popular
wisdom (well-known communal maxims, aphorisms and general common-sense truths)
and didactic wisdom (an expounded wisdom and rational thoughts of some individuals
within the community) (Oruka 1991, 33; emphasis mine).
He goes on to point out that while popular wisdom is often “conformist”, didactic wisdom
is at times critical of the communal systems and popular wisdom. Put differently, while popular or
folk sagacity consists of generally well-known communal principles and common-sense truths,
didactic or philosophic sagacity expresses deep-seated insights and rational thoughts of some
intellectually outstanding individuals within a given society. Oruka in fact refers to folk sagacity
as “culture philosophy” or philosophy in the first order in contra-distinction with philosophic
sagacity, i.e., philosophy in the second order; and he insists that his research project in Kenya was
concerned with the sage philosophy of the second order to disprove the well-known view that real
philosophical thought had no place in traditional Africa (Oruka 1983, 387; Oruka 1991a, 34).
It appears, therefore, that sagacity or wisdom as such is the object of sage philosophy, with
philosophic sagacity as one aspect of it and folk sagacity the other, even though the two aspects of
sagacity are very much related. This is because it is the thoughts of persons already acknowledged
as incredibly wise that, in fact, constitute the basis on which their respective communities build
popular or folk sagacity. But that should not be the reason to conflate the two. Thus, we insist with
Oruka that philosophic sagacity transcends folk sagacity by always being critical and non-
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conformist to attain that technical status. Put differently, whereas all instances of philosophic
sagacity locate within sage philosophy, not every instance of sage philosophy amounts to
philosophic sagacity; some could be instances of folk or popular sagacity (Oruka 1991, 33).
From what we have said also, it is apparent that we can think of sages in two ways, namely,
folk (or mere) sages on the one hand, and philosophic sages on the other. According to Oruka, a
sage is a person who is well versed in the wisdom and traditions of his or her people. In this regard,
a sage normally acts as a mirror reflecting the community’s wisdom, culture and traditions (Oruka
1983, 386). But being a sage does not necessarily make one a philosopher; for one may be wise
“within the conventional and historical confines of their culture”, yet, one may not be wise (or
critical) “in understanding or solving the inconsistencies of their culture or coping with the foreign
innovations that encroach on it” (Oruka 1983, 386).
Some sages, however, have the capacity to transcend folk (or popular) sagacity so that as
serious thinkers, they display not only critical thoughts, but most importantly adhere only to those
aspects of sagacity that satisfy their rational scrutiny. And as Oruka points out, such sages are in
most cases “potentially or contemporarily in clash with the diehard adherents of the prevailing
common beliefs” (Oruka 1983, 386). They are not only critical, but sometimes rebellious against
status quo or popular sagacity. For Oruka, then, only those sages who are critical and inquisitive
qualify to be called philosophic sages; and philosophic sagacity, as a trend, aims at exposing and
systematically rearticulating their insight, thoughts and ideas for the betterment of our society.
On the other hand, though, there are folk sages who, unlike the philosophic sages, operate
squarely and almost lazily within the confines of their cultural beliefs and status quo. Talking
about folk sages, Oruka pointedly says:
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Beliefs or truth-claims within culture are generally treated as ‘absolute’ (i.e., not to be
questioned). Anything outside or contradictory to the culture is treated with indifference
and even hostility. Those sages or persons who are (merely) experts in the culture defend
this “philosophy” and the structure of their society with the zeal of fanatical ideologists
defending their political line (Oruka 1983, p. 387).
Thus, while folk sages may glorify communal conformity, a philosophic sage is in most
cases sceptical and critical of communal consensus, often employing reason to assess it. Also,
while folk sages are often identifiable by their consistent inability to isolate their own opinions
from the beliefs of the community (for instance, being readily inclined to take refuge behind the
popular unexamined positions whenever one is intellectually challenged), philosophic sages are
clearly able to isolate community beliefs from their own critical evaluation, rationalization, and
even criticisms, quite often enjoying a dialectic encounter with the challenger (Oruka 1991, 36).
To illustrate this point further, Odera Oruka compares two sages: Ogotemmeli from the
Dogon community in Mali and Mbuya Akoko, a sage from the Luo in Kenya. In this comparison,
Ogotemmeli, given his unequalled capacity to faithfully recite and fanatically defend beliefs
common to his people, represents a typical folk sage. He makes no attempt either to assess or
transcend them. Thus, in spite of the seemingly significant ideas attributed to him, Ogotemmeli
cannot qualify to be a philosophic sage given that his doctrine is even well known to the average
member of his community, especially the elders. His teaching, one could say, is rather esoteric in
character, though not necessarily philosophical. When asked about what he thinks about women,
for instance, Ogotemmeli lazily answers that according to customary belief of Dogon, a woman is
fundamentally different from a man based on a curse and punishment from God. “After God made
woman”, argues Ogotemmeli, “he gave her bad blood which has to flow every month... which
obviously makes her inferior to man” he says (Griaule 1965, 146).
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Unlike Ogotemmeli, however, Mbuya Akoko (one of the philosophic sages interviewed by
Oruka) not only knows his community’s culture and moral beliefs, but he also critically questions
and quite often improves upon some of the traditional Luo beliefs, such as how the community
thinks about women. As a philosophic sage, Akoko makes his own critical assessment arguing:
A man has the physical capacity to run faster than a woman. But on the other hand, a
woman has the physical capacity to undergo the pains of carrying and bearing a baby which
a man lacks. So, we cannot correctly say one is superior or inferior to the other. ... In truth
... the two [genders] are naturally equal or balanced ...” (Oruka 1983, 389).
Here, then, we have an argument that is not only independent, but most importantly philosophical
in the proper sense given that it goes beyond the communal chorus of the general Luo beliefs about
women being inferior than men; it distinguishes Mbuya Akoko as a typical philosophic sage.
It is crucial to note that Odera Oruka was compelled to make that distinction as he sought
to answer Peter Bodunrin (one of his contemporaries) who, as an attempt to expose and critique
Oruka’s philosophic sagacity had cited two other approaches to philosophy in Africa: (i) Griaule’s
famous Conversations with Ogotemmeli (1965); and (ii) Sodipo and Hallen’s research on the
Yoruba concept of a person in An African Epistemology (1981). Badunrin had then, according to
Oruka, erroneously put the two approaches at the same par with Oruka’s approach, making him
(Oruka) feel misread insofar as his philosophic sagacity trend is concerned. Badunrin had further
unfairly criticised the genius in Oruka’s approach prompting a rejoinder (Oruka 1983, 388-393).
3.3.3. Philosophic Sagacity versus Ethno-philosophy
We have been at pains to ascertain that sage philosophy is not synonymous to philosophic
sagacity. The two are related, although there are some crucial differences that many scholars
unfortunately continue to overlook. This, however, has been to the disservice of sage philosophy,
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with some conflating it with ethnophilosophy. As Odhiambo aptly notes, critics quite often “equate
sage philosophy with ethno-philosophy in toto, yet in actuality it is only the folk sagacity aspect
[of sage philosophy] that lends itself to ethno-philosophy” (Odhiambo 2008, 105).
Indeed, comparing philosophic sagacity with the ethno-philosophy reveals that the former
significantly differs from the latter; the former is both individually-based and dialogical in nature.
It is a thought process of variously known and named thinkers, and not a popular or communal
worldview. More so, unlike ethno-philosophy, philosophic sagacity is rigorous and philosophical
in the strict sense of the word (Oruka 1990, 17). Thus, we can only equate folk sagacity (but not
philosophic sagacity) with ethno-philosophy.
I find that point crucial, for it forms the basis of our previous position that philosophic
sagacity aims at overcoming the challenges of ethno-philosophy, thereby salvaging its unique
indigenous African-ness. Ethno-philosophy, as we said, has been frequently accused of merely
rearticulating African’s communal or folk beliefs and customs using some pseudo-philosophic
language but lacking in any independent, critical and coherent engagement. Perhaps folk (or
popular) sagacity, the other wing of sage philosophy, may fail the task of overcoming this criticism,
but surely not philosophic sagacity. Indeed, philosophic sagacity, as Oruka rightly says, is the only
trend that can give “an all-acceptable decisive blow to the position of ethno-philosophy” (Oruka
1983, 384). This gives us the impetus to interrogate further what philosophic sagacity aims at.
3.3.4. The Hallmark of Practical Wisdom
At this juncture one may ask: what exactly is philosophic sagacity concerned with? And to
answer that question, we say that philosophic sagacity, as a trend in African philosophy, seeks to
escape the many criticisms levelled against ethno-philosophy while manoeuvring its way past the
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limitations of “professional” philosophy. Put differently, besides disproving the false suppositions
of the former, philosophic sagacity becomes handy in rescuing the latter. At its best, philosophic
sagacity seeks to bring back to light some of the lost glory of philosophy in Africa by emphasizing
sagacious reasoning (i.e., practical wisdom) rather than merely abstract speculative discourse. But
that does not mean philosophic sagacity is unfriendly to or incompatible with theoretical critical
thinking. What it means is that theoretical critical thinking ought to be taken as means toward
addressing practical issues affecting us. Thus, a good philosophic sage will have to employ critical
thinking to come up with a philosophy that must be relevantly applicable to alleviate humanity’s
perils, thereby help to improve people’s wellbeing without neglecting the environment.
To put this into the perspective of what we said earlier, philosophic sagacity seeks to
combine and retain the unique indigenous value-systems found in ethno-philosophy with modern
“professionalism” in the professional trend as it endeavours to handle fundamental issues and
problems facing humanity and the environment across the board, but with special focus in Africa.
Thus, as it seeks to rehabilitate philosophy in Africa, it focuses on African thoughts that are truly
critical, discursive, and independent. Conversely it focuses on philosophical issues that are
genuinely relevant to contemporary Africa. It does this by striving to find out how sages in Africa
(traditional and modern) could effectively address the current problems (Odhiambo 2009, 97-98).
Furthermore, cognizant to the fact that a sage can be either formally educated or not,
philosophic sagacity expresses the view that there exist within various African communities
individuals who, despite the fact that they have not had the benefit of having contact with the
Western philosophy (such as the works of Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Kant, Heidegger, etc.) are,
nonetheless, philosophical by the power of reason and inborn insight rather than by the authority
of communal consensus (Oruka 1990, 16).
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Thus, from a practical point of view, philosophic sagacity first and foremost aims at
showing that the problem in traditional or modern Africa is not really lack of logic, reason, or
scientific curiosity. The problem rather is failure to identify these factors (logic, reason and
scientific curiosity) due to some unjustifiable, biased and racist misconceptions. The fact is: given
that we can find some philosophic sages with a system of thoughts that employs a rigorous use of
their mental gifts, then that shows clearly there is rational reflection in Africa.
Second, philosophic sagacity aims at showing that communal consensus, a fact typical of
most if not all traditional societies, should not be viewed as a hindrance for individual critical
reflection. Indeed, as Oruka further observes, “just as religion and all kinds of dogmatic fanaticism
did not kill philosophy in the West, traditional African folk wisdom and taboos left some room for
real philosophic thought” (Oruka1983, 385). The main task therefore is to try to distinguish the
two wings of sage philosophy and systematically rearticulate the thoughts of philosophic sages in
every society. That would make philosophic sagacity arguably the most effective trend capable of
understanding what philosophy is, before articulating the sort of philosophy found in Africa.
Finally, and to conclude this section, we say that philosophic sagacity is a school of thought
that enables our talk of philosophy in Africa without alienating African thinkers from their
“intellectual roots”. Given that it tries to systematically bridge the gap between “traditionalists”
and “modernists” insofar as the debate on the nature and the existence philosophy in Africa is
concerned, philosophic sagacity guides us on how best we can do philosophy in a relevant and
well-founded way to combat the current issues affecting humanity and the environment, while at
the same time being aware of our cultural cum historical milieu. As an invaluable tool or means
toward creating practical philosophy, philosophic sagacity, then, has an important function of
distinguishing a genuine philosopher (lover of wisdom and truth) from, say, a mere rhetorician, a
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religious leader, or a political activist. Thus, philosophic sagacity is the hallmark of advancing
practical wisdom, a prerequisite condition for building up a more humane and just society.45

3.4. Conclusion
This chapter was meant to further discuss Oruka’s commitment to practical philosophy by
exploring his rather incontestable contribution to defence and shaping of philosophy in Africa. In
response to some misconstrued bias against Africans, Oruka is known to have embarked on a
research project in Kenya to demonstrate that there really are genuine philosophers who, solidly
guided by reason, do critique the status quo as much as they propose new ways of solving human
predicaments. Such philosophers might or might not have been formally educated through the
Western system, for instance, but they nonetheless clearly demonstrate the use of reason, logic and
critical thinking, thereby debunking the racist bias that Africans are incapable of having or doing
philosophy given that reason and logic seems alien to them. At the heart of this project was Oruka’s
concept of philosophic sagacity, in which this chapter had special interest.
Thus, we started off by displaying the historical and contextual background that informed or
prompted Oruka’s response to the then distressing matter of the nature and existence of philosophy
in Africa, before considering in depth philosophic sagacity within sage philosophy. This was
meant to show Oruka’s approach to philosophy as a practical response to one of the most intriguing
issues in contemporary Africa: biased social, economic, political, and intellectual deprivation and

I am alive to several criticisms against philosophic sagacity, most of which, unfortunately arise from
misreading Oruka. They include: Keita (1985); Badunrin (1981); and Masolo (1995). For an intriguing
debate on how Oruka responded would have responded to such criticism, see Odhiambo 2010, 126-150;
and Oluwole in Graness & Kresse 1997, 149-162.
45
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suppression. It was therefore meant to portray Odera Oruka as a diligent practical philosopher
committed to seeking justice for his people.
In the first section, we critically considered the three phases that, according to Oruka, seem to
characterize a rather turbulent path that finally saw the recognition and appreciation of philosophy
in Africa. The first phase dubbed “the myth of pre-philosophy” comprises of a stage in which
African’s culture and mind were generally claimed to be extremely alien to logic, reason,
philosophy and civilization. Ironically, this phase is well represented by such prominent
philosophers as Hume, Kant, Hegel, among others.
The second phase, the ethno-philosophical era, saw such scholars as Tempels and Mbiti
vehemently trying to assert African philosophy, but only succeeded in lazily conceiving of it as a
communal affair (with no individual thinkers) that uniquely define the African mind. That
necessitated the rise of yet another phase, with individual Africans who had been professionally
trained as philosophers in Europe and elsewhere grappling to articulate issues about African
philosophy. But in their endeavour, the so-called “professional phase” alienated itself from (or
took for granted) the existence of indigenous African thinkers while at the same time going too far
in employing Western methodologies and skills to determine how philosophy in Africa ought to
be done. And it was precisely due to these challenges that Oruka ingeniously came up with a new
trend he dubbed philosophic sagacity, a trend that tries to capture both indigenous value-systems
on the one hand and critical professionalism on the other in developing African philosophy.
The second section was dedicated to espousing philosophic sagacity as a trend that properly
underscores Oruka’s practical dimension of philosophy. In the context of his Sage philosophy
project, philosophic sagacity can be viewed in two related senses: (i) as a trend or a school of

87

thought; and (ii), as a quality or capacity of an individual who qualifies to be a philosophical sage.
We tried to focus much on the first sense. Thus, we have seen that philosophic sagacity is no doubt
one of the most profound philosophical trends in Africa, just as it is also applicable elsewhere.
This is so because it calls for a genuine retrieval as well as critical reconsideration of traditional
philosophic wisdom and insight that would be instrumental in solving contemporary problems.
In short, using philosophic sagacity as his trademark, we have tried to show how Oruka was
able to successfully master the tension between tradition versus modernity, thereby fulfilling a
mediating function between the two value systems. This was done by showing how philosophic
sagacity, as one of the trends in philosophy, sails through the challenges of both ethno-philosophy
and professional philosophy. As a practically relevant school of thought, it takes a crucial step
towards the preservation of traditional (classical) wisdom while at the same time contributing
immensely to an independent and critical history of philosophy in Africa. This way, Oruka rescues
the nature and the existence of philosophy in Africa, which is one way of seeking justice for Africa.
At the same time, understood as a quality or ability that a philosopher has or ought to have,
philosophic sagacity turns out to be handy in emphasizing the practical dimension of philosophy;
it is that which qualifies one to be a philosophic sage, that is, a thinker who is not only reasonable,
critical, independent-minded and logically consistent but most important also one who embraces
ethical duty to improve humanity’s wellbeing without jeopardizing the environment. Thus, a
philosophic sage, we argued, ought to be wise, meaning she or he should be able to make proper
and reasonable judgments in life based on her or his account of the past, analysis of the present
and projective goals of the future. To be wise would also mean that one should aim at pursuing the
truth and upholding justice as an ethically responsible moral agent.
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Now looking at the trajectory of Oruka’s interest in philosophy reveals that over time, the issue
of proving the nature and existence of philosophy in Africa to biased and racist outsiders eventually
diminished in importance as the question of how sagacity and critical reflection could help Africa
and humanity as such took centre stage (Odhiambo 2006, 21; Kalumba 2004, 39-40; and Presbey
2007). Thus, it comes as no surprise to see Oruka’s practical philosophy remarkably working
through and taking such topics as truth, justice, liberty, and ecological ethics to a global level, even
long before such topics had become as “fashionable” as they are today. But it is also regrettable
that many do not recognize or acknowledge Odera Oruka as an important practical philosopher.
In my ensuing chapters, I will demonstrate how Oruka’s legacy, particularly his commitment
to practical philosophy, is specifically a sagacious-ethical quest for a genuine practice of justice at
the global level. It is a quest that seeks to uplift, safeguard, and promote humanity’s wellbeing
while at the same time taking care of our environment. His concept of global justice, we shall see,
aims at achieving not only ‘egalitarian fairness’ but also ‘ecological fairness’, which fairness ought
to be realized irrespective of our geographical, national, racial or any other sectarian affiliation.
His “parental earth ethics” is centred on the concept of human minimum; a unique “humanism” or
humanness based on the principles of egalitarian and ecological fairness. It calls us humans, who
presumably are rational cum ethical beings, to embrace some ethical duty toward each other as
well as our environment, even as we pursue what we tend to think is rightfully due. It is therefore
more eco-centric rather than anthropocentric. And being praxis-oriented, it seeks to realize socioeconomic reforms that would see the building of a more humane and more just global society.
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CHAPTER 4
ON HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITIQUE OF THE CURRENT DISCOURSE
If human beings did not have some needs, they would not know or care about “rights” (Oruka 1991b, 53).

4.1. Introduction
As we have seen in the last two chapters, Odera Oruka spent a considerable portion of his
short life mulling over the questions of what philosophy is or ought to be in general, with a special
interest in philosophy in Africa from a practical point of view. He believed that any philosophy
worthy of its name ought to be sagacious, meaning it ought to be practically relevant to the
wellbeing of humanity and the environment. At the heart of his practical philosophy was ethics,
which he regards as a philosophical inquiry into the moral language and principles that govern or
ought to govern the conduct of human beings as well as determine their value and dignity in a
global society (Oruka 1990b, 3). Thus, Odera Oruka ventured into such important ethical issues as
human rights, justice, liberty, punishment, humanism, ecology, etc.
This chapter aims at discussing the issue of human rights from a critical and practical point
of view. Thus, using Oruka’s philosophical insight, I seek to critique the current human rights talk
that to a large extent seems heavily influenced by modern cum post-modern liberal philosophies
in the West. First, I try to establish what a human right is or ought to be, thereby determining the
nature and the qualities of what could be considered human right per se. I then employ Oruka’s
insight to establish a possible philosophical defence of human rights discourse, insisting on the
actual enjoyment of their substantive elements, thereby ascertaining whether they all necessarily
imply duty in the same way or not, and how far that duty (if any) ought to abide.
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Next, I will critically engage John Locke’s philosophy of natural rights, pointing out some
shortcomings therein. His account, as we shall see, conflates the idea of right and duty with
freedom or power that people supposedly have to pursue their own interests. Thus, it tends to
promote exaggerated individualism, greed, and hence irresponsible exploitation of the ‘other’. 46 I
will use Oruka’s insight to critique that position, before evaluating two important claims about
human rights: (i) they are universal, inalienable, moral and legal norms for ensuring justice; and
(ii) they ought to be socially guaranteed and enforceable, meaning they do have some compelling
reasons to be enjoyed by all members of human species equally. Hopefully this will enable us to
advance a sound critique of the current human rights talk, one that unfortunately tends to deny or
ignore the concept of duty - understood in terms of the socio-ethical obligation that we humans
ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other without over-exploiting our environment.
Finally, using some traditional value-systems (or sagacity) from Africa, I will attempt to
construct a different human rights discourse that would primarily enhance a genuine quest for
justice at the global level. This will hopefully enable us to deconstruct a commonly held fallacy
that human rights talk has its “origin” from modern liberal philosophies in the West.
4.1.1. Preliminary Remarks
It is arguably true that human rights are universal standard norms for promoting justice to all,
where justice means striving to fairly render or facilitate the enjoyment of what every human being
is justifiably entitled to insofar as one is human. That would, however, presuppose a global society
governed by such principles as “egalitarian fairness”, which principle implies a sense of duty or

By the ‘other’ here I mean both fellow human beings who, for instance, supply labour as well as the
environment from where wealth and resources come.
46
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ethical obligation towards the wellbeing of each another for the common good. But that may raise
a fundamental question: do all human rights imply duty in the same way?
The current human rights talk to a large extent appears oblivious to that question, thereby being
unable to enhance a genuine quest for justice at the global level. First, it seems more inclined to
advancing the so-called civic or “political” right - for instance, right to freedom of speech - more
than it does on socio-economic rights, such as the right to decent life. That oblivion has made it
difficult to determine how best we can achieve actual enjoyment of rights, if any. Put differently,
it has made it difficult to establish priority order so that not every individual’s claim would qualify
to be a human right per se. As a result, the current human rights talk has become mere rhetoric for
political purposes rather than being the means to ensuring actual enjoyment of justice for all.
The current human rights talk also seems predominantly influenced by modern liberal
philosophies from the West,47 thereby isolating other philosophical trends in the world. This has
been partly due to a biased thinking that the idea of human right is a “child of Enlightenment”
(Cranston 1962, 1), and that only Western liberal thoughts can make human rights be what they
ought to be: universal moral and legal norms for ensuring equality, fairness and common good.
Indeed, until the late 1990s, hardly did we have any major contribution from non-Western
philosophies into the current human rights talk; yet, one would expect a meaningful discourse to
be not only inclusive but also at the core of our natural quest for justice for all people. That lack
of inclusivity, in my view, casts doubt as to whether the ideals supposedly being advanced in the

This is a philosophy mostly advanced by such modern thinkers as Locke and Hobbes, whose idea of right
tends to exhort unlimited pursuance of individual freedoms and entitlements but at the expense of ethical
duty toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’. It also tends to view human beings as self-autonomous agents, at
liberty to construct their identity devoid of social norms guided by reason (i.e., nature).
47
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current human rights talk are able to transcend the dominant philosophical thought (i.e., modern/
post-modern liberalism) so as to develop a universally acceptable discourse that would champion
the enjoyment of what the idea of justice entails at the global level.
To change this situation, I submit that we need to urgently engage and involve other nonWestern value-systems or philosophies so that we not only enhance the discourse itself but also
ensure actual enjoyment of what is justifiably due to all humans – for instance, such basic human
needs as security, subsistence and health care. This is what this chapter, inspired by Oruka’s
insight, aims at. We want to inject some sagacity into the current human rights talk, part of which
means being ethically responsible toward the wellbeing of each other and taking care of our
environment. And that, to me, would enhance the quest for justice at the global level. We begin by
considering the concept of human right and what it really means, or what it ought to imply.
4.2. Defining Human Rights
The term human right is an honorific term given that what it stands for is normally
considered universally desirable, even though it cannot be precisely defined. It is perhaps one of
the most problematic issues at hand. Most of us often cry “my right has been violated”, whenever
we feel treated unjustly, pointing to a possibility that human rights are really tied to our natural
quest for justice; yet, few can ascertain precisely what a human right is or entails. Even more
troubling is the fact that only few can really establish the basis of our thinking that we humans
have some universally accepted entitlements we can justifiably claim as fairly due. There is also
the question about duty, namely, who is responsible for the fulfilment of such entitlements, and
how far should that responsibility (if any) stretch? Our position with Oruka is that that obligation
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ought to include every capable moral agent, our social, political, regional, racial or any other
sectarian affiliation notwithstanding. That is what would ensure global justice (Oruka 1997, 85).
Of course, some might argue against a single universally endorsed definition of human
right despite our having a robust discourse in play (Nickel 2014). And this could be attributed to
the fact that different thinkers tend to give different concept of what they think human rights are
or ought to be based on their historical, cultural and philosophical orientations. Nonetheless, there
has been consensus among ethicists at least in advancing a possibility of having some standarduniversal norms (or means) for respecting human dignity and promoting justice for all. Here,
“justice” refers to not only receiving what one is fairly entitled to insofar as one is human, but also
facilitating the enjoyment of what others are duly entitled to as well.
Thus, we can tentatively define human rights as “universally recognized norms, standards
or principles that are morally, socially, and therefore legally grounded to protect human beings
from various forms of injustice based on our common humanity”. 48 This is a definition Oruka
would have most likely endorsed. Although he does not explicitly define human right, Oruka was
deeply concerned about issues of racial discrepancy, social-economic inequality, oppressive
governance, etc.; all of which are violations of justice, as they also contribute to abject poverty in
the world. He had a great passion for holistic liberation of the poor and the oppressed.
For the most part of his short life, Oruka spent a lot of time reflecting on and trying to find
solutions to abuses of justice in the world, and especially in Africa. As we learn from one of his
intriguing essays “Philosophy and Humanism in Africa”, Oruka believed that it is within the nature

I derive this “working definition” from Nickel 2014; Mutua 2013; Shue 1996; and Cranston 1962, and I
intend to use Oruka’s insight to support and develop it further.
48
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and mandate of philosophy to discern, safeguard, and promote “humanism and moral good”, which
would in effect improve the quality and security of human life (Oruka 1997, 138-145). He also
envisioned a theory of global justice that would, among other things, treat all human beings as
existing in a global society governed by what he calls “rational and humanistic ethics” regardless
of our national, regional, racial or any other sectarian affiliation (Oruka, 1989, note no. 9).
According to Oruka, then, human rights are standard principles meant to ensure quality and
security of human life for all. As universal, moral and legal norms also, human rights are meant to
guarantee what all human beings are entitled to everywhere at all times simply by virtue of their
being human (Cranston 1962, 36). But human rights are not just abstract ideals; rather, they are
means to establishing a “humanized way of life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85). They are, in other
words, means to ensuring enjoyment of something that would enhance human dignity, decency,
fairness, equality and equitability for all. They are also means to ensuring a sense of duty or ethical
obligation toward the wellbeing of each other despite our apparent differences.
4.2.1. A Possible Philosophical Defence
A more fundamental question, perhaps, may arise: what is the philosophical basis of our
thinking that there are universally recognized “things” that all humans deserve to enjoy? This is
no doubt a tough question to tackle. Granted that the idea of human right, as said above, implies
equality or common humanity, and given that it is often associated with our (human) natural quest
for justice, one might argue that unless all human beings are actually equal then we can neither
have nor need similar universal entitlements. And given the current prevalent situation where
people are physically, morally, socially and economically unequal, then the idea of having
universally recognized norm to guarantee even the so-called “inalienable rights” for all humans is
a just but farfetched, unnatural, and simply impossible moral plea (Vincent 1986, 8).
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But as Oruka helpfully points out, such “elitist conception of human rights”, though
widespread and popular among those who wish to perpetuate injustice in the world, is basically
misleading. Thus, it should be replaced by what he calls “democratic conception of human rights”
which states that “physical and moral differences among persons notwithstanding, men and women
are, as human beings, endowed with dignity and worth, which entitle them all to certain
fundamental rights and freedoms” (Oruka 1982a, 8). He elaborates further saying that these
entitlements arise from the fact that all humans have similar needs, at least the basic ones.
There is no difference in kind between the needs of people. Therefore, the equality of all
human persons means at least that physically and morally human beings have the same
needs. And they should all be entitled to the rights necessary for fulfilling those needs.
Such rights are human rights (Oruka 1982a, 8).
Thus, in response to a rather rhetorical question about the basis of our thinking about rights
- in terms of entitlements that all humans deserve - we can follow Oruka’s “need-based account”
and say that such a thinking derives from the fact that all humans are essentially equal; and that
equality is based on undeniable fact that all humans naturally have the same basic needs key among
them being physical security, subsistence and health care. And as we shall see later in the next
chapter, these three basic needs constitute the substantive elements of the right to a human
minimum, an ethical principle Oruka says is the basis for enjoying any other human right.
Elsewhere, Oruka reiterates this point saying that a human right cannot be said to exist
devoid of the actual enjoyment of its substantive element (Oruka 1991b, 53). To say that human
beings have ‘right to food’, for instance, is not enough. What matters most is whether people are
actually enjoying or having access to quality food at the time they need it. And to that we may add
and say human rights cannot be enjoyed adequately without people having a sense of duty or ethical
obligation toward the wellbeing of each other, thereby promoting justice and common good.
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In sum, our discussion so far indicates that human rights are or ought to be intricately tied
to our natural quest for justice, which quest at minimum level implies enjoyment of some basic
needs. It also indicates that human rights could philosophically be grounded on the understanding
that we have not only a common humanity to share but also some common basic necessities we
all need, pointing to what we might call “egalitarian common good.” 49 Hence, the idea of human
right also seems to imply a sense of duty - understood in terms of the ethical responsibility that we
humans (as moral agents) have or ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other. Finally, the
discussion also points to a possibility that the idea of human right can be traced from every
organized human society geared toward egalitarian common good. I come back to qualify these
claims later, but first, we need to engage John Locke, whose account seems to suggest otherwise.
4.3. John Locke and ‘Philosophy of Right’
John Locke (1632-1704) is often considered the father of human rights talk, perhaps due
to his systematic ‘philosophy of right’ that diametrically differs from his predecessors, one that
seems quite palatable today. That, however, does not mean the concept of human right and what
it really stands for – quest for justice – is a brainchild of Locke. As Cranston critically points out,
whereas it might be plausible to trace human rights talk from modern philosophies, it would be
blatantly fallacious to simply think the idea of human right is “the child of Enlightenment”
(Cranston 1962, 1). In fact, as Hayden says, the concept of human right seems to have arguably a
much more solid if not better foundation from some Ancient and Scholastic philosophies in the
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By “egalitarian common good” I mean that for the sake of which human societies exist, which in most
cases is desirable wellbeing for all. This follows from the fact that human beings, as Aristotle says, are
social (political) beings (cf. Aristotle Politics 1253a). That means we all have a natural aptitude to live in
solidarity so as to prosper and effectively achieve a common (though not uniform) desirable well-being or
happiness. This, as we shall try to argue later, could be achieved within a society that is both egalitarian
and communitarian oriented, a society where justice is the key governing principle.
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West, just as it does with other non-Western philosophies (Hayden 2001, 3). Locke nonetheless is
a key figure to consider.
Unlike his predecessors in the West (the Ancients and Scholastics) who, for instance,
preferred the ‘eudemonistic’ approach to ethical issues – i.e., seeking happiness and social order
via virtuous life – Locke, just like most of the 17th century thinkers like Hobbes, opted for “personal
freedoms” to pursue one’s self-interest guided by “reason” or nature. Locke apparently thought,
contrary to his predecessors, that humans are not by nature socio-political beings with some
ultimate end or common good. For him, each of us simply pursues what seems good guided by
reason (by which he means nature). That means we form societies out of convenience - for safety
and freedom to pursue self-interest according to how nature and personal inclinations dictate.
The Lockean account, no doubt, has significantly influenced the current human rights talk.
A good example is the 1787 United States Constitution (cf. Guier 2017). In his Two Treatises of
Government (1690), Locke claims that individuals have some basic “natural rights” independent
of their socio-political structures, meaning there are entitlements that we all have equally in a “state
of nature”. These are: (i) right to life, (ii) right to liberty, and (iii) right to property. They have
become the ground upon which other human right declarations, including the UN Bill of Rights,
have been made. They have also become the basis upon which the current human rights discourse
has been advanced, especially in the West.
Now according to Locke, “natural rights” are so called simply because they flow freely
from “natural law”, by which he means (again contrary to his predecessors) the law that governs
our human nature as individuals. It is this “natural law” or the law of nature that determines our
individual choices based on reason and personal inclinations (Hayden 2001, 4). Here, we find
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Locke cleverly diverging from the “classical” concept of natural law – such as the one advanced
by the Scholastics - to develop a new kind of ethics that unfortunately seems to promote greed,
possessive individualism, pride and irresponsible appropriation of wealth (Oruka 1997, 126).
According to Aquinas, for instance, “natural law” derives from divine reason (i.e., God),
and is imprinted within our hearts to govern human relations. It is the basis upon which the concept
of right or entitlement and duty (understood in terms of ethical responsibility of a moral agent) are
philosophically grounded. It is related to what is popularly known as “the Golden Rule” or the law
of reciprocity prevalent in many world religions and cultures. Hence, natural law, for Aquinas,
expresses the “essence” of universal morality that is supposed to guide all our human relations (cf.
Aquinas ST. Qs. 91-94). Locke, however, reverses this view to claim that natural law (i.e., the law
of nature) gives freedom to pursue individual self-interest.
Locke starts off the second treatise by discussing “the state of nature”, which for him is a
quasi-historical notion of a pre-political condition of humanity. This is a state of perfect freedom
bound only by reason or the law of nature. It is also a state of equality in which no one has a natural
claim to rule over another. It is therefore a non-political state where everyone has a ‘right’ (i.e.
freedom) to make their own laws according to their own self-interest (cf. §4; §19). That means
individuals have a right or freedom to choose what seems good to them.
Although his account is not as radical as that of Hobbes who equates the state of nature
with a state of war – where life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (Hobbes 1994, xiii §9),
the Lockean account, nonetheless, clearly runs contrary to the traditional concept of justice, the
one advanced by most of the Ancients. He seems, for instance, to contradict Socrates who in the
Republic claims justice for the most part means seeking egalitarian fairness for a common good
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rather than personal interest. Instead, Locke seems to be embracing Thrasymachus and Glaucon,
who both insist that some form of injustice and pursuing self-interest pays, and that the strong and
mighty triumphs over others (Plato, Republic book 1). However, rather than directly advocating
for injustice, Locke cleverly appeals to “human equality” that he believes would somehow lead to
some sort of justice without the demand for common good. Apparently, his reasoning is that since
no one has any natural claim to rule over another, there is no likelihood for injustice to thrive. But
that argument, to me, sounds preposterous; it is difficult to see how it can be practically possible.
The state of nature, though, Locke says, is not “a state of license” (§ 6); meaning people
cannot simply do what they want. To grasp his point, we need to get what “the law of nature”
means for Locke. This is the only law that binds people while in the state of nature. First, it confers
to individuals a “divine” or natural duty to self-preservation, just as it also prohibits “waste”. It,
for instance, prohibits suicide, given that life and everything else is a gift from God. Individuals
only have “right” or duty to preserve it. Locke formulates the law of nature this way:
The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason,
which is that law, teaches all mankind who will but consult it, that being all equal and
independent, no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions (§ 6).

It is quite clear therefore that priority is given to self-preservation by all means. Even
punishment, for Locke, is not absolute, neither is it arbitrary. It is utilitarian rather than retributive;
meaning it is for reparation and restraint or deterrence. Although it is only the victim who gets
reparation in the state of nature, everyone may join in punishing another but only for restraint or
deterrence, except in murder, which Locke considers “summum malum” or greatest evil (§11, §19).
But apart from ensuring self-preservation, the law of nature also teaches us not to harm
others, thereby giving us just a restricted obligation. It is also silent with regard to what one ought
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to do or not do to help another person pursue their interest. It is not the same as the traditional
“Golden Rule” that says: ‘do unto others as you’d have them do unto you’ or ‘love thy neighbor
as thyself’. Instead, Locke seems to be saying: ‘preserve yourself by all means, and when you can
avoid it, do not harm others’. Locke, nonetheless, thinks the law of nature is the basis upon which
every other human (civil) law can be considered a “right” (§12).
In the same vein, Locke claims people generally agree to form societies, not so much
because they want to come out of “the state of nature” or that they have mutual responsibility to
pursue a common good, but in order to primarily protect and promote their individual interests (§
123-130). In other words, people, out of convenience, contractually decide to transfer to a public
authority their individual powers to implement “the law of nature” on their behalf. But this power,
Locke says, is conditional and limited to the said society’s capacity to protect individual rights or
freedoms from invasion and to secure their more effective guarantee in life. Thus, when authority
is imposed, the state of nature degenerates into “the state of war”, which in turn degenerates into
slavery - where some work for others without agreement (§22).
Connected to the law of nature is the Lockean account of liberty or freedom, another basic
natural right. For Locke, we are all born free (or to freedom), by which he means we are born to
live only under the law of nature with no other restraint. We only find ourselves under our parents’
guidance, for instance, until we attain the age of reason when the law of nature takes charge. That
means no other law can strictly speaking restrain our freedom (§ 57-61). Instead, law is primarily
meant to protect our freedoms. Any law that tends to restrain peoples’ rights or freedoms should
not be obeyed. Thus, Locke defines liberty precisely as doing what one wishes to in accordance
with “the law of nature”. And that capacity, he says, is grounded on the same law - reason (§63).
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With regards to the right to property, Locke initially suggests that all things are freely given
by God to all, pointing to a possibility of egalitarian communalism. But he later says property
precedes political community; hence, people enter commonwealth basically to protect their ‘right
to property’ (§27). He argues further that the need for consumption to survive is what gives rise to
the need for private property and appropriation. In other words, the law of nature, which essentially
calls for self-preservation gives us a right (i.e., freedom or duty) to appropriate whatever one can
mix their labour with. That, according to Locke, is what God’s command to subdue the earth really
means (§32). The earth, then, is made for man to exploit. Here, then we find a salient connection
between Lockean concepts of right, freedom, and duty.
By establishing money through consent, Locke argues, the formal condition for large
appropriation and unequal estate is established (§ 37). And given that money does not spoil, he
suggests that people become greedy only when money is introduced (§ 49-50). Thus, it is money
that causes inequality, which in turn multiplies causes of quarrels and contentions and increased
numbers of violations of the law of nature, which in turn leads to the decision to create a civil
government, hence loss of freedom. Nonetheless, Locke believes large accumulation of wealth
(private property and money) is socially good and beneficial. It depicts individual’s creativity,
astuteness and “smartness”, given that labour is so much the greatest source of wealth.
In effect, Locke seems to be saying that individuals can pursue and appropriate whatever
wealth they may wish through labour, provided they have the means and opportunity to do so
without necessarily minding who suffers pain or loss in the process (Macpherson 1962). But that
would mean only the few mighty and powerful thrive at the expense of exploiting the weak and
defenceless. And that seems to be the common modus operandi fashionable today. Hence, in Locke
and other modern liberal philosophies, we find a salient anticipation of the current human rights
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talk, one that oddly tends to promote not only individual rights and freedom of choice, but also
possessive individualism characterized with greed and exuberant appropriation of wealth, with less
emphasis on ethical duty toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’ (Oduor 2012, 224).
4.3.1. Locke and the Current Human Rights Talk
We have been trying to set up a possible basis of our thinking about human rights in Locke.
His account, however, seems to be working differently from his predecessors’ ethical thoughts.
His account also appears fundamentally opposed to what we said human rights are or ought to be:
universally recognized norms that are morally, socially, and therefore legally grounded to protect
human beings from various forms of injustice based on our common humanity. His account seems
especially flimsy with regards to the kind of duty or ethical obligation that we humans ought to
have towards the wellbeing of each other and our environment. It seems, therefore, not sufficient
to establish a genuine discourse that would enhance global justice: dignity, decency, fairness,
equality and equitability for all. Needless to say, Locke’s involvement with slavery has ruined his
reputation as perhaps the great champion of liberty and equal rights (Armitage 2004).50
One interesting move that Locke makes is to conflate the idea of right, duty and freedom
together, thereby deriving a different account of justice (and injustice). For him, right refers to the
freedom or liberty or power due to one having property and ability to use it because one has reason
under the law of self-preservation (§57). But right also refers to entitlements or privileges that
come about through labour and laying down some of our freedoms (§67, 78). Hence, our rights
come about by birth or by labour and consent. And the basic right that we have is the duty or
obligations one ought to do to ensure self-preservation (§ 88-89). That means my primary duty is
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See also Uzgalis (2017) in Zack (ed.) 2017, 29; and Losurdo 2011, 3, 14.
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to promote my entitlements and freedoms. But that would only lead to possessive individualism,
greed and irresponsible exploitation of people and the environment. Put differently, Lockean socalled “liberty-based account” seems to deny the fact that we are essentially socio-ethical beings
who are also inter-connected with Nature – i.e., our environment (Oruka 1993).
Another interesting twist Lockean account makes is to deny the idea of summum bonum or
the highest good as the “end” of human action. That, in effect, makes ethics to depend upon what
individuals can judge palatable to them. In other words, it is personal reason as directed by the law
of nature that determines what one should or should not do. And given that the law of nature will
always prioritize what is best for me, then I will not have any duty or obligation to mind the
wellbeing of my fellow human being. What matters most is not “the good” as the end of
philosophizing or leading virtuous life but rather personal good or pleasure as one dims fit.
The Lockean account, then, seems to contradict what we said earlier: that the idea of human
right ought to be intricately tied to our natural quest for justice, where justice at minimum implies
enjoyment of some basic human needs. The idea of human right, we also said, implies a sense of
duty understood in terms of the ethical responsibility that we humans (as moral agents) have or
ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other. In what follows now, I attempt to use Oruka’s
“need-based account” to advance these claims. Oruka’s insight, as we shall later see, derives from
traditional African sagacity meant to enhance justice for egalitarian common good.
4.4. Oruka’s Need-based Account
In one of his striking essays entitled “Philosophy of Foreign Aid”, Odera Oruka neatly
defines the concept of right as the rational basis for a justified demand of something that is fairly
due to a member of the human species (Oruka 1997, 85). That something, he says, is the substance
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of the right in question, and it ought to be socially guaranteed; meaning other people or global
society should make some arrangements so that one will still be able to enjoy the substance of the
right even if actually, and especially if, it is not within one’s own power and capacity to arrange
or ensure enjoyment of the substance of the right in question.
Oruka’s argument follows that of Henry Shue, who says that “to have a right is to be in a
position to make demands of others” (Shue 1996, 13), that is, to claim that which is inherently due.
Shue, however, points out that in making the demand of that which is inherently due, one also
needs to be mindful of the wellbeing of others. Now Oruka picks up this idea to further claim that
the concept of right is the rational basis for a justified demand of something that one ought to have
access to in order to live and function as a human person - not merely exist as a human being but
actually enjoy living and functioning as a responsible moral agent (Oruka 1997, 86). That means
the concept of right also necessarily implies duty, the latter being understood in terms of the ethical
obligation that we humans have or ought to have toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’. 51
It is through the idea of human right, Oruka further argues, that we relate or ought to relate
and treat each other as equal members of one global society. Put differently, it is on the basis of us
(humans) having some “justifiable claims” that one can reasonably hope to be treated humanely,
that is, treated with fairness, respect, dignity and care, failure to which certain vital human
potentialities such as rationality, creativity and character development would adversely be
affected. Here, Odera Oruka seems in concurrence with such contemporary thinkers like Martha
Nussbaum and Amartya Sen who both agree on “capability approach” to the issue of global justice,
thereby arguing that human rights are necessary not merely for life but for a life of dignity, a life
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Similar argument has been made by Miller (2005), who talks about “care ethic” that acknowledges the
situatedness and interdependence of human existence.
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worthy of human beings capable of exercising their potentials in a freely and effective manner
(Nussbaum 1997, 2011; Sen 2004, 2005).
Oruka therefore connects and justifies the idea of human right with human needs, saying
that their actual enjoyment ought to be socially if not legally guaranteed against any standard
threats lest they adversely affect people’s functionality, security and good conduct. That in effect
qualifies Oruka’s “need-based account” which says that without realizing some basic human needs
- security, subsistence, and health care - then human dignity, morality, personhood, etc., cannot be
effectively realized (Oruka 1997, 87). Elsewhere, Oruka makes this point clearer saying,
We usually need a right not just for its own sake but in order to fulfill something.
“Something” must refer to certain needs that are either necessary for maintaining our
survival or for advancing and enriching it. If human beings did not have some needs, they
would not know or care about “rights” (Oruka 1991b, 53).
Oruka’s position presupposes that there are some basic needs or entitlements that human
beings can justifiably demand from each other, either to maintain or enrich their survival. It also
points to the fact that the actual enjoyment of the substantive element of any right in question,
which for him is the most important thing, ought to be socially if not legally guaranteed (Oruka
1997, 85). Thus, Oruka could most likely have agreed with his critic/ friend Kwasi Wiredu, who
defines human rights as “justifiable human entitlements” that are morally, legally, and socially
owed to all (Wiredu 1996, 172). He could also most likely agree with Patrick Hayden, who says
that human rights are “essentially inviolable kinds of entitlements that are required to attain basic
security, well-being, self-respect and dignity for all” (Hayden 2001, 8).
Perhaps one might be tempted to dismiss Oruka’s need-based account (i.e., talking about
human rights in terms of necessary human entitlements) as less inclusive, given that it seems not
to capture such “obvious” rights as freedom or liberty the way Lockean account does. But before
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raising this criticism, it is important first to note that the term entitlement can be understood in two
related senses. In one broader sense, the term entitlement means power, capacity, or the prerogative
to claim, demand and pursue what is justifiably due. In another narrower and proper sense,
however, entitlement means the substantive element or the object under pursuit. The former
implies and presupposes liberty/ freedom to demand and pursue the substance of what is justifiably
due. This is because liberty in and of itself cannot be the substance of what is justifiably due (Oruka
1991b 53). It is not the end but rather the means to actual enjoyment of the right in question. Hence,
liberty or freedom ought to be understood as an entitlement also (i.e., as one of fundamental human
rights) but only in the former sense, not in the latter sense. However, other basic human needs such
as physical security, subsistence and health care are all basic human entitlements in the second and
proper sense of the word. Hence, they ought to be given priority.
Now that distinction, to me, is very important because, as we shall see later in the next
chapter, it forms the rationale behind Oruka’s claim that the three basic needs - physical security,
subsistence and health care - together constitute the right to a human minimum, which right, he
says, ought to be fulfilled first if the other human rights, including ‘the right to liberty’, are to be
actually and effectively enjoyed. Here, it forms the basis of our critique of the current human rights
talk that unfortunately seems not keen to acknowledge such priority order.
4.4.1. Moral and Legal Rights
According to Oruka, human rights could further be considered as either morally or legally
grounded and binding. And what determines the difference is their enforceability. They are
considered legally grounded or binding, he says, “if they are to be enforced by a given legal system,
by the sanctions of law”. They are, however, considered morally grounded or binding “if they

107

ought to be enforced by an ethos arising from the prevailing moral system” (Oruka 1997, 87).
Morally-grounded rights, Oruka further notes, are usually universal insofar as the obligation to
ensure their fulfilment or to blame their violation is a duty of every person, every responsible moral
agent. They include the right to physical security, subsistence and health care. Legally-grounded
rights – such as right to freedom of speech or assembly, however, have the government or some
other “legal” institution as addressee.
Again, Oruka’s views resonate well with some leading contemporary human rights
protagonists. James Nickel, for instance, defines human rights as “moral and legal principles” that
aim at identifying some “necessary positive and negative prerequisites” for humans to lead “a
minimally good, decent, and happy life” (Nickel 2014). His definition presupposes that human
rights are not only universal norms (meaning they ought to apply everywhere for everyone) but
also that they are enforceable either morally or legally. And being enforceable, as Kuper adds,
means they have compelling reasons to be realized and enjoyed, otherwise there results some
serious unpleasant effects, especially to the victim (Kuper 2005, 17, 80).
In my view, Oruka would have agreed with Nickel and Kuper, but he would quickly point
out that human rights are not like legal enactments, meaning their duty does not oblige in the same
way. Hence, some rights, he says, are considered inalienable to the extent that they flow from the
very human nature. A good example is the ‘right to life’ whose object is self-preservation through
actual enjoyment of such basic human necessities as security, subsistence, and health care. Such
necessities are also rights, Oruka argues, adding that they also ought to be considered “absolute”
in the sense that nothing can justifiably compromise their demand (Oruka 1997, 87). Denying
someone of such basic needs, then, is tantamount to denying one of the very human life. On the
other hand, there are some human rights - such as right to freedom of speech, assemble, associate,
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worship and own properties - that are or ought to be considered rights prima facie; meaning,
“however important they may be to enhance human life, they can justifiably be overridden by other
rights or by something of a greater moral significance” (Oruka 1997, 87).
Now that is another crucial distinction Oruka makes, but one quite often ignored in our
current human rights discourse. Whereas inalienable rights are also essentially necessary for
people’s existence and normal human functionality as moral agents, the prima facie rights are not
necessarily essential, even though they are important. That is why inalienable rights are said to be
absolute, meaning nothing can justifiably compromise their enjoyment without adversely affecting
human existence and functionality. They are also universal; meaning they ought to be guaranteed
for, and actually enjoyed by, all human beings everywhere. They are, in other words, the basic
prerequisites that are essentially necessary (though not sufficient) for humans to lead a minimally
secured, decent, healthy, and possibly happy life.
In the next chapter, we shall see Oruka pushing this argument further to claim that the
actual enjoyment of the three inalienable rights (or needs) - physical security, subsistence and
health care - is the foundational basis for the actual enjoyment of other human rights, thereby
ensuring a more “humanized life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85). Put differently, the actual enjoyment
of the three basic human needs above is what defines the right to a human minimum, which right
is a basic prerequisite means to enjoyment of other human rights (especially freedoms).
4.4.2. Human Rights and Correlative Duty
We mentioned earlier that enjoyment of human rights implies correlative ethical duty,
although not in the same way. This is yet another important insight that Oruka introduces in our
current human rights discourse. For Oruka, duty means the specific obligation, commitment and
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responsibility that we humans have or ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other and the
environment. In fact, it is the concept of duty, Oruka says, that makes us different from other nonrational beings (Oruka 1997, 103). It is therefore crucial in ensuring the actual enjoyment of the
substantive elements of our rights, given that rights are supposed to be socially if not legally
guaranteed. This is because no one can effectively enjoy the substance of his or her right (which
is what matters most) in isolation. Conversely, rights cannot be violated unless people interact
without minding the need or the well-being of the ‘other’. What ensures harmonious interaction
with each other and with our environment, and hence effective actual enjoyment of the substance
of our rights, we now submit, is the sense of ethical duty as defined above.
To put the point differently, the concept of duty is essential to advancing the concept of
right, the latter being understood as a justifiable demand of something due upon each other,
however difficult it might be to point out the ‘other’. But that ipso facto means that rights basically
have “addressees” who could be either individuals or government agencies. Thus, Oruka observes
that the concept of ‘right’ is correlative (but not equal) to that of ‘duty’ so that if a person has a
right to something very basic and necessary, it means somebody else has the duty to ensuring its
enjoyment, however difficult it might be to point out that other person (Oruka 1997, 87).
In that argument, Oruka seems to agree with Shue, who says that the duty associated with
our rights typically require some actions that ought to be carried out by individuals or government
agencies; hence, both positive and negative duties. The former involves what “addressees” should
do to ensure actual enjoyment of rights; the latter involves what they ought to restrain from doing
to ensure enjoyment of the right in question (Shue 1996, 52). And to what Shue is saying, Oruka
adds that duty, especially with regards to the basic human needs, reciprocally binds every capable
and responsible moral agent (Oruka 1997, 103). It refers to what a human person is reasonably
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expected to do, uphold, or desist from in order to assist another, especially those lacking the basic
needs, to enjoy their needs. And because it is tied to our natural quest for justice (part of which
means enjoyment of some basic needs), the concept of duty, therefore, just like the concept of
right, also ought to be considered morally, socially, and therefore legally grounded. That is why
Oruka insists that we can only talk of duty in reference to human beings who alone are presumably
rational, moral and social beings (Oruka 1997, 130).
Here, we find Oruka injecting something desperately lacking or not given enough attention
in the current human rights talk, namely, that human rights cannot be said to exist without there
being some measures in place to ensure the actual enjoyment of their substantive elements. But
such necessary measures, and hence the actual enjoyment of rights, can only be had if and only if
we all embrace a sense of ethical duty toward the wellbeing of each other our geographical, racial,
or any other sectarian affiliation notwithstanding.
We might easily claim that every human being has a ‘right to life’, for instance. But that is
not enough to guarantee that everyone (including the most vulnerable) is actually enjoying that
which sustains life: security, subsistence, medicines, etc. We need therefore to revise not only our
thinking but also the “world order” to ensure that majority, if not every member of human species
is actually enjoying at least the basic inalienable rights (Kuper 2005). This is basically what Oruka
means when he says that human rights, especially the basic inalienable rights, also have correlative
necessary duty that ought to be morally, socially, and therefore legally binding. He writes,
There is … the moral obligation that requires every moral agent to protect … the right to
life of every human being. This obligation is not confined just to relatives and members of
one’s nation. It is a global duty for every member of the human race (Oruka 1997, 103).

111

Oruka seems to agree with Kuper who, in emphasizing global responsibility, suggests the
need to shift our approach to human rights talk “from a recipient-centric articulation of rights to
an agent-centric approach”, thus focus more on identifying those with capacities and obligation to
deliver on basic rights. We need, in other words, to focus on “who must do what for whom?”
(Kuper 2005, xi). For Oruka, that ethical duty more intricately binds every capable responsible and
capable moral agent within the global society. His proposal also resonates with other contemporary
philosophers like Peter Singer (2002, 2010) and Thomas Pogge (2004, 2008), who both challenge
affluent individuals and nation-states to reverse “the drama of global inequality”, given that they
(the affluent) are the ones who shape “the world order” (Kuper 2005, 31).
We shall explore that possibility in chapter five when we discuss in depth the right to a
human minimum. For now, though, we can summarily confirm with Oruka that human rights are
or ought to be globally recognized norms or principles that are morally, socially, and hence legally
grounded to protect us from various forms of injustice based on our common humanity.
That definition, however, seems to be predicated upon two major premises: (i) every human
being, insofar as one is human, has some basic needs or entitlements to claim, pursue, enjoy, and
hence be able to lead a more decent, dignified and possibly happy life; and (ii) human beings are
(at least essentially) rational, moral and social beings. That means both local and global society
has a duty or ethical responsibility to provide for or at least facilitate the pursuit and realization of
decent life to every member of human species. That in effect means we all have a shared collective
ethical duty to ensure justice (which for the most part involves egalitarian common good) in every
social order we participate in, both locally and globally (Kuper 2005, 10; Graness 2015).
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4.5. On the Bill of Right
In this section, I wish to use Oruka’s “need-based account” to critique the current human
rights talk on the fact that it appears clogged with mere rhetoric as the clamour for more rights
increases without establishing proper mechanism to realize their actual enjoyment. That clamour
has led to what we might call “human rights inflation”, a situation where every individual agitation
seems to be part of the human right corpus (Nickel 2014, 9; Kuper 2005, ix).
Of course, one might argue that expanding human agitations is itself desirable, for it might
lead to expansion of human possibilities and hence maximizing “utility”. But the problem with
maximizing possibilities without establishing proper mechanism to realize them, I think, would
take people’s preferences at face value, urging us to satisfy as many of our preferences as possible
without really distinguishing those that are necessary for really ensuring a dignified human life
and those that are for superfluous things we merely want. In other words, it would make it difficult
to distinguish between human ‘needs’ and human ‘wants’, which distinction is crucial if we are to
be more ethically responsible towards the wellbeing of each other (Reader 2005).
Thus, the current human rights talk also seems to be getting the priority wrong. Rather than
stressing the actual enjoyment of the basic inalienable rights, we find priority given to rights that
ought to be considered so prima facie. A quick snip through the UN “Bill of Rights”, for instance,
reveals a trend where priority is given to civil or political rights (such as right to citizenship) more
than the socio-economic rights, some of which involve basic human needs (Cranston 1962, 47;
Mutua 2013, 47). And that trend, as Mutua further points out, unfortunately appears to have been
carefully designed by the organizers of the first UN assembly in 1948.
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Without entering much into politics, it is worth noting that there were two major blocs
during the first UN assembly: the Western bloc led by traditional liberal democracies like the
United States and Britain on the one hand, and the Eastern bloc led by former Soviet Union on the
other. The former bloc, however, had an upper hand; it was the key player in drafting the Bill of
Rights.52 Thus, its members were keen to push for liberal principles that would ensure protection
of the so-called individual rights and freedoms (hence the civil/ political rights) according to the
philosophies of Locke and other modern liberal thinkers in the West.
The ‘socio-economic rights’, however, mostly championed by the Eastern bloc were
somehow foreign or unknown to the Western bloc. Hence, their inclusion, as Cranston critically
observes, “represented a considerable diplomatic victory for the Communist members of the
United Nations” (Cranston 1962, 34). Mutua supports that claim, adding that they were, in other
words, included just to compromise and accommodate the ‘others’ – the Eastern bloc (Mutua 2013,
47). And being alive to this “fraud”, Oruka was keen to lament and wonder why article 25 of the
Bill of Rights, for instance, which talks about the right to basic human needs strangely appears
almost as an appendix to the whole document. According to Article 25,
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of
himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing, and medical care and
necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness,
disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his
control (United Nations, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948).

It is also worth noting that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights” was codified into two
covenants: (i) the international covenant on civil and political rights, and (ii) the international covenant
on economic, social and cultural rights. The two covenants, however, came into force in 1976, and
together with the “optional protocols”, they constitute what is now referred to as the “International Bill of
Human Rights” or simply the “Bill of Rights” (see Oduor 2012, 225; and Mutua 2013).
52
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Now for Odera Oruka, this article 25 is perhaps the most important one given that it talks
about what is so basic and necessary to safeguard human life and dignity. It should, therefore, have
followed article 3 that talks about right to life had the organizers of the first UN assembly been
careful enough to get the priority right, and if politics was not in display (Oruka 1991b, 86).
Unlike most contemporary human rights protagonists, Oruka was careful to get the priority
right insofar as the quest for justice is concerned. He sought to first defend or advocate for the
actual enjoyment of such basic human right as the right to a human minimum, whose substantive
elements ought to never to be denied to anybody, lest we adversely affect people’s life, creativity
and ability to function or act as moral agents. He could not fathom, for instance, why priority
should be given to civic or “political” freedoms before guaranteeing the ‘right to life’ whose
substantive elements include physical security, subsistence and health care; yet, the actual
enjoyment of the former presupposes and in fact depends on the enjoyment of the latter. He says:
The necessity to have basic socio-eco-biotic needs fulfilled first precedes all thought [i.e.,
right to express oneself] because their fulfilment is the climate under which everyone might
be able to move from mere instinctual action to thoughtful existence. The fact that they
should be fulfilled cannot be a subject of debate or of any philosophizing. All debate about
their fulfilment, to be reasonable, can only be about how they might best be fulfilled, not
whether they should be fulfilled [first]. This is what we mean by stating that, in human life,
these needs take priority even over thought (Oruka 1997, 100).
It is on these grounds, then, we insist with Oruka that any human rights talk worthy its
name ought to not only prescribe what one is entitled to as human, but also do so cognizant of the
priority order, that is, by ensuring such basic needs as security, subsistence and health care first.
It should also prescribe what one is supposed to do to assist or facilitate others in enjoying what in
principle all humans ought to have access to. Such a discourse should also include some norms
that restrains or prohibit what in principle ought not to be done to any human being. It should
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prioritize, in other words, both positive and negative duties crucial to actual enjoyment of human
rights, and hence to our natural quest for justice. This is because, as Oruka would say, human rights
ought to be sought to fulfil some ends whose necessity or goodness can be easily encumbered and
endangered by actions of other people (Oruka 1991b, 51).
Indeed, the urgency to revise the current human rights talk as well as reorganize our sociopolitical setting to get priority order cannot be overemphasized. As highlighted earlier, the idea of
human right is so intricately tied to our natural tendency for justice. That is why a human right can
also be defined as “a globally shared core conception of basic justice” (Pogge 1995). For Pogge,
just like for Oruka, justice means, first and foremost, ensuring that all humans get access to and
actually enjoy what is due to them – and especially the basic needs. And what is due to humans,
Pogge insists, ought to be morally, socially and hence legally guaranteed. He says:
By postulating a person P’s right to X as a human right, we are asserting that P’s society
ought to be reorganized in such a way that P has secure access to X and, in particular, so
that P is secure against being denied X or deprived of X officially (Pogge, 1995).
Oruka would most likely have agreed with Pogge on this,53 but I think he would have added
that justice also means upholding our ethical duty toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’, given that
we are or ought to be socio-political beings. In other words, justice, as we said earlier, also means
being keen to observe both positive and negative duties. It means being sagacious enough to be
considerate to the needs of other humans. It also means taking good care of the environment even

See Oruka 1991b, 53-55, where he makes a brilliant argument for liberty saying that we should no
longer ask the general question “What is liberty?” but rather “What is liberty for X?” (55). That follows
his argument that liberty as a right ought to be relational; it ought to be considered as liberty for X in S,
where X may represent any individual and S local or global society. He further says that “liberty for X in
S” means that X has, with respect to S and with equality with others in S, ability and opportunity to
obtain or satisfy X’s needs in S (54). The same, I think, can be said of justice.
53
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as we pursue what we consider justifiably due, and to share with those who for some reasons lack
especially the basic needs for humanity’s sake and for the common good. This, in my view, is the
kind of sagacity Oruka wants to inject into the current human rights discourse, a sagacity that is
also prevalent in most pre-colonial African societies.
4.6. Human Rights Talk in Africa
To conclude this chapter, I would like to discuss the concepts of right and duty from the
traditional (i.e., pre-colonial) African perspective. The point of emphasis here is that contrary to
some misleading views, the concept of human right, and what it implies was not alien in precolonial Africa. Like in many other organized human societies, it was prevalently centred on
peoples’ quest for justice, that is, in striving not only to give but also receive what is fairly due.
That is why there were norms, customs and traditions that primarily sought to promote justice,
safeguard human dignity, and hence uphold egalitarian common good.
That, however, does not mean pre-colonial Africa was free from the abuses of rights or
injustice against humanity; this is common to every human society. What it means is that there
were measures in place to enable people access and actually enjoy what they in principle were
justifiably entitled to. There were also measures to ensure people fulfil their ethical duties as moral
agents. That means individual entitlements were relational; which in effect means they could not
be sought outside the social context, nor were they sought for their own sake.
The concept of human right in pre-colonial Africa was therefore defined and imbued with
such ideals as solidarity, generosity, care, respect, and above all ethical duty, whose primary end
was to promote justice and the common good. Put differently, the concept of right in pre-colonial
Africa was engrained within the idea of justice rooted not just in individual’s claims against
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society, but also in the physical, psychic, and social security of the entire community (Mutua 2013,
79). Thus, even though one may argue that most pre-colonial African societies did not emphasize
individual rights and freedoms in the same way as, say, modern Western liberal societies do, it
would be fallacious to assume that they did not have the concept of human right at all. The fact of
the matter is: while individuals had rights or entitlements they could claim and actually enjoy, they
(individuals), nonetheless, remained members of a community in which they had an ethical duty
to protect, uphold and secure.
Thus, it was crucial in traditional Africa, as Cohen points out, to try and strike a balance
between individual rights and freedom on the one hand, and communal ethical duty on the other
(Cohen 1993, 3-4). Here, individual rights and freedoms imply communal duty to provide or
facilitate their enjoyment; but communal duty presupposes individual duty to be ethically sound.
This is what informed the notion of justice understood in term of striving to not only receive (as
an individual) what in principle is fairly due, but also in ensuring the same to other people. And
that, as Mutua argues, was meant to counter-check pride, greed, and exaggerated individualism as
well as promote solidarity, cohension and common good (Mutua 2013, 75).
Commenting about the Akan in Ghana, Wiredu reiterates that balance between individual
rights (and freedoms) and community obligation, urging that even if individuals were believed to
have some intrinsic value and hence “entitled to a measure of basic respect and dignity” - which
ipso facto conferred upon them personhood and individuality - “they were nonetheless members
of a community that generated duties and obligations such as participating in public works and
sustained prosperous household” (Wiredu 1996, 243). And by adhering to these duties, each
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individual enhanced their “personhood”. Conversely, if one failed to meet these duties and
obligations, then their “personhood” also diminished (Wiredu 1996, 243-247).54
The same can be said of the Agikuyu in Kenya (where I come from), and indeed almost
every traditional society in Africa. The point is that in pre-colonial Africa, people were believed
to be born equal, that is, as inherently valuable members, and they were to be treated so even
beyond physical death (Kenyatta 1953). Thus, individuals were naturally endowed with certain
basic entitlements – such as food, security, shelter, etc. - to sustain and enrich life. But each
individual was also naturally endowed with a sense of duty toward the wellbeing of not only
members of one’s own community but also foreigners. The Agikuyu, for instance, were known to
be generous and hospitable even to strangers. One of their proverbs capturing that value says:
mũgeni nĩ rũĩ, which literally means “a visitor is a river”, meaning visitors are passers-by, they
don’t stay long and they cost little to host; yet, like a river, they normally bring invaluable treasure
(Barra 998). Oruka can be seen inspired by such sagacity when he says that the ethical obligation
to eradicate poverty, and so protect the ‘right to life’, “is not confined just to relatives and members
of one’s nation, but is a global duty for every member of the human race” (Oruka 1997, 103)
Some may ignorantly claim that individual rights and freedoms were not upheld in precolonial Africa, but a critical study reveals the opposite was the case. One way in which individual
rights were pre-eminently protected in traditional Africa was through viable judicial systems. The
only “problem” perhaps is that such systems were different from what we have today. Another
“problem” could be that they have not been as publicized as the current liberal judicial system is.
But that does not mean there were no justice systems in Africa. Thus, as Oruka rightly points out,

Wiredu seems to have a similar conception of “personhood” as Oruka, namely, those qualities that
make one function as a responsible moral agent (see Oruka 1997, 86).
54
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the justice system in most pre-colonial Africa was well elaborated to ensure fair trial of the accused
and fair recompense for the victim (Oruka 1985, 45).
Makau Mutua concurs with Oruka, urging that just like we have in the UN “Bill of Rights”
(article 5), no one in pre-colonial Africa could be punished without first given a fair hearing.
Assumption of innocence until proven guilty was an absolute principle of justice. The right to
“personal security”, moreover, was jealously guarded. The ‘right to life’ also was so pre-eminently
valued that the power over life and death was reserved to just a few elders who could measurably
exercise it after an elaborate judicial process on grievous matters like murder (Mutua 2013, 77).
Comparing the penal system and judicial procedure in most of pre-colonial Africa with the
judicial system in the modern “liberal” West, Odera Oruka in Punishment and Terrorism observes
that the objective of settling offences in the former was to compensate the victim rather than punish
the offender by inflicting pain, suffering or loss (Oruka 1985, 48). And compensation, Oruka
argues, would take the form of one family or clan of the offender giving some material goods to
the wronged person or his relatives. Even on serious offenses like murder, fair compensation and
restitution was the preferred mode of settlement, except when the offender proved so notoriously
dangerous to the entire community. On the death penalty, for instance, Oruka says:
Death penalty was inflicted only on incorrigible and frequent murderers and witches. The
argument [or rationale] for this was that such murderers and witches were a danger to the
whole community and it was in the interest and safety of the whole community to dispense
with them (Oruka 1985, 48).
Thus, we evidently find herein an elaborate judicial system that aimed at jealously protecting
individual’s ‘right to life’, except when that right proved a grievous threat to the common good. It
is a system that contrarily runs against the current judicial system inspired by modern liberalism.
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4.6.1. African Socialism
African socialism can be defined as a way of life that exhibits a great deal of solidarity,
communal sharing, and care, among other noble ethical values. It is meant to enhance the balance
between individual rights and community obligations, which balance as we said, was highly valued
in most pre-colonial African societies. Julius Nyerere, among others, has competently captured
African socialism (not communism) in his philosophy of Ujamaa. This is a philosophy based on
the idea of family-hood or kinship. It aims at protection of individuals and their “personhood” in
a more dignified manner within the family setting (Nyerere 1968). But this protection comes with
commitment and a sense of duty toward the wellbeing of other individuals, one’s own family, and
the entire community. As Hyden further elaborates, Ujamaa is based on three key principles: (i)
mutual respect as each family member recognizes the place and rights of others; (ii) common
ownership of property for the common good based on the fact that all people have the same basic
necessities; and (iii) obligation to work, given that every family member has the duty to provide
for their right to food, shelter, security, etc. (Hyden 1980, 98).
Apart from solidarity, especially in times of need, socialism in Africa was also evident
through such human values as tolerance, loyalty, hard-working, and consultative dialogue - also
known as “consensus democracy”.55 And the aim was to make each member feel part of the entire
community; with individual rights, dignity and autonomy, but at the same time with a sense of
ethical duty imbued in each one’s consciousness (Mutua 2013, 79). In this way, African Socialism

This is a “non-party democratic system” of governance rooted in the traditional humanist and
communitarian conceptions of the individual and the community in which political decisions are reached
by consensus (see Wiredu 1996, 182-190).
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not only supported individual rights, dignity and welfare, but it also did not allow gross inequality,
exaggerated individualism or greed and irresponsible exploitation of the ‘other’.
Thus, inspired by such value-systems from Africa, Odera Oruka insists on our having a
sense of ethical duty as an essential part of ensuring the actual enjoyment of human rights. This is
an important insight Oruka wants to inject to improve the current human rights talk. His philosophy
underscores a sagacity prevalent in most pre-colonial Africa, just as it also attempts to develop a
more unitary, integrated and solid conception of human rights where greed, pride and extreme
individualism could be tempered by the individual’s obligation toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’
within a global society. According to this sagacity, a human being is to be understood not just as
an isolated and abstract being, but most importantly as an integral member of a community
animated by a spirit of solidarity and communalism (Mutua 2013, 65).
Oruka’s philosophy also captures the underlying wisdom prevalent in traditional Africa,
namely, that individual’s entitlements, joys, sorrows, etc., are interwoven into what we might call
“social tapestry” (not social contracts) that denies isolated individuality. John Mbiti sums up that
sagacity well with a maxim: “I am because you are, and because we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti
1990, 141). That maxim, prevalent in most traditional African societies, means no one can exist
on their own, given that humans are socio-political cum ethical beings. Oruka seems inspired by
that maxim when he calls for a global ethics of inclusivity that would ensure a more “humanized
life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85). For him, the world (i.e., humans and the environment) ought to
be seen as a kind of family unit, that is, a “complex web of beings” governed by principles of
interdependence and ethical responsibility (Oruka 1997, 150).
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Part of what that means is that we human beings (who are presumably socio-political moral
agents) are endowed not only with individual rights and freedoms, but also with global ethical duty
to contribute to the unity and the common good of the entire global society, thereby proactively
tying our personal needs with other people’s needs (Hayden 2001, 9). In deed this seems to be the
epitome of the concept of human right as such. An in my view, it is what Oruka wants to use to
critique and hence enrich the current human rights discourse.

4.7. Conclusion
This chapter was meant to advance “a need-based account” that would help give a sound
critique to the current human rights discourse that seems predominantly influenced by modern
Western liberalism. It was also meant to dispel a fallacy that the concept of human right and what
it stands for – quest for justice - derives from liberal philosophies in the West. Thus, using Oruka’s
insight, we have defined human rights as globally recognized norms, standards or principles that
are morally, socially, and therefore legally grounded to protect human beings from various forms
of injustice based on our common humanity. We have tried to analyse what that definition means,
emphasizing the idea of duty or ethical obligation that it also implies.
We have also seen that some rights are so basic and inherent to human life that they deserve
to be called inalienable or absolute rights. Others, however, are just but considered human rights
prima facie. That distinction, which sadly seems often ignored today, is very crucial because it
advances our argument with Oruka that there are some basic rights whose actual enjoyment of
their substantive elements cannot be compromised or denied of someone without adversely
affecting their existential wellbeing and functionality as moral agents.
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And to debunk a rather misguided view that human rights talk is a child of Enlightenment
and liberalism, we have critically engaged Locke, whose account tends to promote unlimited
pursuit of the so-called individual rights (or freedoms) but at the expense of having ethical duty,
thereby promoting greed, exaggerated individualism and irresponsible exploitation of the ‘other’.
In fact, the Lockean account only seems contrary to his predecessors – the Ancients and Scholastics
– who, in my view, had a much better grip of such ethical issues as justice. His account, we said,
may not succeed in delivering a genuine human rights talk whose aim is to promote justice at the
global level, with principles of egalitarian fairness and common good as the driving force.
In the same vein, we have applied African socialism/ communalism to demonstrate that
pre-colonial Africa was not innocent of human rights talk. The concept of human right, we said,
was centred on people’s natural quest for justice, that is, in striving to not only give but also receive
what is fairly due. It was also imbued within such values as solidarity, generosity, care, respect,
and a sense of ethical responsibility. These communitarian ideals were also treasured among the
Ancients in the West and other parts of the world. Unfortunately, they seem to have been eroded
or altogether ignored today courtesy of the modern/ post-modern liberal philosophies.
In my view, though, there is need to seriously reconsider what non-liberal philosophies can
offer to enhance the current human rights talk. The truth of the matter is that principles of justice,
human dignity, equality and equitability – which all are the basis of the idea of human right – are
inherent in every organized human society. It behoves us, then, to critically evaluate such valuesystems, thereby seeing each philosophical tradition as essential contributor to, rather than try to
project one as the ideal constituent of, human rights talk. Engaging such philosophies, moreover,
will not only enrich the current human rights talk but will also enhance their actual enjoyment,
which is essential for establishing a more humanized life in the world.
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Odera Oruka’s practical philosophy is, no doubt, committed to that task. By critically using
traditional African value-systems, Oruka is able to construct an ethics that would help curb the
shortcomings often presented by liberal philosophies in the West: exaggerated individualism or
greed, and irresponsible exploitation of the ‘other’. He was critical of modern and post-modern
liberalism, just as he was keen to re-introduce practical sagacity into the current human rights
discourse. Thus, he advances a “need-based account” of human rights as the means to a genuine
quest for global justice. His account essentially calls for the actual enjoyment of some basic needs
that may never be compromised or denied any human being, lest their existential wellbeing and
functionality as moral agents be adversely affected. We shall try to advance this point further in
the next chapter where we explore the concept of the human minimum – both as a right and a duty.
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CHAPTER 5
IN SEARCH FOR THE RIGHT TO A HUMAN MINIMUM
For all human beings to function with a significant degree of rationality and self-awareness, they need a
certain amount of physical security, health care, and subsistence (Oruka 1997, 87).

5.1. Introduction
In the last chapter, we tried to advance Oruka’s need-based account of human rights, as we
also gave a critique to the current human rights discourse. We tried to situate Oruka among thinkers
who subscribe to the view that human rights have their basis from the very human nature and
status, meaning they are not political privileges, nor are they legally or otherwise revocable. Thus,
linking the concept of human right with our natural quest for justice, we defined human rights as
globally recognized norms that ought to be morally, socially, and hence legally grounded to protect
us humans from various forms of injustice based on our common humanity.
We therefore emphasized actual enjoyment of the substantive elements of rights as the most
important thing, taking the idea of right as a rational basis for a justified demand of what in
principle all human beings are entitled to insofar as one is human. And for Oruka, we observed, it
is through the concept of right that humans ought to relate to each other as equal members of one
species. The concept of right, we observed, is the basis for our socio-political way of life as moral
agents. But we also realized that that ‘justified demand’ and actual enjoyment of what one is
entitled to ought to go hand in hand with a sense of duty, that is, with some ethical responsibility
toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’. And that duty, we further said, is often considered as either
positive or negative. The concept of duty, then, refers to what we humans (who presumably are
moral agents) are expected to do (hence, positive duty) or refrain from doing (hence, negative
duty) in order to fulfil, realize or facilitate realization of what we in principle owe to each other.
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We also noted that human rights are not on the same level, meaning the duty they elicit to
realize or facilitate their enjoyment does not bind us in the same way. Hence, some rights (say, the
right to subsistence) are considered inalienable or absolute to the extent that they flow from the
very human nature. Such rights are necessary (though not sufficient) to preserve and sustain human
life, just as they also enhance human dignity and our ability to function or act as moral agents.
That in effect means nothing can justifiably compromise their demand; and nothing can
legitimately jeopardize their fulfilment as well, even though that is not always the case. Other
rights, however (say, the right to freedom of speech), are considered so prima facie. They are,
strictly speaking, important though not necessary for human existence and functionality as moral
agents. Their demand and their actual enjoyment, in other words, can justifiably be overridden or
compromised by other rights or by “something of a greater moral significance” (such as national
security), their importance notwithstanding (Oruka 1997, 87).
Now that distinction, which sadly today seems often ignored, is very crucial because it forms
the basis of Oruka’s critique of the current human rights discourse. It is also the basis of his
argument for the idea of the human minimum: a claim that there are some basic human needs whose
demand, realization and actual enjoyment ought to be morally, socially and hence legally
guaranteed to every member of the human species, lest their existence and functionality as moral
agents be adversely affected, thereby jeopardizing global security and peaceful co-existence.
In this chapter, we focus on critically examining Oruka’s argument for the right to a human
minimum, an ethical principle he crafted as a means to ensuring what he calls “a more humanised
life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85); that is, a way of life governed by egalitarian principles of justice,56

Justice here means not only receiving what one is fairly entitled to, but also giving or facilitating
realization of what others are duly entitled to insofar as they are humans.
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key among them being the ethical duty toward the wellbeing of each other. We shall establish what
constitutes the right to a human minimum, as we also seek to understand why it is not only the
prerequisite for one to act as a moral agent but also the basis upon which other human rights can
be sufficiently enjoyed. And being an ethical principle, the right to a human minimum, we shall
see, also necessarily elicits a correlative ethical duty that binds or ought to bind every human being,
every capable moral agent irrespective of their national, regional, racial or any other sectarian
affiliation or demarcation. We shall interrogate further what that claim entails.
As a critique to the current human rights talk also, we therefore seek to engage Oruka’s insight
in depth. His philosophy, as we shall see, seems closely tied to issues of global justice (as opposed
to international justice); that is, in striving to achieve for every human being what in principle
everyone is justifiably entitled to insofar as one is a member of human species. It seeks to
emphasize, for instance, the importance of realizing basic human needs for all as a necessary
prerequisite for acting or functioning as a responsible moral and creative agent. His philosophy
also emphasizes the importance of human relations and solidarity, hence the ethical duty that is
central to establishing anything akin to global justice.
Thus, following Oruka’s insight, we might discover that as human beings (i.e., rational socioethical beings), we all have some basic entitlements that we are always necessarily justified to
demand from each other. But a critical question is: what is the basis of that ‘justified demand’?
Likewise, it seems we have some correlative necessary duty to fulfil or at least facilitate the actual
realization of what in principle everyone is entitled to, especially the inalienable rights. But again,
the question is: what is the rationale or the basis of that duty? Our assumption is that these rather
difficult queries can be answered by critically analysing the concept of human minimum, the
primordial ethical standard of living for every human being. The idea of human minimum, we will

128

see, is the rational basis of our justified demand of our rights. It is also the rational basis of our
duty to each other as equal members of global society. It is therefore the basic principle of ensuring
that justice is practiced at the global level.

5.2. Human Minimum: Towards an Ethical Standard of Living
Crucial to Oruka’s ethical thought is the concept of human minimum. It first appears in his
1979 essay entitled “On Philosophy and Humanism in Africa”, where he uses it in reference to the
minimum standard necessary for any human being to live a decent life worthy of a human person.
Here, Oruka defines it as “the ultimate or most basic standard of moral good” whose aim is to
ensure “the quality and security of human life” (Oruka 1997, 138). And for Oruka, the dignity and
security of human life is measured by the quality and security of individual and collective existence
or lifestyle. But that would be determined by how both local and global society responds to various
forms of dehumanizing lifestyle of some of its members. It is the concept of human minimum that
helps in establishing a bench-mark or a standard below which no one can reasonably be expected
to tolerate if we are to ensure quality and security of human life. The concept of human minmum,
in other words, is what defines “the highest ethics of humanism” (Oruka 1997, 139), whose
ultimate goal is to establish a more humanised kind of life on earth.
The concept of human minimum then appears in his 1989 essay dubbed “The Philosophy
of Foreign Aid”, where Oruka employs it to argue for the ethical duty that global society has for
everyone to live a standard humanly dignified lifestyle. Here, he develops it as the minimum basis
for achieving global justice as opposed to international justice. He also links it with human rights
talk, and so he defines the human minimum as “the very minimum a human being demands from
the world so that he or she may be in a position to understand and recognise the rights of others”
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(Oruka 1997, 147). Thus, using the concept of human minimum, Oruka is able to advance what we
might call a need-based human rights discourse,57 thereby bringing about a paradigm shift insofar
as our quest for global justice is concerned.
To underscore that point, it is important to note that Oruka believed not only in human
equality but also empowerment, which he wants to justify or at least attempt to achieve using the
concept of the human minimum. He wants to develop an ethical principle that would justify
equitable distribution or sharing of wealth and world resources. He is not necessarily advocating
for monetary foreign aid, nor is he promoting merely giving hand-outs to the poor; rather, he wants
to instil a sense of global responsibility towards the wellbeing of each other, part of which would
mean ensuring: (i) equitable sharing or distribution of wealth and resources; and (ii) empowering
the poor and the youth with skills and opportunities to realize their potentialities.
Oruka therefore envisioned a situation where all people in the world would have, in more
or less equal measure, the ability and opportunity to satisfy at least the most basic human needs:
physical security, subsistence and health care. And for those who for some reasons lack that ability
and opportunity, he says, arrangements ought to be made so that their needs are also met (Oruka
1997, 85). The assumption here, of course, is that we are all members of a global society that has
some obligations to fulfil what in principle every member is entitled to (Oruka 1991b, 55-56). It
is only when majority if not all members of the global society are able to enjoy their right to a
human minimum that Oruka believed we can have anything akin to global justice.

This is a discourse that emphasizes the actual enjoyment of the substantive element associated with a
particular right if that right is to achieve its “moral worth” (cf. Oruka 1991b, 55).
57
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Thus, it follows that human minimum is or ought to be the same for all people, given that
it is a standard below which no human being should be allowed or would willingly accept to sink.
But that should not be construed to mean that everyone ought to be forced to meet the same
minimum, although it is hard to believe that any reasonable person would prefer to live below the
human minimum, that is, live without enjoying at least the basic needs. There are, no doubt, many
people in the world today who live below the human minimum, but very few if any do so willingly.
And on the same note, the human minimum should not be taken simply as a sort of static
quantitative measure – ensuring a particular number of calories for food per day, for instance;
rather, the quality and the standard of the substantive elements of the human minimum ought to be
dynamically revised depending on how the society can afford, that is, based on the availability of
resources and technology. Hence, Oruka’s important point, as I see it, is that it would be ethically
irresponsible, and in fact, a form of injustice for some people in the world to exuberantly amass
wealth and resources while others haplessly languish without even the basic needs. I come back to
this later, but first, we need to clarify what the term ‘global justice’ means or ought to mean.
5.1.1. Global Justice or International Justice?
The term ‘global justice’ is perhaps a fairly recent term that has become “fashionable” in
the late 1990s. But Odera Oruka as early as 1980s applied this concept in more or less the same
way as it is used in the current cosmopolitan approach. As Anke Graness points out, he applied it
to elevate the context of principles of justice to a global level, linking it to the ethical responsibility
that every capable moral agent has to enforce justice on a global scale (Graness 2015, 128). Indeed,
his 1981 essay - “John Rawls’ Ideology: Justice as Egalitarian Fairness” - attests to this fact.
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In that essay, Oruka critically engages the Rawlsian view of justice, which says that the
scope of obligations to ensuring justice is defined and largely determined by the citizenship that
people share within a particular socio-political setting. According to Rawls, therefore, one would
have obligations of justice - ensuring what is fairly due to others - and hence the duty to meet or
facilitate enjoyment of the basic human needs, for instance, only to the extent that people live
together under a particularly recognized regional boundary (Rawls 2001, 70-74). But Oruka
vehemently refutes that view, arguing that if justice was to be understood as “egalitarian fairness”
(which is what human rights essentially seek to promote), then principles of justice, especially in
matters of basic human needs, cannot justifiably have boundaries. This is because all humans in
principle have the same basic needs (Oruka 1997, 123).
Now even without going into details of Oruka’s attempt to “salvage and purify the
egalitarian elements in Rawls” (Oruka 1997, 115), it is clear that there has been a misconception
with regard to what global justice really is, with some applying the term ‘global justice’ when they
actually mean ‘international justice’. But as Oruka pointedly says, it would be a huge mistake to
think of the two terms as synonymous. And the key to unlock the difference largely involves
clarifying the “entities” involved. Thus, whereas international justice involves a kind of “relation
that holds between two or more independent nations,states or societies,” global justice, in contrast,
is basically “a relation that holds between human or sentient beings within something called the
global society” (Ericsson 1981, 20-21 quoted by Oruka 1997, 84).
In other words, while international justice mainly has nation-states as its crucial entities,
global justice takes human beings as primary subjects in quest for justice. Also, whereas the former
is pretty much in practice today insofar as nation-states relate and deal with each other (say, in
trade), the latter remains sort of an ideal to be realized. Oruka clarify the matter saying,
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I do not pretend to believe that we have anything in the world today that can significantly
be treated as global justice. Global justice is still only an ideal as far as nations are
concerned. What obtains among nations is international justice rather than global justice
(Oruka 1997, 84, emphasis mine).
Thus, Odera Oruka suggests that we need to urgently formulate a theory of achieving global
justice, and that formula would consist mainly on how we humans (socio-politico-ethical beings)
ought to relate and treat each other as members of a global society irrespective of national, regional,
racial, political or any other sectarian affiliation. And to justify this urgency, Oruka demonstrates
how global justice is more relational, inclusive, dynamic and progressive than international justice,
given that global justice is meant to be concerned with what is “good and fair” to individual human
beings in terms of their needs, their citizenship notwithstanding (Oruka 1997, 84).
It is in this context that Odera Oruka propagates the idea of human minimum, thereby
bringing a dynamic shift insofar as our quest for justice is concerned. The goal is to have an ethical
principle that would enhance a healthy human relationship within the entire global society. At the
back of his mind, Oruka seems convinced that the most important issue in this endeavour has to
do with what we all are entitled to or owe each other (i.e., our basic rights), and how we ought to
responsibly try to realize or facilitate realization of that entitlement. But that would require, among
other things, laying down some normative conditions for a fair distribution or sharing of wealth
and world resources (Ericsson 1981, 20-21). It would also require having some ethical duty toward
the wellbeing of each other, and especially the poor, so as to achieve egalitarian fairness. And for
Oruka, that egalitarian fairness can only be had if we first guarantee the right to a human minimum.
5.2.2. Rationale for the Idea of Human Minimum
To justify the idea of human minimum, Oruka appeals to the principle of self-preservation,
which for him is not only the object of ‘right to life’, but also “the basic necessity for an individual
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if he is to enjoy any other right” (Oruka 1997, 85). But to preserve life for an individual, Oruka
observes, entails first and foremost satisfying some needs meant to sustain human existence, key
among them being physical security, health and subsistence (Ourka 1997, 85). The three basic
needs taken together, he says, constitute the very minimum any human being can justifiably
demand from both local and global society for one to live a standard humanly dignified lifestyle.
They, in other words, constitute the right to a human minimum, which right, Oruka says, ought to
be treated as the most basic, universal, inalienable, absolute and necessary - not only for human
existence but also for enabling us to function as moral agents.
That argument follows Oruka’s noble conviction that all human rights that aim at ensuring
the fulfilment of basic human needs ought to be treated so simply because they essentially ensure
“necessary basic requirements for human survival and development anywhere and for the exercise
of the functions of a [human] person” (Oruka 1997, 85). As a caveat, though, the human minimum
should not be construed to be the end or the “floor” equivalent to mere self-preservation - as in
Hobbes and Locke; rather, it is really the means or the “doorway” to living a decent and dignified
life. As Oruka would say, it is only the basic necessity for enjoying other human rights (Oruka
1997, 85). We shall be investigating further what the right to a human minimum entails, but for
now, we need to clarify the claim that it is the basic necessity for enjoying any other human right.
5.2.3. The Basis of other Rights
As highlighted above, the idea of human minimum is the rational basis for demanding some
basic necessities without which a human being cannot sufficiently enjoy life and other rights. It is
therefore the basis for establishing “a more humanised life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85), that is, a
life governed by egalitarian principles of justice. To get Oruka’s point, we need first to remember
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his definition of ‘right’, which he says is the rational basis for a justified demand of something that
is fairly due (Oruka 1997, 85). We need also to remember that for Oruka, the actual enjoyment of
the substantive element of a right in question (which is what matters most) ought to be socially if
not legally guaranteed. But for one to enjoy the substantive element of any right whatsoever, one
must first of all be alive, secured, and healthy. Put differently, one must first be assured of the three
basic needs that sustain life, namely, physical security, subsistence, and health care before one can
effectively enjoy the substantive elements of any other right.
On these grounds, then, Oruka claims there must be some rights that are crucial to ensuring
the three basic human needs mentioned above; and these rights properly qualify to be everyone’s
minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of human society. That means their fulfilment and the
actual enjoyment necessarily ought to be morally, socially, and hence legally guaranteed so that
no one member of human species goes without. This is because they not only ensure individual’s
survival but also “preservation of the value of humanity in the universe” (Oruka 1997, 85). Here
Oruka seems to be following Henry Shue who, in defending some basic human rights holds that
even under unfortunate circumstances where it is not within one’s own power, for instance, to
arrange on how to enjoy the basic needs, other people ought to make some arrangements so that
one will still be able to enjoy them (Shue 1981/1996, 26, 27).58
Hence, Oruka claims that the concept of human minimum is the rational basis for a justified
minimum demand of the three basic needs - security, subsistence and health care, the denial of
which “no self-respecting human being can reasonably be expected to accept” (Oruka 1997, 85).
Now there are two possible interpretations here. First, we can take Oruka to be defending the

Shue has only security and subsistence as basic rights. Oruka, however, adds health care on the list, for
it is indubitably basic, universal and necessary for preserving life and for the enjoyment of any other right.
58
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human minimum precisely as that which is the most necessary (though not sufficient) means or
basis for people to live a worthy humanly dignified life.59 But second, we can also take him to be
defending the fact that every human being is entitled to enjoy that minimum justified demand
insofar as one is human, which implies that we owe each other the human minimum both as a right
and a duty. To me, both interpretations are complementary. Hence, Oruka elsewhere would define
the human minimum as the very minimum a human being can demand from the world so that one
may be in a position to understand, recognize and fulfil the rights of others (Oruka 1997, 147).
Oruka further observes that the three basic rights referred to above are also human rights,
meaning they are fairly entitled to every member of the human species and not merely to some
citizens of a given nation. They are also universal, meaning they ought to apply everywhere in the
same way, given that their fulfilment is very essential for the preservation of the very human life
and for upholding human dignity. Finally, Oruka adds that the three basic rights are inherent to
every human being, meaning their justifications flow from the very human nature. They are also
“absolute” in the sense that nothing can or ought to compromise their fulfilment without adversely
affecting human life, dignity, and ability to function as a capable moral agent. He says:
I wish to refer to the three basic rights (the rights to physical security, health, and
subsistence) as “the inherent rights of persons.” They are “inherent” because, for any
individual to be able to exercise the function of a person (the function of being a capable
moral agent), he [or she] needs at least the fulfilment of these rights as a necessary
condition (Oruka 1997, 86).
59

Earlier (see footnote no. 1), we defined ‘dignity’ as that “special inner worth” associated with human
species by virtue of them being rational and having capacity to act as moral agents. Here, we emphasize
not only the importance of enjoying or realizing that dignity, but also the role that society ought to play to
realize it. That, however, does not mean the society owes anyone their dignity; rather, it means the society
can determine how people actually enjoy their dignity. A society that tends to neglect people’s right to a
human minimum, for instance, would make it extremely difficult for them to live a dignified kind of life,
to function as moral agents, for instance, even though they may still struggle to do so.
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It seems quite clear, then, that the reason why Odera Oruka pushes for the concept of human
minimum, both as a right and a duty, is not merely to defend human entitlements for the sake of it
but rather to ensure that the majority (if not all) are able to enjoy a life worthy of a human person;
that is, a life not of sheer survival – scavenging dumpsites for food or living in fear of imminent
attack, for instance - but rather a more humanly dignified lifestyle that would enable people to
function as they ought to. Oruka clarifies the matter saying:
For all human beings to function with a significant degree of rationality and self-awareness,
they need a certain amount of physical security, health care, and subsistence. Let us, for
simplicity, refer to this minimum amount as the human minimum. Below this minimum,
one may still be human and alive. But one cannot successfully carry out the functions of a
moral agent or engage in creative activity (Oruka 1997, 87).
One of Oruka’s points here is that for any human being to live and function as a human person
(i.e., function with a significant degree of rationality, creativity, self-awareness, liberty and
capability as a moral agent), one would need significant amount of what the concept of human
minimum calls for, namely, security, health care, and subsistence. Although Oruka does not specify
how much of these basic needs would be necessary, my take is that it is as much as the society
(both local and global) can afford.
Oruka, however, further points out that below the human minimum, that is, below some
significant amount of security, subsistence and health care, “one may still be human and alive”,
but it would be almost impossible for such a human being to “successfully carry out the functions
of a moral agent, or engage in creative activity” (Oruka 1997, 87). And we might add to that and
say that it would be difficult to freely engage in such human activities as studies, religious worship,
or participation in decision making processes. Put differently, it would be more difficult to enjoy
other human rights. I come back to this point below; but for now, we need to reiterate Oruka’s
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point: meeting what the human minimum demands is very necessary (though not sufficient) for
anyone to be truly reasonable, free, self-determinate, creative, and responsible moral agent. 60
5.2.4. On Human Functionality
The analysis above seems to lead us to an interesting but important discussion about the
human minimum in relation to human capacity or functionality. And the question is this: how does
the human minimum (as a right to some basic needs) or lack of it affect the human’s capacity to
function as a moral agent? That question arises from Oruka’s assertion that enjoyment of the right
to a human minimum is necessary (though not sufficient) for a human being to act as a moral agent,
that is, function as a human person: reasonably, freely, creatively and ethically responsible (Oruka
1997, 87). It also emerges from Oruka’s further claim that without practically realizing what the
human minimum essentially calls for (physical security, subsistence, and health care), a human
being tends to be reduced to function either as a brute or a human vegetable, thereby losing “the
very minimum necessary for a decent definition of human being” (Oruka 1997, 87).
Now to understand Oruka’s claims, we need to clarify what he means by the terms ‘person’
and ‘personhood’. The two terms have had varied connotations throughout history of philosophy.
Boethius (480-524 AD), for instance, in De persona et duabus naturis, c. ii. defines a human
person as “an individual substance of a rational nature” (Gedes 1911). For Boethius, then, it is the
rational nature or some “isolated static quality of rationality” that grants human beings
‘personhood’, and hence dignity and ability to act as moral agents (Mentiki 1984, 172). But that

I don’t intend to mean that people living below the human minimum in any way cease to be human beings,
meaning they cannot or should not function as moral agents or engage in such activities as believing in
God; in fact, majority of them do. What I want to emphasize, as the discussion below will prove, is how
lack of the human minimum may adversely affect human functionality. Later, I will argue that perhaps it is
unfair for any society to expect those members living below the human minimum to act as moral agents.
60
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conception of a person does not address the role community plays or ought to play in realizing an
individual’s ethical conduct in terms of pursuing their rights and fulfilling ethical duties. It does
not, for instance, address how the physical or bodily needs of an individual would be met, yet these
are, needless to say, central factors that contribute toward human development and fostering the
individual’s personality, dignity and ability to function as expected – function as a moral agent.
And that has been the critique to the so-called “classical” conception of ‘person’ and
‘personhood’, especially in the West, where a human person is metaphysically conceived as “a
self-sufficient atomic individual who does not depend on his/her relationships with others for the
realization of his/her ends” (Gyekye 2002, 297). It seems to beg for another concept of “moral
personhood”, where a human person would be defined largely “in terms of moral qualities or
capacities” that are, nonetheless, realizable only within a community (Gyekye 2001, 304).
To me, Oruka’s argument for the human minimum seems to be emphasizing the fact that
that capacity to function as a moral agent ought to be actualized first if one is expected to make
proper moral judgments, and hence function as a moral agent. His position is that ensuring what
the human minimum demands is arguably the most basic necessity towards actualizing the human
capacity to act as a moral agent. Oruka would therefore define a human person as a human being
who not only has moral or ethical inclination (and hence capable of making moral judgments), but
one who actually does that. But that would presuppose a community that has prepared or facilitated
means and ways of making moral judgments. And one way of preparing an individual to make
moral judgments is by ensuring such basic needs as physical security, subsistence and health care,
which is what the idea of human minimum demands. That, Oruka believes, would make or allow
people to fully utilize their rationality, and hence be more confident, creative, and free. It would
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also make them ethically responsible toward the wellbeing of each other, thereby curbing pride,
greed and possessive individualism.
Hence, Oruka claims that a human person must have “characteristics which are additional
to those qualities that are sufficient for the definition of a human being, i.e., a member of human
species” (Oruka 1997, 86). Here, Oruka seems to be following Kant who argues that the idea of
‘personhood’ implies human dignity; thus, it must be inextricably linked with human freedom and
“autonomy” besides the rational nature (Kant 4:435-436). For Kant, therefore, just like in Oruka,
‘personhood’ includes those qualities of an individual that go beyond the mere fact of having
“rational nature” or being a member of the human species. Oruka, however, seems to dynamically
blend the Kantian view with what has been aptly referred to as “the traditional African concept of
person and personhood,” where each individual is diametrically seen as an important part and
parcel of the entire community rather than an isolated autonomous entity (Mentiki 1984, 2006;
Gyekye 1995, 85-103; Wiredu and Gyekye 1992). Thus, Oruka insists that a community or human
society (local and global) must first ensure the demands of the human minimum to its members
before blaming them for acting contrary to its norms (Oruka 1997, 88).
In this context, Oruka seems to understand a human person not only as a member of human
species (i.e., rational, sentient, and self-conscious being), but also one who is free to act and engage
in creative activities as a responsible moral agent. For him, ‘personhood’ refers to those qualities
that enable a human being to function as a rational, free, self-determinate, creative, and responsible
being. But such qualities are properly actualized insofar as one enjoys at least some basic human
needs: security, subsistence and health care. Put differently, it is the enjoyment of what the human
minimum demands that actualizes “personhood” which in turn enables a human being to actually
function or act as a moral agent. That in effect means there are some human beings who, for some
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reasons, cannot strictly speaking be considered “human persons”, especially insofar as they fail to
act or function as responsible moral agents. But that does not mean such people cease in any way
to be humans with no value and dignity.
To clarify his point, we see Oruka vehemently attacking such contemporary thinkers as
Peter Singer who, following Kant, narrowly defines a human person merely as sentient, rational
and self-conscious being (Singer 1980). Singer makes a distinction between “sentient beings” and
“sentient beings that are rational and self-conscious”. He then claims that human beings mostly
belong to the second category, and so they are considered ‘persons’. But he also controversially
argues that there are some humans who just fit in the first category, whereas some non-human
animals could fit in the second category, i.e., as persons. For Singer, then, it is only ‘human
persons’ (i.e., human beings that are not only sentient but also rational and self-conscious) who
have such “special value” in society as dignity, rights, and liberty. In other words, there is no
special value in the life of a human being simply because one is a member of the human species.
That logically means there are at least some humans (say, the unborn babies) who are less valuable,
even less valuable than non-human animals (Singer 1980, 123-154). But this is not what Oruka is
suggesting or implying, as he eloquently says:
Here, I am not concerned with persons in general, but only with human persons. I do not,
however, wish to buy Singer’s definition of ‘person’. All I am concerned with here is to
point out those needs whose fulfilment liberates human beings from the life of sheer
existence to that which offers a possibility for creativity. And I am also suggesting that this
liberation is necessary condition for one to function as a person, whatever meaning we
attach to this concept (Oruka 1997, 92 footnote no. 11).
In other words, Oruka seems to be saying that potentially every human being is a human
person by virtue of being a member of the human species. But one needs to actualize their
personhood, and hence be able to function reasonably, creatively, freely, and responsibly as a
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moral agent. And for him, what brings about actualization of that capacity to function as a moral
agent is the actual enjoyment of at least the three basic human needs: physical security, subsistence
and health care. Thus, guaranteeing these basic needs to every human being, Oruka would say, is
the most basic prerequisite means for social and global justice. It is the basis for ensuring that “all
human beings live in dignity, and are thus able to be part of the community of moral agents”
(Nyarwath 2012b, 76). Fulfilling what the human minimum demands, in other words, is the basis
for establishing socio-economic freedom, thereby ensuring possibility for establishing a more
humanized way of life on Earth” (Oruka 1997, 85).61
It follows, therefore, that the right to a human minimum is indeed one of the basic
prerequisites for ensuring the possibility of realizing our human/ ethical potentialities so that a
human being is not simply alive (having the life of sheer existence) but also able to function as a
reasonable, creative, and responsible moral agent. Like Martha Nussbaum, Odera Oruka believed
that it would be extremely difficult for people to function as moral agents unless the global society
makes some effort to “create capabilities” that would enable them to enjoy their universal
entitlements, key among them being the right to a human minimum (Nussbaum 2011, 33-34).
For clarity’s sake, let us think of someone who has lost the entire standard guarantee for
physical security, and has been exposed to threats against his or her life. Such an individual may
still be human and alive, but because of the imminent danger, his or her immediate concern would
most likely be survival at all costs. And in such a situation, we cannot justifiably expect the victim
to act as rational, self-determinate, free, creative, and responsible moral agent. If a woman, say,
was at the verge of rape or murder, she may decide to co-operate with the rapist or the murder; she

61

For Orukan concept of freedom/ liberty, see his book Oruka 1991/1996 and Nyarwath 2012b 76-82.
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may also agree to do any possible thing to survive - however stupid, irrational or useless that action
may appear from our own ordinary perspective (Oruka 1997, 86).
In the same way, people starving to death or being afflicted by terrible diseases are most
likely prone to lose their capacity for a creative and self-determinate kind of life, even though they
may still remain alive as humans. They may, however, adapt to a stoic way of life to survive; in
which case they may embrace servitude, pain, and sickness as normal or as fate would dictate. But
they may do so only to avoid trouble or perhaps gain some short-term tranquillity. They may even
strive to function as moral agents, abiding by all the norms and laws of morality – as many of them
do anyway. But that would by all standards of justice be unfair to them, not unless they embrace
stoicism deliberately, which is not what we are talking about. 62
The ancient Stoicism in around 3rd century BC is known to have advocated for a way of
life where individuals would be “in a state of being fully free”, even when in servitude, sickness,
torture, or whatever form of bodily suffering. For the Stoics, virtue (or the highest good) is based
on one’s knowledge of their surrounding; which comes about when one learns to live in harmony
with the divine reason (i.e., fate) that governs the cosmic world. Freedom and hence happiness,
therefore, for the stoics also comes about when one tries to be indifferent toward the vicissitude of
fortune, pleasure, and pain (cf. Epictetus, Discourses 1.15.2). Oruka, however, would obviously
reject such kind of “philosophy”.63

I am not insinuating that people under risk due to lack of the human minimum ought to be immoral; nor
am I saying that their striving to be moral is unfair or undesirable on its own. My point with Oruka is that
it seems quite unfair for global society, especially from the side of those living in affluence, to expect or
demand that those deprived of their right to a human minimum should function normally as moral agents.
The goal is really to underscore the ethical duty that we ought to have toward the wellbeing of each other.
63
Of course, there are some even today who might be sympathetic to stoicism – perhaps for religious or
political reasons; but in my view, it is really difficult to see how stoicism can be taken seriously.
62
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Thus, as Oruka rightly suggests, it is reasonably important, necessary, and morally binding
that people who are lacking basic needs be helped out of their misfortune (Oruka 1997, 86). And
that is where the concept of duty - i.e., a sense of being ethically responsible towards the wellbeing
of the ‘other’ - becomes handy. It enables us to realize that it is morally unjustifiable for us (who
are assured of the basic needs) to expect those living below the human minimum to always act as
responsible moral agents. It also makes us aware that it is ethically unfair if not unreasonable,
Oruka insists, to think that people starving to death would be capable of freely negotiating a fairtrade deal or sign business or political contracts (Oruka 1997, 86).
To underscore that point, Oruka makes us reflect on some common practices in the world
where affluent nations or individual billionaires tend to use their wealth and power to entice smallstarving (poor) nations with unfair deals. They may, for instance, seek to have monopoly of
utilizing the poor people’s “resource-and-mineral-filled land” for about 99 years or so in exchange
of food and medicine. Yes, by all reasonable and normal standards, Oruka agrees, such deals look
grossly unfair to the poor, considering the high value of minerals and resources targeted by the
rich and powerful party. Yet, Oruka thinks it would be unfairly cruel (if not unreasonable) to blame
the poor governments for accepting such raw deals since their first priority would be emancipation
from starvation and diseases (Oruka 1997, 86).
Oruka’s example might appear too simplistic and farfetched today, but it reflects what
happened when colonialist from Europe first came into Africa. British colonialists in Kenya, for
instance, are known to have duped the locals (who could not read English) into signing a lease to
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use “crown land”, i.e., prime and fertile land, for over 99 years.64 And the majority of Africans
continue to suffer devastating effects of such frauds. One just needs to read Rodney’s book How
Europe Underdeveloped Africa (1972) to concur with me. Oruka’s example also sadly reflects the
socio-economic exploitation prevalent, especially in Africa today, of course, under the disguise of
development while the reality is neo-colonialism at best.
And in the same vein, I do not think Oruka was naive to the fact that there are some rogue
leaders in Africa and other so-called ‘developing countries’ who continue to enrich themselves
through such corrupt trade and mineral deals as the one highlighted above. Of course, there are
corrupt leaders in Africa, just as they are also there in other parts of the world; and the challenge
is always how to get rid of them. But there are also leaders in Africa who genuinely want the best
for their people. A case in point was Mwalimu Nyerere of Tanzania, whose fight against poverty,
greed, and exaggerated individualism (among other vices) arguably has no equal. His efforts to
champion global justice, peace, unity and fostering equitable distribution of world resources is
indubitably distinct. In one of his intriguing speeches in 1970s, for instance, Nyerere attacks the
then “world economic order” that favoured the rich and the so-called “developed countries” while
exploiting the poor. He then calls for “a new world economic order” that would deal with most
global inequalities and injustices (Nyerere 1986, 7, 12).
That, however, does not mean such leaders as Nyerere (if he was alive today) cannot
sometimes be duped into raw deals that by reasonable standards appear unfair to their people. But
the question is: do such leaders have another better option? Put differently we may ask: what is

For a devastating policies of land alienation and colonial labour in Kenya (1897-1934), see Kinoti
2010, 43-55. These policies not only took away African’s right to use their own land but also allotted to
them “duty” to work for Europeans, and to the latter the right to own land (p. 49).
64
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the lesser evil: to let your people die of starvation and diseases, or forego their right to minerals
and resources in exchange of some food and medicine? Any responsible leader, I believe, would
go by the latter option even though it may look unreasonable to an outsider. And that is Oruka’s
point! He wants to establish the priority of human minimum in terms of what ought to be realized
first as the prerequisite for humans to act responsibly as moral agents.
Hence, one conclusion we can draw from the analysis above is that there are some basic human
needs - key among them being physical security, subsistence and health care - that all human
beings ought to unconditionally enjoy so as to effectively preserve life and function as responsible
moral agents. We can then justify the human minimum as the basic prerequisite standard necessary
for any human being to live a decent life worthy of a human person, and hence be able to enjoy
other rights. It is also the basis for our ethical duty toward the wellbeing of each other, our
geographical or any other sectarian affiliation notwithstanding.
5.3. The Right to a Human Minimum
We have been at pains trying to establish and justify the concept of human minimum, which
involves a fundamental expression that there are some inherently basic human needs that all human
beings ought to enjoy so as to preserve life and effectively function as responsible moral agents.
From one angle, the human minimum, we have seen, helps to underscore the idea of human right
and what it involves – quest for global justice. But human minimum can also be considered as a
human right on its own. This section aims at elaborating that point.
The concept of human minimum, as we have established, involves striving to realize three
basic human needs, namely, i) physical security, ii) health care, and iii) subsistence. Taken together
as a unit, Oruka argues, the three basic needs constitute the right to a human minimum, which in
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essence is meant to ensure preservation and sustenance of humanity. Thus, the right to a human
minimum is not only inherent to every member of the human species but also universal, meaning
that every human being is justifiably entitled to it. Thus, it also imposes obligations that transcend
territorial, national or any other sectarian affiliation (Oruka 1997, 87). That means to deny
someone the right to a human minimum is to deny them the very minimum prerequisite to not only
be human but also function as a human person or a responsible moral agent; it is to deny them the
right to life, dignity, liberty, creativity, and self-determination (Oruka 1997, 88).
Here, Odera Oruka concurs with Sterba, who points out that basic needs are those human
necessities that must be guaranteed to every human being in order not to seriously endanger one’s
life, health, and sanity (Sterba 1991, 108). He also concurs with Shue, who defines basic needs as
necessities that ensure the ‘right to life’ (Shue 1996, 26-27). For Oruka, therefore, the right to a
human minimum is, in fact, analytically equivalent to the ‘right to life’, whose enjoyment is
necessarily presupposed for the enjoyment of any other right. That also means the right to a human
minimum (or right to life) cannot be restricted, limited, compromised or overridden by any other
consideration; not even by the enjoyment of any other right (Oruka 1997, 88).
Oruka pushes his argument further, claiming that since it is inherent to every human being,
the right to a human minimum ought to be safeguarded by the law of every nation or society worth
its name. He stresses the term ‘ought’ because laws exist primarily to ensure order, which order
cannot be had if people are lacking the minimum means for realizing their right to life, dignity,
liberty, and self-determination. That means ensuring the right to a human minimum to the majority
would make it easier, say, to govern and conduct other business; it would proportionately reduce
risks of insecurity, insurgence and upheavals.
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Thus, Oruka concludes by saying that the right to a human minimum is both inherent and
universal to every member of the human species. It is also “absolute” meaning there is no other
right that can justifiably compromise its enjoyment. And as a right, it is the basis upon which every
human being can duly demand some basic things from both local and global society without feeling
guilty or inferior. Its fulfilment, moreover, obliges everyone both morally and socially regardless
of their national, geographical, or any other sectarian affiliation. That means it also confers a
necessary duty to every capable moral agent to provide for those who for some reason may find
themselves unable to realize it without feeling sympathetic or superior. Its fulfilment, in other
words, is the most basic starting point for the enjoyment of any other human right. Indeed, the
right to a human minimum seems to be the basis of both our justified demand of what in principle
we are all entitled to as well as our ethical duty to ensure that others too enjoy their rights. Oruka
sums up these points quite ingeniously saying:
Thus, the right to a human minimum is the basis for a justified demand by anybody that
the world (not just his society) has the duty to ensure that he is not denied a chance to live
a basically healthy life. And should he find himself in a situation denying him this right,
he will be tempted to disown himself as a moral agent. And if he does this, the world will
have no adequate moral ground for expecting such a person to abide by anybody else’s
right to anything (Oruka 1997, 88).
5.3.1. A Quest for Global Justice
There are a number of contentious practical implications that Oruka’s argument for the
right to a human minimum elicits. That includes his proposal that the rich (individuals as well as
nation-states) have the moral obligation to help the poor by sharing their purported wealth. For
him, foreign aid (i.e., monetary or otherwise) should be justifiably given on the understanding that
the affluent are simply fulfilling their global ethical obligation, and not that they are doing any
favour to the poor (Oruka 1997, 88). His point is that everyone living above the human minimum
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has an ethical obligation to facilitate or assist those living below the human minimum so that the
majority (if not everyone) in the world are able to enjoy the right to a human minimum. And behind
this rather contentious proposal is Oruka’s keen concern/ quest for global justice, which he says
cannot be had without first reducing the gap between the few rich and majority poor.
In one of his intriguing essays entitled “Philosophy of Foreign Aid”, Odera Oruka tries to
establish a situation where foreign aid from affluent nations to poor ones would be morally and
legally justified without making the donor feel superior or more important whereas the recipient
suffers humiliation, guilt, and inferiority complex. This is an important move or condition that
Oruka believed would make global justice realisable. For him, global justice would be realisable
in a situation where: (i) the gap between the rich and the poor is significantly reduced (if not
completely done away with); (ii) the wealth and world resources are equitably shared to correct
some historical injustices, and (iii) everyone feels ethically responsible for each other despite our
cultural, national, racial or any other sectarian affiliations (Oruka 1997, 84). Oruka’s insight seems
to resonate with John O’Neil’s, who in his essay “Need, Humiliation and Independence” strongly
argues for social solidarity at the global level (O’Neil 2005, 73-98).
One might claim that Oruka’s argument was perhaps palatable only in 1990s when much
of debate on global justice was about foreign aid. But that, in my opinion, would be an ungenerous
way of interpreting his argument. Oruka’s point, as I see it, is not so much about foreign aid; it
rather has more to do with creating awareness that we (humans) have ethical duty to be concerned
with the wellbeing of each other despite our apparent differences, even as we pursue and enjoy
what we believe to be personaly due. Thus, Oruka’s argument seems to dynamically enhance our
natural quest for justice. It is therefore even more relevant today in matters global justice.
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Looking at our contemporary world, we might regrettably agree with Oruka that what we
have been having in practice as nation-states interact with each other is at best international justice,
not global justice. As noted above, these two terms might be in use interchangeably, but they do
not philosophically speaking mean the same. Whereas global justice takes human beings as the
primary concern, international justice takes nation-states as its crucial entities. Hence, we properly
talk of global justice as consisting mainly on how we humans ought to relate and treat each other
as members of a global society on the one hand, and international justice consisting on how nations
relate and deal with each other (say, in trade or other negotiations) on the other (Oruka 1997, 84).
I am therefore tempted to think that if Oruka was alive today, he would be even much
concerned about issues of inequitable distribution of resources and opportunities more than he was
in 1990s. He would, in other words, be concerned about global injustices that tend to hamper the
actual realization and enjoyment of the right to a human minimum in the world. Like most global
ethicists, Oruka would abhor the ever-growing gap between the rich and the poor. He would also,
I believe, challenge us to strive for “a more humanised global society” (Oruka 1987, 84), where
everyone feels not only cared for but also ethically responsible towards the well being of all, and
especially those living below the human minimum in America, Europe, Asia, or in Africa.
In sum, Odera Oruka would no doubt advocate for a global society that is more egalitarian,
inclusive, and hence dynamically transformative. He would therefore advocate for global justice
rather than mere international justice. This is because global justice typically considers what would
be fair to individual humans irrespective of their citizenship. And perhaps the most important
question in our quest for justice has to do with what we owe one another and how we responsibly
try to realize that obligation. Indeed, one advantage of searching for global justice is that we are
not forced to take nation-states as fixed constraints, meaning we can consider a wider range of

150

relevant relationships, capacities, obligations, etc., thereby being able to structure our interactions
in a way that might foster a more elaborate concept of global responsibilities (Gillian 2015).
The point we are trying to make here with Gillian and Oruka is that asking about what
individuals owe each other as moral agents may well have wider implications of justice not only
for nations and their respective obligations but also for individual agents themselves and other
global institutions. That, I believe, is precisely what Oruka’s argument for the right to a human
minimum aims at establishing – global justice, and not international justice.
5.3.2. Principles of International Justice: A Critique
We have tried to establish that what has been in play as nations interact with each other is
at best international justice, even though we aspire to establish global justice. I this section, we
critically examine at least three principles that have apparently been in use to legitimize or forge
international relations, pointing out why they all have failed to achieve anything akin to global
justice. These principles according to Oruka are: (1) the principle of international trade; (2) the
principle of historical rectification; and (3) the principle of international charity (Oruka 1997, 85).
While they may prima facie look attractive, they, nonetheless, harbour some shortfalls in that none
of them, not even all of them taken together, would form an adequate ethical rationale for ensuring
global justice in our time. None them, in other words, would make it morally obligatory for affluent
nations or wealthy individuals, for instance, to aid the global poor purely from what Oruka calls
the “unqualified moral duty for humanity” (Oruka 1997, 84).
To put it differently, the three principles of international relations that justify foreign aid to
the so-called developing countries, for instance, cannot help the donors from psychologically
feeling superior out of their “charitable” actions, nor can they make the recipient receive and

151

actually enjoy such aid honourably without feeling self-pity, guilty and humiliated. Hence, Oruka
contends for another principle that would form the basis for an ethics that will help ensure the
practice of justice among all the inhabitants of the world regardless of their cultural, national,
geographical, racial or any other sectarian affiliation. That principle, he says, is the right to a
human minimum. And before we can establish how it qualifies for that noble task, let us consider
first how the other three principles fail.
Now according to Oruka, the first principle of international trade aims at establishing trade
relations between nation-states in equal terms. But that is not always the case, given that poor
developing countries are often left at disadvantaged positions, thereby hampering genuine growth
(development) and fair practice of justice. It is true that the necessity and intricacy of modern
international trade might bring about economic growth and socio-cultural exchange between
nations. But when that relation is between rich and poor countries, it often comes along with what
Oruka calls “the reality of unequal exchange,” which results in “unequal development within the
monolithic systems of world trade” (Oruka 1997, 83). It comes, in other words, with some
disguised expensive prices that mostly the poor countries have to pay.
As Oruka further observes, the rich (developed) nations may give aid to poor developing
nations, but they quite often do so not purely from “unqualified moral duty for humanity”, but
because they have some other ulteria motives. The donor might, for instance, be highly targeting
recipient’s raw materials, human resource, markets, etc. Affluent nations may also donate a
substantial amount to poor developing nations either as means to securing “ideological alignment”
and agreements from recipients, or they may do so as a disguised form of price or bribe that the
donor has to pay in order to remain the dominant player at the expense of recipients (Oruka 1997,
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83). That, as most political analysts observe, was indeed the case during the cold war era; it is also
very common trend today, albeit in a different version (Gaddis 1997; and Lölke 1997).
One may object that perhaps human beings and hence nation-states are self-interested
actors by design, which means we should not expect any other sort of behaviour other than each
one of them pursuing their self-interest regardless of who gets injured or unfairly treated in the
process. That extreme “conservative” view might have sympathisers from the so-called
“nationalists” who have a particularistic approach to international relations. But it has recently
been fairly challenged by another view: the cosmopolitan approach. In the next chapter, we shall
try to situate Oruka’s philosophy within that debate, where we shall try to argue that he seems to
embrace what has now become the “moderate cosmopolitan approach” to matters global justice
(Mandle 2006, 42). But for now, it suffices to say that the principle of international trade, as it
stands, cannot be the basis for justifying foreign aid, equitability and egalitarian common good
purely from “a global ethical obligation to humanity” (Oruka 1997, 85). It cannot, in other words,
ensure possibility of enhancing a genuine quest for global justice.
Likewise, the second principle of historical rectification fails to establish global justice,
for it advances the argument that the gap between the rich and the poor can only be reduced if and
when the past historical injustices are settled and rectified accordingly. It is true that the gap
between the rich and the poor (or under-developed) countries in the world is to a larger extent due
to past and present forms of such unjust policies as slavery, colonialism, and imperialism. One
may therefore reason following the principle of historical rectification that affluent former colonial
or slave masters are ethically obliged to assist their former subjects to develop if we are to have
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anything akin to global justice.65 Great Britain, for instance, would by this principle be ethically
obliged to help rebuild or rehabilitate such countries like Kenya, which was (and perhaps still is)
one of its strategic colonies or neo-colonies.
Oruka, however, contends that while such an argument may sound attractive, it does not
really meet the threshold to ethically justify foreign aid from affluent nations for three compelling
reasons. First, rectification, he says, cannot and should not be made based on a universal policy
for all kinds of aid. Second, if at all foreign aid were indeed a form of rectification for historical
injustice, he argues, then it should not come with “humiliating conditions for repayments”, as it
often does. Third, pegging justification of foreign aid on the principle of historical rectification,
Oruka says, would imply that any affluent nation that can prove not to have been party to past
historical injustices would have no moral obligation to offer foreign aid (Oruka 1997, 85). Affluent
countries like USA or China, then, would use that reason to exonerate itself from aiding most poor
countries like Kenya for they were not directly involved in the latter’s colonial menace. Oruka
therefore insists that we need another principle that for the sake of global justice would justify the
rich to assist the poor purely from “a global ethical obligation to humanity” (Oruka 1997, 85).
In the same vein, Oruka dismisses the principle of international charity, arguing that even
though charity is generally treated as one of the basic ethical values or principles in the practice of
foreign aid, it nonetheless only attracts the acceptance and recognition of donors, but not the
recipients (Oruka 1997, 83). And in this way, he says, we lose the very essence of charity, which
requires that the act be performed purely from moral obligation to humanity rather than from some
other ulterior motives like recognition. Oruka, therefore, envisions another principle that would

These rather polemical arguments can implicitly be found in Rodney (1972), and in various works of
Africa’s leading nationalist such as Kenyatta (1953), Nkuruma (2009) and Nyerere (1974).
65
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vindicate the position of the recipient and their right to receive such aid without feeling inferior,
guilty, or that they are receiving a favour. He says,
Aid from affluent nations (or individuals) to those countries (or individuals) suffering
abject poverty, should be given on the understanding that people from the affluent nations
are fulfilling the global ethical obligation of enforcing the latter’s right to a human
minimum (Oruka 1997, 88).
And to further discredit the principle of international charity as incapable of bridging
genuine practice of justice at the global level, Oruka observes that it takes us back to a situation
where donors are protected by what he calls “national supererogation”. This is a principle that
tends to protect a nation-state from blame if it remains indifferent to the needs of those outside its
borders, however needy and desperate such people may be (Oruka 1997, 82).
Interestingly, though, the principle of “national supererogation”, Oruka keenly observes,
also tends to “inspire” affluent nations to demand “showers of praise” should they decide to offer
foreign aid to poor nations. In other words, the principle claims that nation-states are not ethically
or otherwise obliged to aid each other; yet, should one of them decide to help another, “then the
donor has an absolute right” to not only demand recognition and praise but also decide the terms,
conditions, and the timing when such a donation would be appropriate (Oruka 1997, 82). Hence,
the principle of “national supererogation” might inevitably lead to a form of neo-colonialism.
5.3.3. Alternative Ethical Principle
The three principles of international justice, then, seem to fail insofar as our quest for global
justice is concerned. Hence, as Oruka claims, there is need for a fourth principle, one that will be
the basis for the justification of foreign aid and equitable sharing of world resources purely as a
global ethical obligation to humanity (Oruka 1997, 82). Such a principle would not only promote
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mutual co-operation but would also invalidate or minimise the use of “national supererogation” in
international relations, without, of course, discrediting the concept of national sovereignty and
equality among individual nations. Most importantly, the principle should also ensure preservation
of the existence and the rights of all human beings, as much as it also seeks to preserve the
existence and the rights of every nation-state. He says:
We need a principle which would make it ethically obligatory for affluent nations to aid
poor ones as an unqualified moral duty for humanity, and for the latter to receive such aid
without feeling a sense of self-pity. Such a principle should also help to invalidate the use
of “national supererogation” … without thereby discrediting the principle of national
sovereignty and the equality of nations. It should also be a principle from which any nation
(however independent) that treats its citizens as “sub-humans” would legitimately call for
humane external interference in her internal affairs (Oruka 1997, 84).
Now according to Oruka, the principle that meets the aforementioned threshold is the right
to a human minimum. It provides some adequate basis or rationale for our ethical responsibility
toward the wellbeing of each other, just as it also enhances mutual relation and egalitarian fairness,
thereby ensuring a possibility of achieving genuine practice of justice at the global level.
A question may, however, arise as to how that would prevent nations from oppressing each
other given the current “world order”. As long as the oppressor gave the oppressed nation ‘the
minimum conditions for life’, thus the charge might go, the former would seem to have a license
to do anything else it wanted with the oppressed. And the same could be said about individual
people dealing with each, say, in trade. Now while that may sound a valid critique, it nonetheless
seems to miss the “spirit” or the rationale behind the ethical principle of human minimum. Thus, it
is not so much about meeting some sort of static threshold or particular measurement as ‘the
minimum conditions for life’ that matters most, but rather ensuring fairness in all our human
undertakings, especially when it comes to distribution or sharing of wealth and world resources.
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Furthermore, the quality of the human minimum, as we said earlier, ought to be dynamically
revised, most preferably upward, depending on how the society (local or global) can afford. Now
it might be true that ideally we should aim at flourishing the human condition for all rather than
just striving to meet the bare minimum. But faced with the “reality” on the ground – the prevalent
cases of poverty among other human perils – justice, I think, would require us to first strive to
meet the right to a human minimum for all as a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for
realizing anything akin to global justice. And that seems to be Oruka’s point too.
As he rightly points out, the right to a human minimum makes it morally obligatory
especially for the affluent nations and individuals to assist the global poor (i.e., those living below
the human minimum) “purely from an unqualified ethical duty to humanity” such that donors do
not feel superior or special while recipients feel guilty or humiliated (Oruka 1997, 84). His point
is that we should all strive to do good, fulfill our duty of helping each other enjoy the right to a
human minimum, not for the occasional humanitarian ground based on sympathy, but in service of
a moral norm that aims at uplifting humanity toward a common good (Masolo 2012, 48).
Oruka’s argument seems closer to Peter Singer’s in his famous essay, “The Famine Relief
Argument” (1997). Singer claims that when the rich people and affluent nations allow the global
poor to suffer and die when they can prevent such suffering and death with a minimum “sacrifice”,
they actually engage in what he calls “reckless homicide” for which they are morally blameable
(Singer 1997, 90-91). His argument for assisting the poor (those living below the human minimum)
runs as follows: (1) If someone can prevent something bad without sacrificing anything of greater
or equal comparable moral significance, then one ought to do it. (2) Absolute poverty is an
intrinsically bad thing. (3) There is some absolute poverty that can be prevented without sacrificing

157

anything of greater or equal comparable moral significance. (4) Therefore, an ethically responsible
and capable human person ought to prevent some absolute poverty (Singer 1997, 85-9).
To grasp Singer’s argument, let us suppose that I have a significant amount of hard-earned
savings meant for a nice vacation, say, in Mombasa or buy a luxurious Ferrari. But before spending
the money, someone who works with a charitable organization approaches me with a request to
contribute towards feeding some malnourished sick children in Somalia or Haiti. In this case, I
have the freedom to choose: either to forego my vacation or buying luxurious Ferrari to feed the
hungry children or ignore their plight and go ahead with my plans - spend what is rightfully mine.
It seems sort of a dilemma. According to Singer, however, as an ethically responsible and capable
person, I ought to “sacrifice” buying the Ferrari (or going for vacation) and instead contribute
towards saving the plight of the malnourished sick children. This is because, morally speaking, the
latter act is “of greater comparable moral significance” than the former.
But one may question the basis or rationale behind making that choice. Hence, whereas
Singer’s argument might sound logically appealing, it doesn’t, on its own, appear ethically
compelling. It seems to beg for another ethical principle as the basis for acting according to what
it proposes purely from an unqualified ethical duty to humanity such that the donor does not feel
superior while recipients feel guilty or humiliated. That principle, we submit following Oruka, is
the right to a human minimum. It ethically awakens the donor to realize that it is his or her duty to
ensure what it calls for; thereby be able to “sacrifice” luxury so that the starving children can have
the basic human needs. It also enables the recipients to receive whatever aid from the donor, not
as a favour but as their right; that is, without feeling guilty or humiliated.
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Thus, the right to a human minimum provides an important ethical shift insofar as our quest
for justice is concerned. It enables us to not only get priority right but also shift our thinking: from
being self-centred and nation-centric to being cosmopolitan and globally minded. It therefore helps
us shift focus from international justice to pursuing global justice.
As a caveate, though, we should not simply disregard the three principles of international
relation; we should rather insist with Oruka that they are inadequate, and hence in need of a solid
base to meet the threshold for global justice. And precisely because it fulfils the threshold he sets
for global justice - justifying equitable distribution of resources purely from an ethical duty to
humanity, we suggest reversing the order so that the right to a human minimum comes first, given
that it is the most basic of the other three principles of justice.
5.4. Practical Implications
We have tried to establish that the right to a human minimum is the most basic human right. It
is therefore inalienable, universal, absolute and moral; meaning it ought to be socially and legally
grounded or “safeguarded by the law of any state worth its name” (Oruka 1997, 87). It is necessary
(though not sufficient) not only for the survival of humanity as such, but most importantly for
individual humans to function as they ought to, that is, to function as responsible moral agents. All
these qualifications have some interlinked practical implications that we now seek to discuss.
First, being universal and morally grounded, the right to a human minimum necessarily
evokes an ethical duty on every capable moral agent to act responsibly by ensuring that this right
is never compromised, overridden or violated. It, ipso facto, ethically obliges us to respect and
uphold human value and dignity in the world. And that obligation, Oruka says, transcends our
territorial, national, racial or any other sectarian affiliation (Oruka 1997, 87). We can also argue
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that it is what fundamentally put us “in a position to understand and recognize the rights of others”
Oruka 1997, 147). It is therefore the basis of establishing what Oruka calls “radical humanisation”
that would get rid of all forms of injustices in the world (Oruka 1997, 132).
Put differently, adherence to what the human minimum standsd for would make it possible
to establish a communitarian global society governed by principles of justice, key among them
being egalitarian fairness. My assumption with Oruka is that it is incredibly difficult to establish
global justice in a society predominantly defined by greed or possessive individualism (Graness
and Kresse, 1997, 119), and hence socio-economic inequality and poverty. It is also not possible
to have global justice without first taking care of our environment from which resources come.
In his 1993 essay entitled “Parental Earth Ethics,” Oruka makes it clear that global justice
can only be had if we (humans) embrace an ethics that conceives the whole universe as a
commonwealth or a common good. That ethics, he says, would make us be concerned with the
wellbeing of the ‘other’, and so be able to share the resources therein despite our differences. For
him, the world is “a kind of family unit in which the members have a kith and kin relationship with
one another” (Oruka 1997, 150). That means we all have an ethical duty also to take care of our
environment, just as we also mind about global redistribution of resources if we are to achieve
anything akin to global justice. In other words, we need to be concerned about the wellbeing of
the ‘other’66 even as we pursue and enjoy what we believe to be our entitlements.
In yet another fascinating essay dubbed “Philosophy and Humanity Today”, Oruka keenly
observes that although humanity is a part of nature, it is not itself a necessary part of nature. That
might sound an obvious truism, but Oruka uses it “to calm the pride of those whose attitude is that
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By the ‘other’ here I mean our fellow human beings and the environment or the universe at large.
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man [i.e., human] is the vital part of nature and the centre of universe” (Oruka 1997, 126). A
corollary of that view, he says, is to think that a given nation or an “ideological bloc” has monopoly
of truth for all humanity (Oruka 1997, 126). Another corollary, we might add, is to think that some
people are more important than others simply because of the privileges or possessions that
happened to come their way. In sum, Oruka insists, we need to get rid of pride or prejudice that
often blinds us humans from seeing the ethical duty that ought to guide our relationship with each
other and with other non-human beings in the world.
Elsewhere, in an interview with Kai Kresse in August 1995 (three months before his tragic
death), Oruka pushes that idea further, calling for a kind of “global ethics” that conceives the whole
earth as a global society, that is, a sort of “organic unity” governed by the principles of
interdependence and ethical responsibility (Graness and Kresse 1997, 257).67 And in this “complex
web of being” with symbiotic relation, Oruka further says, everything seems to depend on each
other for survival; and nothing or no one is supposed to be more important than the other.
Everything on earth is important, you see. Even some of the small insects that we might
think are useless, if you regard the earth as organic unity, then they are not useless. Maybe
an earth worm may not look important, less important, for instance, than the German head
of state, but maybe there could be no German head of state without the existence of the
earthworm (Graness and Kresse 1997, 258).

Here, Oruka evidently seems to be pushing for what we might call ‘eco-centric’ rather than
mere ‘anthropocentric’ account of global justice. He seems to be developing an ethics that
recognizes the importance of every being, each according to its own mode of existence. But, Oruka

That seems to be the direction Oruka’s ethical thought would most likely have taken had he lived longer
(Graness and Kresse 1997, 257). And to me, ensuring the right to a human minimum as a standard of living
for all is the key towards establishing such an ethics, and by extension ensuring global justice.
67
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also emphasizes the central role that humans (who apparently are the only rational cum ethical
beings on earth) have to play to bring about global justice. As rational cum ethical beings, Oruka
says, we ought to enjoy the earth and its resources responsibly; that is, as stewards not owners,
taking good care of it as our common good (Graness and Kresse 1997, 258). That means none of
us, for instance, has, strictly speaking, an absolute right or monopoly of ownership and enjoyment
of the earth more than others who for some reasons might appear less privileged.
Similar sentiments have been made by Pope Francis, who in his Encyclical “Laudato Si:
On care for our Common Home” cautions against what he calls “the crisis and the effects of
modern anthropocentrism”, which comes about when people tend to praise or prize the
“technological mind” (i.e., human mind) over the rest of reality, thereby compromising the
intrinsic value of the world. And that happens, he says, when humans see nature merely as “an
insensate order, as a cold body of facts, as a mere ‘given,’ as an object of utility, as raw material
to be hammered into useful shape…with complete indifference” (Francis 2015, 78). In this culture
of exaggerated “technical thought” as the Pope further laments, human beings paradoxically “fail
to find their true place in this world” as they fail to take themselves as stewards rather than masters,
perhaps because of pride, arrogance, and ignorance We then misunderstand ourselves to be the
most important beings in the world, and so end up acting in a way that is detrimental to the common
good of the whole world (Francis 2015, 78).
And that is evident especially today, the Pope observes, when we fail to monitor the harm
done to nature and ignore the environmental impact caused by our techno-minded decisions. It is
also evident when we fail to acknowledge as part of reality the worth of the poor, the disabled, and
the most vulnerable among us. Put differently, it is evident as we fail “to hear the cry of nature
itself; everything is connected” (Francis 2015, 79). The fact of the matter is: once we declare our
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pseudo-independence from the rest of reality and start to treat nature with absolute dominion, then
the very foundation of our human life begins to crumble.
Thus, Like Oruka, Pope Francis advocates for an ecological approach to the issues affecting
global society where humans are the key players. He propagates for what we might call an ethics
of inclusivity and mutual respect as we listen to “the message of each creature in the harmony of
creation” (Francis 2015, 58). In other words, he calls for an ethics that requires us (humans) to use
world resources responsibly as good stewards, taking care of the wellbeing of the ‘other’ (i.e.,
other humans and the environment) even as we pursue and enjoy what we think is rightfully due.
This is an ethics that also gives preferential option to the poor and the most vulnerable in our global
society. But such an ethics would necessarily call for, among other things, egalitarian fairness in
terms of equitable redistribution or sharing of world resources. It would require, as the Pope further
says, to “integrate questions of justice in debates on the environment, so as to hear both the cry of
the earth and the cry of the poor” (Francis 2015, 35). Our submission with Oruka is that the right
to a human minimum is the basic principle or rationale behind embracing such an ethics.
We have also said that the right to a human minimum is not only inherent but also absolute
and necessary; meaning nothing (not even another right) can morally, legally or otherwise
justifiably compromise its fulfilment. That means it is the basis upon which any human being in
the world can make a justifiable demand to both local and global society for the fulfilment of at
least some minimum basic necessities. That in effect means both local and global societies have
an ethical responsibility to ensure that no member of the human species gets denied a chance to
live a basically secure, healthy, and subsistent life; otherwise the society would not be morally or
otherwise justified to exist and to blame any member who fails to function as a responsible moral
agent when their right to a human minimum has been compromised (Oruka 1997, 88, 130, 147).
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That conclusion might sound outrageous, but it philosophically makes sense, for to deny people
the right to a human minimum is tantamount to denying them the right to live. It is also tantamount
to denying them ‘personhood’ - the capacity to function as responsible moral agents.
5.5. Possible Critique and Way Forward
There are a number of possible critiques that may arise from Oruka’s argument for the right
to a human minimum. To conclude this chapter, I wish to highlight a few of them; and I believe
Oruka was aware of them, only that he unfortunately did not live long to thoroughly address. First,
we may rightly ask whether denying someone the right to a human minimum necessarily makes
her/ him lose capacity to lead a rational, creative, free and morally responsible lifestyle, as Oruka
seems to suggest (Oruka 1997, 88, 147). Put differently: do those who for some reasons get denied
the right to a human minimum have any ethical obligation to function as moral agents?
To answer these questions, it is important to point out that Oruka’s argument should not be
taken to imply that those deprived of the right to a human minimum and hence their “personhood”
cease to be human beings at all. Thus, it doesn’t mean those living below the human minimum are
incapable of being responsible moral agents either. The fact is: they remain human beings with the
value, dignity, and respect they deserve only that their ability to fully function as human persons
(i.e., function as creative, free and responsible moral beings) may be adversely affected. In other
words, their potentiality to act as moral agents remains intact only that they may fail to always
actualize that potentiality since denying someone of the right to a human minimum amounts to
denying her/ him of the most basic prerequisite to function as a moral agent. Oruka’s language,
moreover, suggests that even those living below the human minimum ought to act as moral agents.
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Thus, he observes that majority of them actually struggle to negotiate through the world as
responsible agents; his problem is that perhaps that is grossly unfair to them (Oruka 1997, 86-87).
Second, some might be tempted to accuse Oruka of narrowing down the issues to do with
morality and human functionality to material/ economic wellbeing. Hence, another question may
arise: does material/ economic wellbeing alone really affect people’s rationality, and by extension
their ethical obligation to function as responsible moral agents rather than moral patients or
irresponsible agents? Again this, in my view, is a question about what really makes one function
as as a responsible moral agent. Indeed, there are other factors such as cultural, social, political
and religious background that adversely contribute to or determine how human beings function.
And I believe Oruka was not naive to them, only that he wanted to emphasize the economic
wellbeing, which arguably is one of the key factors, but certainly not the only one that determine
morality and human functionality.
But a third contentious issue may follow: if enjoying the right to a human minimum is one
of the key factors determining our morality, would it be ethically correct and therefore reasonably
fair for those who are economically affluent to treat those who are apparently deprived of such
basic needs as subsistence, security, and health care as though they are equal moral agents capable
of freely and willingly engaging in fair deals, say, in trade? In other words, what could be the fair
way to proceed given the apparent forms of inequality in the world?
Now one way in which Oruka would have answered that question, I think, would be to
encourage the critic to read his ethics keenly and try to implement what he proposes, and hence
run “from conjecture to practice” (Oruka 1997, 91). Oruka’s ethics, as we have said, challenges us
to be ethically concerned about the wellbeing of the ‘other’ despite our differences, even as we
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enjoy what we think is rightfully due. He, for instance, suggests revising “the world order” so that
we might have new global arrangements that would see the wasted consumption in affluent nations
being saved and transferred to alleviate poverty in other poor nations (Oruka 1997, 91).
Elsewhere in his essay entitled “The Ethics of Consumerism”, Oruka suggests creating
national and international laws to protect consumer’s rights and ensure priority insofar as rationale
for consumption is concerned. Such laws, he says, should also ensure an ethical framework,
thereby restore ethical duty and harmony between “super-consumers” (the rich) and the “underconsumers” (the poor). And such laws, Oruka further argues, should “ethically remain part of
human attempts to eradicate hunger and poverty,” which is arguably the number one priority of
human consumption (Oruka 1997, 265).68 Here Oruka seems to be attacking, just like Pope
Francis, a culture of over-consumerism, wastage, and “throwaway” syndrome (Francis 2015, 1819); a culture that appears prevalent today in some regions.
Finally, there are those who might ask whether the world, given its wealth and resources
vis-à-vis human population, can economically afford a life above the human minimum for all the
human inhabitants (Hardin 1980). This is a question Oruka anticipated, of which he suggests
seeking an honest answer from the experts in “positive economics,” which refers to a systematized
knowledge about people’s economy, i.e., wealth and resources. He contrasts this with normative
economics, or welfare economics, which “presupposes the existence and findings of positive
economic but strives to utilize such findings for recommending ethically appropriate actions and
the rational reorganization and redistribution of resources” (Oruka 1997, 81). But even as we wait

Oruka thought there are basically three reasons for human consumption: (i) alleviation of hunger, hence
basic consumption; (ii) the enrichment of life, hence, social consumption, and (iii) aesthetic enjoyment,
hence, luxurious consumption. And for him, alleviation of hunger and poverty ought to take priority if we
are to achieve a harmonious and more humanised world (Oruka 1997, 264-65).
68
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for that honest response, Oruka suggests that nations of the world should significantly cut the
current waste in military affairs and domestic consumption and then turn such savings to “rational
redistribution among the global poor” (Oruka 1997, 91).69
And even in the unlikely event that the experts in positive economics prove that the world
cannot afford to raise the welfare of everybody above the human minimum, Oruka still believes
that “everybody and every nation which can afford the human minimum for some people is
ethically obliged to do so” (Oruka 1997, 92). The real issue, therefore, is not so much about
whether the world has enough resources or not; the real issue, in my view, is about how we use (or
misuse) whatever resources available. The real issue, in other words, is about whether we humans
are ethically responsible toward the wellbeing of other fellow human beings and the environment
or not, even as we pursue what we think is rightfully due.
5.6. Conclusion
This chapter was meant to critically examine Oruka’s argument for the right to a human
minimum, an ethical principle he believes to be the foundational basis of the actual enjoyment of
all other human rights, just as it also has the most compelling ethical duty to every capable moral
agent. It is therefore crucial in our quest for global justice. We started off by assuming that: (i)
human rights, at least the inalienable ones, are or ought to be morally, socially, and hence legally
grounded to protect all human beings from various forms of injustice based on our common

There are credible researches indicating that the world has sufficient resources to meet the cost of
satisfying at least the basic needs of every existing human being; the problem, however, is that priority
seems to be given where it is not due (see Sterba 1991, 114-115 and Singer 1997, 86-87). That, to me,
seems to be Oruka’s stance as well. For him, the reason why people tend to think the world has limited
resources is mainly because of: (i) fear among nations, hence lack of political goodwill help each other, (ii)
greed (camouflaged as ambition) hence lack of moral fairness, and (iii) irrational pride (Oruka 1997, 134).
69
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humanity; (ii) human rights attain their relevance or “moral worth” if and when their substantive
element associated with them is realised and actually enjoyed; (iii) human rights imply or elicit
correlative ethical duty to realize or facilitate their enjoyment, though that duty does not bind with
the same impetus; and hence (iv) there are some human rights that are inherent to the very human
nature, meaning they are so basic and necessary to preserve human life, dignity, and ability to
function as moral agents. The last assumption is what this chapter was aimed at expounding.
This we have done by delving into the concept human minimum, which Oruka sets up as
the standard of living below which it would be extremely difficult for any human being to survive
decently as she or he should, let alone function as a reasonable, creative, free, and responsible
moral agent. Oruka’s subsequent argument has been thoroughly analysed. First, we discovered
that it acknowledges some basic human rights that are universal, necessary and indispensable. His
argument also presupposes there is no greater right of a human being than ‘right to life’, the object
of which is self-preservation, which is what the concept of human minimum aims at establishing.
The concept of human minimum, we then said, involves enjoyment of three most basic
human necessities, namely, (i) physical security; (ii) health care; and (iii) subsistence. Taken
together as a unit, they constitute what Oruka dubs the right to a human minimum, which right is
universal, necessary, inalienable, and hence the most basic prerequisite for any human being to
survive decently as well as function as a creative, free and responsible moral agent. That means
every human being is, by virtue of being human, inherently entitled to this right, meaning its
enjoyment ought to be socially and where possible legally guaranteed. It is therefore the rational
basis for our justified demand of what we as humans are entitled to, the denial of which no selfrespecting person could reasonably be expected to accept willingly.
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Similarly, we have discovered that by virtue of being the most basic, necessary and
inalienable right, the human minimum also implies a correlative necessary duty on us. As an ethical
principle, it by design or default imposes ethical duty upon every human person, especially those
who are economically stable, to ensure that no human being goes without enjoying the right to a
human minimum. Put differently, the right to a human minimum is the basis for our necessary duty
toward the wellbeing of each other as rational beings striving to establish a more humanised life
on earth. It is crucial to the establishment an egalitarian-communitarian global society governed
by principles of justice, key among them being egalitarian fairness and ethical responsibility.
Consequently, we have established that the right to a human minimum is also the minimum
prerequisite for us to have anything akin to global justice. It is, in other words, the minimum
necessity that must be met for everyone in the world regardless of our racial, national, geographical
or any other sectarian affiliations. Its fulfilment, as Oruka insists, is not only the starting point for
the fulfilment and actual enjoyment of any other human right, but also guarantee for other liberties
to dynamically pursue what is good for all. This, however, does not mean that the human minimum
is the end of our quest for global justice; it is rather the mere foundational means to it.
Finally, we have looked at some practical implications that the right to a human minimum
as an ethical principle presents with regards to our quest for global justice. We were able, for
instance, to develop a rational defence as to why affluent nation-states and individuals should aid
the global poor purely from their ethical responsibility for humanity’s sake. In the next chapter,
we shall see how Oruka’s insight, particularly his concept of the human minimum might enhance
the current talk on our quest for global justice. We shall especially see how Oruka’s “humanism”
and “eco-philosophy” dialectically lead to what he calls “parental earth ethics” that he proposes as
an ethical framework to help inspire in us a genuine practice of justice at the global level.

169

CHAPTER 6
PARENTAL EARTH ETHICS: TOWARDS GLOBAL JUSTICE
The earth or the world is a kind of family unit in which the members have a kith and kin relationship with
one another, and the earth is a commonwealth to all humanity (Oruka 1997, 150).

6.1. Introduction
This chapter aims at advancing a discourse that would help ensure a genuine practice of
justice at the global level. A good number of practical thinkers have been concerned with the issue
of justice, that is, with the human effort to give and receive what is fairly due. Thus, such issues
as human rights abuse, socio-economic inequality, poverty, etc. have always been raised and talked
about. Most of these talks, however, tend to be confined within national or territorial boundaries.
They tend, in other words, to “territorialize” the concept of justice, yet, one would expect that such
ideal principles of justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’ would be applicable everywhere for everyone.
The rise in globalization, moreover, despite some of its positive aspects has nonetheless exposed
the reality of global injustice. The gap between the rich and the poor, for instance, seems to be
escalating day by day.70 But to some of us, this is a worrying trend; it is a real threat to posterity
and security of both humanity and the entire universe; it not only jeopardizes the dignity of human
life but also threatens global security. The situation inevitably begs for a genuine concept and
practice of justice at the global level. We seek in this chapter to establish what that might entail.
At the centre of global justice talk, then, is a question that, I think, needs to be addressed
with urgency to help us transition more effectively towards a less unjust and more “globalised”
world. In a world as interconnected and interdependent as ours, one may ask: is it justified that

According to Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the richest 10% of
world population earn 9.6 times the income of the poorest 10%. Such inequality, the OECD warns, is a
threat to economic growth; it is a grave form of injustice (Reuben 2015).
70
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some few people have so much affluence while the majority languish in abject poverty? To put the
question differently, is it fair for some people to exuberantly exploit world resources at the expense
of the survival of others? What responsibility, if any, do we (humans) have toward establishing a
more genuine practice of justice at the global level? Furthermore, how ought we to treat other nonhuman beings in the world? These are some of the questions we seek to address in this chapter.
We want to try and establish some ideal ethical principles that ought to guide our engagements
and endeavours as humans, thereby making the world fairer enough for everyone.
Thus, the chapter attempts to apply Oruka’s insight to advance a critical discourse on global
justice, a sensitive but crucial topic that, I think, has not been substantially considered. We shall
see how, for instance, Oruka’s eco-philosophy, and hence his parental earth ethics leads us to a
different kind of humanism (or humanness) that Oruka believes would motivate both: (a) global
environmental concern, and (b) global distribution or sharing of wealth and world resources for
the common good (Graness Kresse 1997, 130; Oruka 1997, 150). His parental earth ethics, we
shall see, helps us understand what it really means to be human in relation to our environment. It
calls for an integral approach to ecosystem, even as we humans strive to meet our needs and resolve
our contemporaneous problems, thereby seeing the world as a global society, a sort of “organic
unity” or a family governed by principles of interdependence and ethical responsibility.
Oruka’s parental earth ethics also helps us conceive the earth both as a home and a
commonwealth or heritage for all of us – including non-human beings. It advocates for a
“stewardship model”, thereby stressing our ethical duty as humans (who presumably are the only
rational beings on earth) to take good care of the earth by responsibly using and equitably
distributing (or sharing) resources therein. Parental earth ethics, therefore, helps us recognize and
uphold human dignity as well as appreciate the unique role (or obligation) that we humans have to
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play in making this world more habitable for all. But that would require us to be more stewards
rather than owners or exploiters of the earth, thereby fostering our relationship to and with the
environment – i.e., the natural world.
Some recent important philosophical thoughts seem to rekindle or resonate with Oruka’s
proposal, and we seek to engage them critically. In his Laudato Si, Pope Francis, for instance,
appeals to all people of the world to take a “swift and unified global action”, particularly in relation
to environmental degradation (Francis 2015). His proposal requires taking good care of Nature,
i.e., the whole of creation, which call also implies equitable distribution or sharing of wealth and
resources with the poor. It also requires people coming together as rational cum ethical beings to
initiate integral and sustainable developments throughout the world, which developments would
ensure a more secured and habitable life on earth for all without jeopardizing the ecological system.
Oruka’s appeal, likewise, is for global society to ensure a more secured and humanized life
on earth (Oruka 1997, 85), that is, a life above the human minimum to all members of the human
species. This is a kind of life in which one is assured of enjoying at least such basic human needs
as physical security, subsistence, and health care. Oruka believed that that is the basic prerequisite
for establishing anything akin to global justice. But that would require not only equitable sharing
or distribution of wealth and resources but also taking good care of our environment. Thus, we
seek in this chapter to establish what global justice at minimum level entails. And our contention
with Oruka is that a genuine account and practice of global justice, one that aims at curbing socioeconomic injustices while promoting “ecological fairness” in the world ought to be grounded on
parental earth ethics, whose driving principle is the right to a human minimum.
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We start off by critically analysing the idea of justice understood as ‘egalitarian fairness’.
We then show why and how justice as so defined - in terms of egalitarian fairness - ought to be
practiced at the global level, before establishing what global justice would really entail at the
minimum level. We shall then discuss Oruka’s eco-philosophy, particularly his parental earth
ethics. Here, we shall critically engage Hardin’s Lifeboat Ethics (1980) as a classical account that
tends to “territorialize” or limit the practice of justice. Finally, we shall look at Oruka’s humanism
and his unrelenting quest for justice at the global level. This will hopefully help us define global
justice not merely in terms of ensuring “egalitarian fairness” but also “ecological fairness”. The
former, we shall argue, cannot effectively be had without the latter.
6.2. Justice Defined as ‘Egalitarian Fairness’
The concept of justice is, no doubt, one of the central ideals in human relations, though it
is difficult to precisely define. It therefore seems to be one of those concepts Oruka would call
honorific, meaning it is something universally desirable to have even though its actual meaning
seems to be “vague, obscure, and pervasive” (Oruka 1991b, 49). Nonetheless, in almost every
culture or human society, justice is often understood not only as a virtue (i.e., human disposition
toward moral good and excellence) but also a sort of contractual concept that facilitates every other
human relation and interaction - social, political, economic, religious, etc.
The idea of justice, then, is essentially meant to ensure ‘egalitarian fairness’ in our human
endeavor, which prima facie implies equitability, impartiality and reciprocity. Under the principle
of ‘egalitarian fairness’, it is often assumed that people are and hence ought to be treated as equal
members of a particular society regardless of their apparent differences. That, however, does not
mean everybody should get the same amount or necessarily be treated exactly in the same way. A
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horrible violinist does not have to be admitted in an orchestra anyway for justice to be had. The
principle of ‘egalitarian fairness’, then, is meant to ensures that everyone is impartially given their
due. It also implies reciprocity so that one does not only receive what in principle everyone is
fairly entitled to, but that one also fairly gives or facilitates what others are duly entitled to.
Now the phrase ‘egalitarian fairness’ may sound attractive to define justice, but the idea in
itself does not guarantee the actual enjoyment of justice. Thus, from a practical point of view, I
think, we need to ask a more fundamental question, namely: how far should the demand of justice
stretch or oblige? This is a question about the scope of justice, a question that Oruka sought to
address, as he adopted the idea of justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’ from a global perspective.
Of course, there are several theories of justice that tend to explicitly push for the principle
of ‘egalitarian fairness’, but most of these theories do so only for a particular region or nation;
they, in other words, tend to limit the demands of justice (equitability, impartiality and reciprocity)
within a particular territory. Under such accounts, then, one is expected to be more committed to
the demands of justice only to the extent that one shares a common territorial establishment. It is
such accounts that tend to inform what is now popularly known as “political realism” characterized
by extreme nationalistic rhetoric and divisive politics (Mandle 2006, 28).
One may, for instance, recall the 2016 presidential elections in U.S.A., where Mr. Trump
(now president) run a campaign with a slogan “make America great again!” The rhetoric that
followed that slogan was to portray the urgency of ensuring “justice” to the American people first
by dumping the rest of the world. That, to me, is a classic example of political realism where
politicians are driven by the urge to pursue national (perhaps personal) self-interest and security
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through power struggle. One may argue that that’s how the “world” has always operated - pursuing
self-interests first; but that view is no doubt misleading if we are to seek justice at the global level.
Thus, perhaps the question we should focus on is how we can possibly “de-territorialize”
the practice of justice so that there can be egalitarian fairness for all people in the world. This was
one of Oruka’s major concerns when he sought to establish the foundational rationale of the idea
of global justice using the ethical principle of human minimum. He believed that we cannot claim
to practically have justice in the world unless we first ensure that no human being goes without
enjoying the right to a human minimum (Oruka 1997, 84). The idea of justice, Oruka argues, ought
to be practically de-territorialized if it is to achieve its desired egalitarian dimension. And for him,
the right to a human minimum is the driving principle towards that end.
Oruka’s argument can be structured as follows. First, he adopts the definition of justice as
egalitarian fairness, which implies equality, equitability, and impartiality. Second, he claims that
‘egalitarian fairness’ also implies reciprocity, that is, not only receiving what in principle every
human being is fairly entitled to, but also giving or facilitating realization of what others are also
duly entitled to insofar as they are human. Third, he establishes the right to a human minimum
(whose substantive elements entails enjoyment of such basic human needs as security, subsistence,
and health care) as one basic “thing” that every human being is entitled to. Thus, he concludes that
ensuring the enjoyment of the right to a human minimum is the basic necessary (though not
sufficient) prerequisite to having justice at the global level (Oruka 1997, 85, 88).
The next question that Oruka seems interested to answer is how justice could be deterritorialized or made “global” in practice. This is no doubt a difficult if important question. As
mentioned earlier, the idea of justice as egalitarian fairness is crucial because it influences how
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well people live or ought to live in any given society. It is related to almost every important aspect
of human existential wellbeing. Yet, as Amartya Sen rightly argues, what animates our thinking
about justice is the ability to arrest such “redressable injustices” as human rights abuse, socioeconomic inequality, poverty, etc. (Sen 2009, vii). Such really dilapidating phenomena, according
to Sen, must be addressed urgently at global level if we are to establish anything akin to global
justice. His proposal seems to recount Oruka’s call for “a radical humanization” of the world
(Oruka 1997, 132), which would require not only striving to eradicate socio-economic inequalities,
but also coming up with viable plans and action for the abolition of most of human degradation.
6.2.1. What is Justice for X in S?
One important point, in my view, that Sen and Oruka seem to be making above is that there
is need to urgently shift our focus from the mere theoretical/ intellectual conception of justice to
the actual practical exercise of justice at the global level. Hence, our major concern, in other words,
should not be with the mere question: what is justice? Rather, we ought to ask ourselves: “what is
justice for X in S?” where X stands for individual person (or a group), and S for global society. I
borrow this analysis from Oruka’s similar treatment of the idea of liberty, which he says ought to
be understood as “liberty for X in S” rather than merely “what is liberty”. This is what would
render liberty its desireble “moral worth” (Oruka 1991b, 53-55). In the same way, I think, justice
would have its moral worth or practical value only if it stands to defend against what we are calling
with Sen “global redressable injustices”. To put it differently, it is not enough to define justice
merely as egalitarian fairness, but it is more important to ensure egalitarian fairness to all people.
The question “what is justice for X in S?” is crucial for several reasons. First, it enables us
see justice not merely as an ideal concept for the sake of it but rather as “something” that is either
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necessary for maintaining human life or for enriching it. In other words, it underscores what Oruka
would call the “practical moral worth” of the idea of justice. Second, the question enables us grasp
the necessary duty (both positive and negative) that global society has, where every other human
being is a legitimate member. Put differently, it helps us see the value and the need for each other,
and hence our duty toward the wellbeing of each other as members of one global society.
Third, the question “what is justice for X in S?” resonates well with the principle of
egalitarian fairness, which is essentially meant for establishing equitability, impartiality and
reciprocity. Thus, it points to the idea of global justice, which as we have said, is meant to address
what we owe to each other as humans at global level. This might lead to yet another good question:
“how does Y in S contribute to justice for X in S?” Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the question

“what is justice for X in S?” also points to what we humans owe to our environment, even as we
pursue what we think is justifiably due. It leads, in other words, to an “ecological fairness”, another
dimension of justice that we shall consider shortly.
6.2.2. Defining Global Justice
Following our discussion so far, we can define global justice as the totality of demands of
justice that can be practically applied to human relations with each other everywhere, thereby being
able to establish a global society that guarantees an egalitarian/ communitarian co-existence (Elke
et al 2009, 107). That means if we are to establish anything akin to global justice, then the principle
of egalitarian fairness ought to guide our engagements as humans despite our territorial or any
other sectarian affiliation. That seems to be what would make justice achieve its desirable universal
or global stature. The challenge, of course, is always on how to practically do that.
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That is one problem Oruka sought to address when he wrote the essay “Philosophy of Foreign
Aid”. In that essay, Oruka was, among other things, trying to establish an ethical principle that
would justify stronger ties and relations between different people of different nations. He wanted
also, as a result, to justify the basis of global responsibility that we humans have or ought to have
toward each other as moral agents, thereby enhancing what seems to be our natural quest for justice
from a global perspective. That ethical principle, as we said in chapter four, is the right to a human
minimum. It primarily aims at ensuring a minimum standard of living for all members of the human
species irrespective of their territorial or any other sectarian affiliation. As an ethical principle, the
right to a human minimum, therefore, aims at indiscriminately ensuring a more secured, subsistent
and healthier life for all. It seeks, in other words, to de-territorialize the idea of justice, thereby
creating a more humanized global society on earth (Oruka 1997, 85).
Oruka was also concerned about cases of human rights abuse. And being critical to the current
human rights discourse, he abhorred what purports to be a universalistic conception of human
rights that, nonetheless, neither has a strong foundation in nor give priority to the most basic human
needs. For him, any human rights discourse worthy its name ought to have a strong commitment
to oblige the global society to first provide every member of the human species with at least a
minimum standard of living that includes physical security, subsistence, and health care. Thus, he
argues that the right to a human minimum is the basic prerequisite for enjoying other human rights,
and hence for establishing anything akin to global justice.71
One important insight worth noting is the distinction Oruka draws between global justice
and international justice. The two are not synonymous, he says, even though they are related. Thus,
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This is what we tried to establish in chapter three.
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while international justice (which seems prevalent in practice) mainly has nation-states and
regional territories as its crucial entities, global justice, which remains sort of an ideal to be
realized, has human beings as its primary “entities” (Oruka 1997, 84). Thus, after considering three
principles of international justice - international trade, international charity, and historical
rectification – which principles, nevertheless, fail to establish egalitarian fairness at the global
level, Oruka proposes the right to a human minimum as the fourth principle that we would need
first to establish global justice. This is because the latter proceeds purely from what he calls
“unqualified moral duty for humanity” (Oruka 1997, 83-84).
For Oruka, then, global justice consists mainly on how we humans, who are presumably
rational, ethical and hence social beings, ought to relate and treat each other as equal members of
one global society irrespective of our territorial affiliation. It has to do with, say, how we equitably
distribute or share the resources available. It would also involve how we relate to and responsibly
use other non-human beings who are also legitimate members of the world. Hence, global justice,
the way Oruka sees it, is more relational, inclusive, dynamic, and progressive than international
justice. It is concerned primarily with what is good and fair to every individual human being, i.e.,
what ensures their general wellbeing, their citizenship notwithstanding (Oruka 1997, 84). It also
involves what is good and “fair” to other non-human beings, i.e., our environment.
6.2.3. Global Justice as ‘Ecological Fairness’
As hinted earlier, Oruka envisioned a situation where socio-economic injustice against
humanity would be dealt with at a global level while at the same time ensuring what we might call
“ecological fairness”. This is a situation where we humans would be more concerned about the
environment even as we strive to meet our own human needs. This is another credible contribution
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toward a possibility of establishing global justice. It resonates with an adage that says power (i.e.,
human capacity) without ethics is profane and destructive (Rolston 1988, xii). Indeed, while many
have come to appreciate power or human capacity, say, in science and industrial technology, few
are yet to see how irresponsible exploitation of the natural world unchecked by any genuine ethics
can ruin not only human dignity and security but also deter us from appreciating the earth as our
common home - together with other non-human beings.
Thus, in his eco-philosophy,72 Oruka suggests a new “epistemological outlook” that would
challenge the current dominant Western ethical thought. He critically questions “traditional ethics”
(Judeo-Christian ethics that has permeated most Western philosophical thought) for territorializing
the idea and practice of justice. That ethics, Oruka observes, tend to elevate humanity above nature
(i.e., natural world), thereby promoting possessive individualism characterized by greed, pride,
and prejudice (Graness and Kresse, 1997, 119). Ironically, though, ‘traditional ethics’ is known to
have excluded some sections of humanity (e.g., slaves and some races) from the domain of ethics.
Oruka, therefore, proposes a new kind of humanism, a new Menschenbild (Lölke 1997,
222) based on what he dubs “parental earth ethics” where humanity would be viewed as part and
parcel of a complex and systematic totality of nature73 (Graness and Kresse 1997, 119). In such a
setting, Oruka says, modernity and development will not be seen merely as continuous domination,
utilization and exploitation of world resources (as evidenced during industrial revolution, for
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This is a philosophical approach that looks at Nature (i.e., natural world inclusive of human beings) as
interrelated in its complexity and interdependent in its totality; cf. Graness & Kresse 1997, 120-121.
73
By “nature” we mean the natural world and whatever can be found therein, including humans. Thus, for
clarity sake, I will capitalize ‘N’ whenever I use the term in that sense to distinguish it from “nature” as
‘that which constitutes a particular being’, say, human nature.
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instance) to benefit humankind alone (Oruka 1997, 246). Instead, modernity and development will
be seen also in terms of how we (humans) take care of Nature for a common good.
It is important to note, however, that in viewing humanity as part and parcel of Nature,
Oruka does not wish to demean human dignity or disregard the unique role that humans play or
ought to play therein. Neither is he sinking into “philosophical naturalism” - a view that everything
in the world has a natural cause, and that organic life, including human life, is solely a product of
random forces guided by no one (Keller 2008, 86). Instead, Oruka wants to underscore the ethical
duty that we ought to have toward the wellbeing of other humans and non-human beings in the
world. Here, he challenges us to appreciate and value Nature, in which we are part (Rolston 1988).
To take care of Nature, Oruka says, means caring for our own prosperity and posterity,
which is what justice aims at. His point is that we must handle Nature carefully and respectfully,
“for it seems as if almost everything in it has value not just for itself but for the reality of the
survival of the rest” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 121). One of the ways in which we can take care
of Nature would be exploring technological possibilities that can help reduce toxic gasses – carbon
dioxide, methane, etc., which are arguably responsible for global warming.
This is the argument Oruka tries to advance in one of his intriguing essays entitled “Ecophilosophy” where he argues for “parental earth ethics”. This essay first published in 1994 (cf.
Oruka 1994, 115-129) before appearing again in memoriam (cf. Graness and Kresse 1997, 119131) is perhaps one of the most philosophically engaging essays that Oruka wrote before his tragic
death. It seems to define the direction his ethical thought would most likely have taken had he
lived longer. Part IV of his book Practical Philosophy (1997) entitled “Philosophy, Ethics and the
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Environment” attests to this.74 The expression “parental earth ethics”, however, first appeared in
another essay Oruka wrote in 1993 as a reaction to Hardin’s “Life-Boat Ethics” (1991).75
Now in all these essays (which I will critically engage shortly), Oruka basically argues for
a new ethics that would prompt us to have a holistic eco-philosophical approach to such human
issues as socio-economic inequality, poverty, environmental degradation, etc. This is an ethics that
seems to appropriately “follow” Nature, thereby optimizing “human fitness on Earth” (Rolston
1988, xi). It is an ethics that would help us recognize the totality of spatial, temporal, spiritual and
other inter-linkages in Nature (Graness and Kresse 1997, 119). It would help curb possessive
individualism, greed, and prejudice; it would also help “calm the pride of those whose attitude is
that man [humanity] is the vital part of Nature and the centre of the universe” (Oruka 1997, 126).
It would, therefore, help us establish a global society that is not only egalitarian oriented but also
ecologically concerned and fair to or appreciative of all its members. This ecologically-oriented
way of thinking based on, but no doubt, going beyond the concept of human minimum is essential
towards building a much better version of global justice, one that is relational and accomodative.
In what follows now, I try to critically evaluate what parental earth ethics entails, before
analysing how Oruka comes to establish and defend it. The question ‘what is justice for X in S?’
will be an important guide in this endeavour, given that it points to a possibility of ascertaining not
only what we owe each other as humans but also what we possibly owe to other non-human beings
at the global level. Hopefully this will help us de-territorialize the idea of justice so that we do not
only emphasize egalitarian fairness (which properly applies to human relations) but also ensure
ecological fairness with Nature (which applies to other non-human beings).
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See especially chapter 24, “Eco-philosophy: Environmental Ethics” in Oruka 1997, 243-254.
A revised version appears in Oruka 1997, 146-151.
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6.3. On Parental Earth Ethics
Parental earth ethics is an important ethics that Odera Oruka proposes to offer motivation
for a possibility of global justice in terms of ensuring: (i) global environmental concern, and (ii)
global use and distribution (or sharing) of wealth and world resources (Oruka 1997, 150; Graness
and Kresse 1997, 130). It is meant to promote justice at the global level for the common good, that
is, for the good of both humans and the environment. It is basically driven by the ethical principle
of human minimum, which principle ought to inspire us humans to be more ethically responsible
insofar as the use and distribution of world resources is concerned for the good and security of all.
The point here is that if we don’t take care of the earth on which we depend, then we endanger not
only our own survival but also that of other creatures. More specifically, parental earth ethics is
meant to advance a new kind of humanism that would ensure the right to a human minimum, which
right involves actual enjoyment of the most basic human necessities, thereby enabling majority (if
not all) to live a life worthy of a human person. I come back to this point later.
Oruka’s argument for parental earth ethics rests on one fundamental conviction: the earth
is or ought to be a commonwealth for a common good. Now the idea of common good traditionally
means the sum-total of living conditions (social, economic, political, etc.) that enable human
beings to realize their natural fulfilment more fully and easily (cf. John XXIII Pacem in Terris,
39). As an ethical principle, it envisions a society that is dedicated to justice, peace, and security
of humanity. Here, the primary goal is the good of all people, which goal is informed by the fact
that humans are social-ethical beings, meaning they co-exist with and for each other.
But the idea of ‘common good’ also necessarily incorporates the security and the wellbeing
of other creatures - the environment. This is an important insight that unfortunately seems to be
ignored by most ethics. It is what Oruka sets to underscore. His parental earth ethics, then, wants
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to reiterate both dimensions of the idea of ‘common good’. And that, he believes, would lead us
to a genuine practice of justice at the global level. For him, everything in the world is somehow
interconnected and interdependent with each other as a “family unit” for survival. He says:
It is now clear, I hope, that I make the claim that the earth or the world is a kind of family
unit in which the members have a kith and kin relationship with one another and the earth
is a commonwealth to all humanity (Oruka 1997, 150).

Thus, according to Oruka, there is one undeniable fact: everything in the world is somehow
interconnected and interdependent. And that is arguably the basic principle upon which any
environmental concern and discourse at the global level would make sense. It is also a basic fact
upon which human beings, who presumably are the only rational cum moral agents, would feel
ethically obliged to responsibly use and equitably distribute world resources. It overrides not only
the individual’s claim for the so-called ‘right to private property’ or personal achievement, but also
the nation’s claim for territorial rights or “right by first occupation” (Oruka 1997, 150).
Consequently, Oruka pushes for an eco-centric rather than mere anthropocentric account
of global justice. He develops an ethics that recognizes the value and importance of every being in
the world, each according to their rightful mode of existence.76 But Oruka also emphasizes the
unique role that humans play or ought to play to bring about what we might call ecological fairness.
As rational cum ethical beings, Oruka says, we humans ought to enjoy the earth and resources
therein more responsibly; meaning we need to use world resources as stewards rather than owners/
exploiters, taking care of the earth as our common heritage (Graness and Kresse 1997, 258).
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Similar appeals have been made by Francis E. Abbot (1836-1903), who argues for the “organic theory
of realistic evolution” as opposed to mechanical theory of evolution, (Abbot 1888, xii, 160-199).
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The idea of the earth as a commonwealth and common heritage also means none of us has,
strictly speaking, a monopoly of ownership and enjoyment of the earth more than others who for
some reasons might appear less privileged. The earth, as Oruka further says, is our home for all.
As moral agents, therefore, we humans have the ethical duty to not only take good care of it, but
also use and distribute (or share) the resources therein more responsibly despite our apparent
territorial or any other sectarian affiliations. That means we need to acknowledge and uphold the
unique dignity and place that humanity occupies in this world; hence the need to equitably share
wealth and resources so as to secure and maintain humane standard of living. But we need also to
respect, value, and foster our interconnectedness to and with our environment; hence, the need to
use the world resources more responsibly.
In sum, parental earth ethics is meant to motivate us to be more ethically responsible
toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’ – i.e., fellow humans and the environment - even as we explore,
use and enjoy whatever we think is rightfully due. It helps us, in other words, understand what it
really means to be human in relation to other non-human beings in the world. It calls for an integral
approach to the ecosystem, even as we try to address our human needs, thereby seeing the world
as a global society, a sort of organic or family unit governed by the principles of interdependence
and ethical responsibility. It is the basis upon which we can enjoy justice at the global level.
6.3.1. Parental Earth Ethics and other Philosophies
Some important ethical thoughts seem to rekindle or resonate with Oruka’s proposal. In his
recent Encyclical – Laudato Si, Pope Francis, for instance, appeals to all people of the world
together to take a swift and unified global action in relation to environmental issues. He calls for
“ethics of international relation” (Francis 2015, 30) or simply global ethics, as a framework to help
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ensure: (i) a more responsible use of world resources; and (ii) an equitable distribution (or sharing)
of wealth and resources for a common good. The Pope also cautions especially the “industrialized
world” on wastage and pollution that has led to global warming among other environmental
hazards. These hazards, the Pope observes, mostly affect the poor - such as farmers and fishermen
who directly depend on “natural world” for their livelihood. Thus, his proposal is that we not only
take good care of Nature (the entire creation, humans included), but also initiate integral and
sustainable development throughout the world, which development would ensure a more habitable
life on earth for all without jeopardizing the ecological system.
Oruka’s parental earth ethics, likewise, calls for an integral ecology (that is, a holistic
economy of Nature), which in its diverse dimension comprehends the unique place, dignity, and
hence the ethical duty that humans have in this world, thereby fostering a relationship to and with
the environment. The aim is to enhance debates on such pressing issues as climate change, global
warming, global inequality, etc; which debates will have impact on socio-economic wellbeing
especially of the marginalized. Oruka’s parental earth ethics, therefore, leads to and demands for
a highly de-territorialized concept of justice – understood as egalitarian and ecological fairness based on a complex interrelatedness and interdependence of all beings in the world (Graness and
Kresse 1997, 224). Put differently, it leads us to and demands for a different kind of humanism, a
new Menschenbild (Lölke 1997, 222) that would take human beings as stewards (rather than
owners and/or exploiters) who are also part and parcel of stewardship (or Nature) itself.
Thus, parental earth ethics is, no doubt, also a critique of most popular ethics under modern
Western liberalism that tend to territorialize or limit the concept and the practice of justice. It
challenges to the core what Oruka following Worster (1985) refers to as “imperial ideology of
Nature” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 121). This is a false belief or teaching that the natural world is
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made for humans, and that humans are not made for the world (cf. Bacon 1603), meaning humanity
somehow has a license to own, subdue, and exploit the natural world unchecked.
6.3.2. Hardin and “Life-Boat Ethics”
To develop parental earth ethics, Oruka sought first to engage Garret Hardin, who in his
fascinating essay “Lifeboat Ethics” (1980) tries to defend a territorial bounded responsibility to
justice (Lölke 1997, 222), claiming that the affluent can save themselves and the environment
while letting the poor people die. According to Hardin, it would be senseless and even suicidal in
the modern world for the rich individuals and nation-states to offer humanitarian aid to the poor.
He gives two reasons. First, he alleges that there are not enough resources in the world to support
large population. And second, he claims that the global poor do not share “our” (his) territory.
Hardin begins his essay by attacking global environmentalists who, using the metaphor of
“spaceship earth” propose measures to prevent further pollution, which pollution largely affects
the poor under-developed nations. While Hardin acknowledges such arguments as attractive, he
nonetheless regrets that the metaphor of ‘spaceship’ is also often used to advance such senseless
and suicidal moves as “generous immigration policy”, which often lead to “the tragedy of the
commons” (Hardin 1980, 171, 174). This is a situation where countless number of people end up
clamouring for equal basic rights without first fulfilling some responsibilities, thereby leading to
what Hardin calls “mutual ruin” (174). For Hardin, then, the metaphor of ‘spaceship’ would make
sense only if the world had a sovereign to enforce responsibilities, which it doesn’t. The spaceship
metaphor, he says, “is used only to justify spaceship demands on common resources” without first
acknowledging “corresponding spaceship responsibilities”. But that should not be the case, Hardin
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charges adding, “where human survival is at stake, the acceptance of responsibilities is a
precondition to the acceptance of rights” (172).
To further discredit “the ethics of sharing” and possible distribution of world resources,
Hardin attacks those inclined to eradication of poverty in the world purely from humanitarian
ground. Thus, considering the reality of an ever-widening gap between the few rich and majority
poor of the world, Hardin makes us think of a fairly-crowded lifeboat carrying just a few well-todo (affluent) nations on the one hand, and another much crowded lifeboat occupied by majority
poor of the world on the other. And in due course, he says, some poor people would inevitably fall
out of their over-crowded lifeboat and haplessly swim for a while in the waters, hoping to either
be admitted to the rich-man’s lifeboat or somehow benefit from the “goodies” therein. The
question, according to Hardin is this: “What should the passengers on a rich lifeboat do?” This, he
says, is the central problem of “lifeboat ethics” (172).
And to further compound the problem, Hardin lets us assume the rich lifeboat having 50
people on board, with a possibility of admitting 10 more, although that would contravene their
“safety factor”. He then indifferently asks: “The 50 of us in the lifeboat see 100 others swimming
in the water outside, asking for admission to the boat, or for handouts. How shall we respond to
their calls?” (172). Hardin’s dilemma is in threefold. First, if the 50 choose “the Christian maxim”
(i.e., to be charitable) or the Marxist’s socialist way and admit all the 100 poor swimmers, then the
lifeboat will be swamped and everyone on board drown: “complete justice, complete catastrophe”,
he says. The second scenario is that the 50 people on board might choose to admit just 10, in which
case besides contravening the safety factor, thereby risking their future, it will also be extremely
difficult, and perhaps against “justice”, to decide how to discriminate. It would make them feel
guilty for admitting just 10 poor people and leaving the other 90 out.
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The third option, the one Hardin certainly prefers, is to “admit no more into the boat and
preserve the little safety factor” (173). That would make it possible for the 50 in the lifeboat to
survive, he says, even though they will have to be on guard against intruders. For him, although
this might be abhorrent and unjust especially to some few “conscience-stricken” and “guilt-addict”
on board (those who might be tempted to sacrifice their position for the poor to come in), yet, the
third option, Hardin insists, is the best. It is what defines the lifeboat ethics.
Eventually, he says, everyone will want to preserve their luck if they happen to be on board,
and it doesn’t matter who gets into the lifeboat first. Hence, following lifeboat ethics, the best way
out the dilemma, Hardin says, is to eliminate “conscience” from the lifeboat, purify people’s guilt
(of being lucky and unable to help) and then move on in pursuit of what is best for me unconcerned
about how the ‘other’ is going through – in this case those who for some reasons find themselves
unlucky and hence haplessly swimming in poverty outside the “lifeboat”.
In sum, Hardin dismisses not only the urgency for global environmental concern, but also
the ethics of possible global sharing of wealth and world resources. Foreign aid (monetary or
otherwise) from rich to poor nations, he says, is absurd leading to an “unsolvable dilemma”
because while the former control their population, the latter breed exponentially and often in direct
proportion to the aid they receive from outside (178). But without foreign aid, Hardin thinks, the
poor would sooner be “checked in their growth by pestilence, wars and earthquakes, among other
factors” (177). Thus, sharing wealth and resources, the way Hardin sees it, only serves to postpone
the “doomsday”, which nonetheless will come and destroy not only the receiver but also the
generous donor as well; hence, “mutual ruin” in the name of justice (177).
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6.3.3. Critique of Hardin’s “Lifeboat Ethics”
Hardin’s lifeboat ethics, as Oruka says, no doubt captures the “realistic truth” that seems
prevalent in the modern world (Oruka 1997, 147). It seems to describe a world driven by extreme
“political realism” where only the strong, the fittest, and the lucky survive; a situation where at
best, justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’ is territorialized if not thrown out of the window. It defines a
society where possessive individualism, greed, exploitation, pride, and indifference toward the
wellbeing of the ‘other’ seems valuable tools for pursuing what one deems right and best. Here,
“any social system [would be] stable only if it is insensitive to errors” (Hardin 1980, 174). In other
words, socialism (not communism), which calls people to restrain some of their selfish pursuits
for the common good is always seen as counterproductive.
The lifeboat ethics, of course, may sound attractive especially today where extreme liberal
capitalism appears fashionable, but it is no doubt contrary to a basic sagacity that implicitly calls
us to cultivate such humane ideals as generosity, kindness, care, and hence ethical duty toward the
wellbeing of the ‘other’. And the ‘other’ here means anyone living below the human minimum,
territorial boundaries notwithstanding.
Thus, Oruka sought to critically challenge such lifeboat-ethics-mentality with his rather
communitarian-oriented parental earth ethics. Armed with such a basic ethical principle as the
right to a human minimum, Oruka is able to critique Hardin’s stance to the core. Hardin, in my
view, seems to take it as impossible or most unlikely that everyone on earth would enjoy the right
to a human minimum; at least not possible while the developed countries maintain their current
way of life. But he was, of course, factually wrong as I will shortly demonstrate. The indifference
and pessimism with Hardin may have to do less with principles than with factual possibilities.
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To begin with, it is important to remember that Hardin is writing in the 1970s, and it seems
possible that many nations are economically in better shape now than they were then. One major
problem, however, remains in that resources and wealth are still predominantly in the hands of
few. Secondly, Hardin seems much more pessimistic about the world and its resources than he is
justified in being indifferent. For him, world resources are too meagre to sustain a large population.
But studies have shown the opposite is the case.
According to Worldwatch Institute the major “global problem” is not about overpopulation
but gross inequality in the use of world resources. A country like the United States, for instance,
with less than 5 % of the global population uses about a quarter of the world’s fossil fuel resources;
burning up nearly 25 % of the coal, 26 % of the oil, and 27 % of the world’s natural gas.77 It is
also known, moreover, that Nature has its way of balancing itself. Of course, it is still possible that
some natural catastrophe could one day put us in the situation as Hardin conceives it. But in the
meantime, I think, it is possible to responsibly use world resources in a way that would ensure
equitable sharing or resources for a common good. In other words, it is possible for all of us to
enjoy the right to a human minimum if we were to curb possessive individualism and greed.
As we established in chapter four, the right to a human minimum being the most basic
human right and the foundation of other rights aims at ensuring a dignified life of a human person
to everyone. It is therefore the minimum necessity for a standard of living that the world (i.e.,
global society) owes to every human being as its legitimate member. It is, in other words, the very
minimum any human being would reasonably demand from the global society. Thus, it imposes a
necessary correlative duty on every capable moral agent in the world to help ensure that no human
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Worldwatch Institute: http://www.worldwatch.org/node/810#4 accessed Nov. 14, 2017.
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being, regardless of their domicile or any other affiliation, lacks in the means to realize and enjoy
the most basic human necessities. Oruka sums up these points well when he says:
It then follows …., that those affluent individuals who are able to, but refrain from helping
to alleviate poverty from any region of the world, are partly responsible for the
consequences arising from such poverty (Oruka 1997, 147).

Now one way of ensuring the means to realize the right to a human minimum to everyone
in the world is by trying to be ethically responsible, especially with regards to the use of world
resources and accumulation of wealth. To be ethically responsible also entails willingness to share
or distribute some of my fortune with those who for some reasons are deprived of such basic human
needs as food, housing, medicine, etc. Thus, if I have a considerable fortune more than I need to
live on, then I should feel ethically inspired to help, say, a family member or even a stranger who
is living below the human minimum.
To be ethically responsible would also involve making viable efforts to curb other inhuman
treatments – for instance, taking advantage of the situation to control minimum wage and market
prices of essential commodities – all of which tend to exploit and marginalize the poor.
Another way in which we can be ethically responsible to the ‘other’ is by being cautious
about wastage and pollution (which lead to environmental degradation) even as we explore and
use world resources for our own survival and enjoyment as humans. This we can do by reducing
industrial waste and agro-chemical products: from construction and demolition sites; from mining,
clinical and electronic plants. As Pope Francis notes, it is quite tragic that while just a few people
greedily clamour for more profit through industrial and technical advancement, we all end up with
bi-products and waste that are often “non-biodegradable, highly toxic and radioactive” (Francis
2015, 19); all of which have irreversible side effects on people’s health, especially the poor who
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cannot afford expensive medication. And that, to me, seems to properly capture Oruka’s argument
for the right to a human minimum and by extension his parental earth ethics.
The point is that we all ought to be ethically responsible as humans to the wellbeing of
each other, part of which means equitably distributing or sharing wealth and resources. We need
also to diligently take care of our environment, even as we pursue what we think to be rightfully
due. Oruka’s argument, however, as said above, presupposes that the earth is a commonwealth and
a heritage for all. It also presupposes what he calls “parental debt” that we all share in common.
This, I think, is an important insight lacking in Hardin’s argument. Also lacking in Hardin but
crucially present in Oruka is the undeniable fact that human existence and posterity is fairly
interdependent because every existence on earth is symbiotically related as a kind of “organic unit”
or “a complex web of being” (Oruka 1997, 150; Graness and Kresse 1997, 219, 258).
Thus, while Hardin talks about “industrialized world” (i.e., the West) as one ‘lifeboat’
comfortably sailing on the sea but surrounded by tons of poverty-stricken hopeless swimmers,
Oruka instead claims there are, in fact, a number of ‘lifeboats’ (nations) in the world; a few of
them indeed are affluent (though not everyone aboard is rich), while the majority of them are really
poor or underdeveloped (though not everyone therein is poor). But all of these ‘lifeboats’, Oruka
observes, are inter-connected by pipes that are fairly a result of historical dependencies (read
injustices) so that “part of the little wealth and safety gadgets that are in the poor boats do find
their way for use in the rich boats” (Oruka 1997, 148).
To underscore the idea of “parental debt”, that is, what we most likely owe to each other
as humans, Oruka observes that it is possible that in the beginning all the ‘lifeboats’ in the world
were poor, that is, undeveloped or unindustrialized (which is true of every nation-state), before
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some sailors of the now rich lifeboats sailed to the now poor lifeboats, he says, “and by all means
possible plundered the wealth of many of those [unindustrialized] boats and used the gain to cause
economic and safety disparity between the boats” (Oruka 1997, 148). And that is exactly what
happened when, for instance, Europe invaded Africa in the name of civilization.
One needs to carefully read Walter Rodney’s book How Europe Underdeveloped Africa
(1972) to concur with me; to understand the dynamics of power, dominance, and socio-economic
exploitation and inequality, and hence the negative effects of colonialism, imperialism, and
slavery. It would also perhaps make one agree with Oruka that indeed “the now rich boats owe
part of their current self-preservation to the gains brought to them by the inter-boat pipes”, and
that if all the poor boats (i.e., poor people) in the world were to sink, “eventually the rich boats
would also sink” (Oruka 1997, 148). Here, I see Oruka trying to underscore the fact that we all
desperately need each other for survival, prosperity and posterity. Hence, it defeats basic sagacity
when some people tend to inculcate possessive individualism, greed, pride, prejudice and hate.
Oruka also wants to make us realize that Nature (and not just humanity) is interconnected
and interdependent as a complex web of beings for mutual benefit. The rest of life in the world,
Oruka says, is no less important than human life (Oruka 1997, 244). The term “important” is
carefully employed here to underscore the value of every living being. Thus, it does not mean all
sentient beings are the same or that they relate in the same way. The way humans relate with, say,
a dog is not the same they would with a worm; but that does not mean the worm in itself is less
important. Oruka’s argument, then, does not demean human dignity; rather, it is meant to inspire
us humans, who presumably are rational cum moral beings, to not only be ethically responsible
toward the wellbeing of each other but also take care of our environment. But that would require
us having a different kind of ethics - the parental earth ethics - that Oruka proposes.
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6.4. The Earth as a Family Unit
Thus, having dismissed Hardin’s lifeboat ethics, Oruka embarks on advancing his parental
earth ethics using the metaphor of a family. He makes us image the world as a sort of family unit,
with members having a close relationship; a common origin, for instance, through their parents
and a common education (Graness and Kresse 1997, 128, 258). But the members, Oruka says, also
have some difference in terms of their socio-economic welfare. He attributes that difference to
three factors, namely, (i) family history, (ii) personal luck and (ii) individual talents. The success
or failure of each member is also determined by how each one of the members applies the common
education they receive (Oruka 1997, 148; Graness and Kresse 1997, 125).
The family unit, Oruka further says, is also bound by some unwritten ethical laws that guide
people’s lives and relations. He sums up these laws into two major principles: 1) the parental debt
principle (PP); and 2) the individual luck principle (IP). And starting with the parental debt
principle (PP), Oruka says it consists of “four related shared assumptions or rules” (Oruka 1997,
148) that deal with family security and dignity, parental debt, and individual and family survival
(Graness and Kresse 1997, 126). Oruka formulates these rules as follows:
First, we have the Family Security Rule stipulating that the fate and security (physical or
welfare) of each of the members is ultimately bound up with the existential reality of the family as
a whole. That means however arrogant, self-sufficient or independent one member may think of
him or herself now, eventually one or their progeny may experience a turn of events that could
make them desperately in need of protection from the family. In other words, individual’s
“existential reality” in a family unit may change so that the one who is poor and dependent now
might become the donor in future and vice versa (Oruka 1997, 149).
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Second, he talks about the Kinship-shame Rule, which states that “the life conditions of
any one member of the family affect all of them, both materially and emotionally” (Oruka 1997,
149); thus, none of the members can reasonably be proud of their current situation, however happy
or satisfied one may be, if any one member of the family tree lives in squalor.
Third, Oruka gives us the Parental Debt Rule, which explains the organic relationship, and
hence parental debt between members. This precept assumes that “whoever in the family is affluent
or destitute partly owes that fortune or misfortune to the parental and historical factors inherent in
the development of the family” (Oruka 1997, 149). That means no one member of a family could
be held exclusively responsible for their affluent or deprived situation. There is always a parental
debt attached our apparent situations. And that, indeed, is a matter of fact; although some
entrepreneurs like to suppose that they made it completely on their own, forgetting that that they
are not really the inventors or creators of what they managed to turn into thriving enterprises. And
in any case, they are also dependent on consumers, political situation and other factors to succeed.
Finally, Oruka talks about Individual and Family Survival Rule, which he derives from the
previous three rules above. According to this precept, no one member of the family has any moral
obligation “to refrain from interfering with the possessions of any other affluent or destitute brother
or sister who ignores the obligation to abide by the rules of the family ethics” (Oruka 1997, 149).
This, in my view, is the most interesting rule; it not only allows the disadvantaged member(s) to
demand assistance from the affluent member(s), but it also allows “the creative and hardworking
members of the family to repossess underdeveloped possessions of the idle relatives and develop
them for use and posterity” (Oruka 1997, 149). It therefore captures the spirit of the ‘parental debt
principle’ (PP), which basically accounts for the specific duties each individual member owes to
the family, i.e., global society (Lölke 1997, 225). Whereas it propagates equitable distribution of
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wealth and world resources - thereby checking possessive individualism, pride and prejudice - it
does not entertain laziness and idleness in the name of communal life.
Next, turning to the individual luck principle (IP) mentioned above, Oruka says it consists
of three decrees that essentially seek to protect individual property and the right to use whatever
one thinks he/ she duly owns in whichever way one may chose or deem fit.
First, he talks about the personal achievement rule, which states that “what a member
possesses is due mainly to his or her special talent and work” (Oruka 1997, 149). And as Oruka
points out, this rule expresses “a kind of family individualism which disregards historical
experience and the organic constitution of the family” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 127). It basically
seeks to protect the right to individual property that seems “fashionable” within liberal capitalism.
The second precept is the personal supererogation rule, according to which every member
has the right to do whatever she or he wishes with their own possession. It parallels what Oruka
elsewhere calls national supererogation, a corollary of the principle of “territorial sovereignty”,
which says that a people organized into a nation-state with a given geographical region, and hence
having territorial sovereignty has the right to utilize or do whatever it wishes with its possessions
(Oruka 1997, 90, 130). And finally, Oruka talks about the rule of public law, which states that any
member who contravenes the rights of another member, especially the personal supererogation
rule will be subject to punishment and reparation to restore justice (Oruka 1997, 149).
6.4.1. Priority Order
Oruka then appeals to the “ethics of common sense” or simply basic sagacity to conclude
that principle number (1), i.e., parental debt principle (PP) is or ought to be always prior to the
individual luck principle (IP). And that priority order, he says, ought to guide our human relations.

197

Thus, should any of the rules in (PP) come into conflict with any of the rules in (IP), the former,
Oruka insists, must always take priority. This is because (IP) is basically supported by what he
calls “the veil of fate” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 127), which includes right of first occupation,
personal luck, and personal achievement. Parental debt principle (PP), however, springs forth from
the “organic unity”, that is, a common origin/ heritage that exists between family members, their
socio-economic differences notwithstanding. It is also grounded on the need to have a common
security, thus the reason why it should always take priority.
Oruka would therefore say that “matters of commonwealth and security” must always
prevail over “matters of personal possession, luck or achievement” (Oruka 1997, 150). That means
“personal supererogation” – i.e., the individual right to own, use or dispose of wealth - cannot
prevail upon matters common good. Likewise, no individual or institution would be spared if it
endangers the security and/ or economy of a community. Thus, Oruka concludes by saying:
There is no country in which, for example, one would accept a wish or a will from one of
its citizens which stipulates that upon death all his achievements, however dear to the
country, should be exterminated or kept from use by anybody… The objection to this will
can be supported by invoking issues of common origin, common security and common
wealth of the community of which the person is a member (Oruka 1997, 149-150).
6.4.2. Practical Implications
There are several implications upon which Oruka’s argument for parental earth ethics
depends. First, we note that Oruka wants to underscore a basic if important sagacity that many,
unfortunately, tend to forget or ignore as they desperately pursue the ‘right to private property’ or
the so-called ‘personal supererogation’. His ethics reminds us that the earth and resources therein
is for the common good of all; not in the sense that it is an open field for the survival of the fittest,
but only in the sense of sharing whatever we might gain from it (Graness and Kresse 1997, 128).
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That means the wealth and property that may come my way as I mix labour with the earth
is mine only in the strict sense of the word. It is simply given for my use. But the gift also obliges
me with a duty to be more reasonable and responsible toward the wellbeing of the ‘other’ – fellow
humans and the environment. This is because the earth from where we get wealth, strictly speaking,
has no sovereign, nor does it have real owners except God, the first principle of being. We humans
are only stewards, and that means the earth is a commonwealth or heritage for all of us. The earth
is also a home and heritage for other sentient non-human beings (Graness and Kresse 1997, 125).
Thus, it seems contrary to basic sagacity when some tend to amass for themselves even what they
actually don’t need either to sustain their life or enrich it. Needless to say, it seems utter vanity or
stupendous to accumulate luxurious wealth (quite often through dubious means) while others
languish in abject poverty; yet, no one takes with them such wealth when they die.
In the same vein, it is important to note that Oruka is in no way discouraging hard work,
innovation, industrialization; nor is he despising wealth and prosperity as such. Rather, he is only
against possessive individualism, greed and pride that often lead to dubious means of acquiring
wealth, most of which means tend to exploit the poor. For him, “subservient ends”, i.e., personal
and national gains, are for the most part a result of “historical factors”, meaning they are outcome
of our common past that only tend to favour some people or nations at one given time (Lölke 1997,
226). But that does not change the fact that the earth is a common heritage for all. In fact, trends
may change (as history attests) so that those successful now may not necessarily be as successful
in future, and vice versa. Thus, it is always sagacious when one is successful and capable now to
consider sharing some of the purported personal wealth with those who for some reason happened
to be deprived. This is what Oruka calls “parental earth insurance policy”, which calls on affluent
and powerful nations and individuals on earth “to invest in the pool of service to the rest of the
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world so that when their historical turn or shift to oblivion comes, others may remember them with
compassion” (Graness and Kresse 1997, 129).
Oruka’s insight also reminds us that the earth is also a habitat to other non-human beings.
It properly underscores the value, the interconnectivity and hence interdependence of all beings as
members of one global organic unit, albeit in different ways and levels. It particularly enables us
humans to understand how much we depend on our environment for survival. But it also reaffirms
our dignity and unique role we play or ought to play within the ecosystem. It therefore re-awakens
our consciousness to realize that it is we who, by virtue of being rational cum ethical, have to take
care of the entire ecosystem for the common good. Oruka’s insight no doubt rekindles that of Carl
von Linnaeus – often refered to as the father of modern taxonomy - who in The Economy of Nature
taught that we understand “the wisdom of creator” better when we relate to natural things by which
everything is “fitted to produce general ends and the reciprocal uses” (Worster 1985, 37-38).
In sum, Odera Oruka’s eco-philosophy, and particularly his parental earth ethics leads us
into a different kind of “humanism” that is capable of establishing the possibility of a genuine
quest for justice at the global level. This point will be advanced further in the next chapter. Here,
it suffices to say that parental earth ethics enables us to practically de-territorialize the idea of
justice so that it does not only refer to ‘egalitarian fairness’ (which applies to human relations) but
also ‘ecological fairness’ that acknowledges, appreciates and values the entire natural world.

6.5. Conclusion
This chapter was intended to advance a critical discourse that would possibly ensure a
genuine practice of justice at global level. We started off by analysing the idea of justice as
‘egalitarian fairness’ - arguably the conventional understanding of what justice is or ought to be.
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Justice as ‘egalitarian fairness’, we said, implies equitability, impartiality and reciprocity insofar
as distribution of resources is concerned. Thus, we emphasized the importance of having that idea
of justice being practically de-territorialized so that the majority (if not all) human beings could
actually enjoy egalitarian fairness. That would make justice acquire moral cum practical worth.
We then established that global justice at minimum level would entail actual enjoyment of
the right to a human minimum. Thus, we defined global justice as ‘the totality of demands of justice
that can reasonably be applied to local and international relations, thereby establishing a global
society that is both egalitarian and communitarian oriented’. But in order to fully de-territorialize
the concept of justice, that is, for us to make it “global” in practice, we said it is imperative to have
a different world view, a new ethics that would not only motivate a spirit of equitable distribution
or sharing of world resources but also take into account the natural world (our environment) as a
valuable member in our quest for global justice.
Thus, in contrast to Hardin’s lifeboat ethics mentality (which limits the enjoyment of
justice, thereby promoting possessive individualism, pride, and prejudice), we have considered
Oruka’s parental earth ethics, which takes an eco-centric rather than anthropocentric approach to
issues of global justice, thereby ensuring “ecological fairness”. Parental earth ethics, we have
seen, emphasizes the stewardship model rather than possessive/ exploitative model, thereby
challenging us humans to be more ethically responsible in terms of how we use and distribute our
wealth and world resources. Parental earth ethics, we have said, is based on one important fact:
the earth is a commonwealth and a common heritage for the common good. Part of what that
undeniable fact means is that we humans have to: (i) responsibly use world resources, and hence
take good care of the environment upon which we depend for survival; and (ii) equitably distribute
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or share wealth and resources so that no one member of human species goes without enjoying the
right to a human minimum.
Parental earth ethics is, no doubt, a milestone, a legacy to reckon with Odera Oruka. It
seems to define the direction in which he would have wished his practical philosophy to take. It
leads us into a different kind of “humanism” that recognizes humans as rational cum moral agents
and the rest of natural world, especially sentient non-human beings, as valuable moral patients that
require moral consideration and care. It helps us realize that humanity is not the master but just a
privileged member of the ecological system.
That privilege, however, comes with a price: not to leave the world worse off than we found
it. Thus, Oruka’s eco-philosophy as espoused by his parental earth ethics underscores the ethical
duty that we humans have to protect Nature. His ethical thought is capable of establishing a viable
concept of global justice, cognizant of the fact that every being on earth is interrelated and
interconnected for the common good. It takes the concept of justice not only as that which helps
us establish ‘egalitarian fairness’ (which properly applies to human relations), but also as that
which brings about ‘ecological fairness’ with Nature. The latter (ecological fairness), we can now
submit, would necessarily and effectively lead to the former (egalitarian fairness).
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CHAPTER 7
GENERAL CONCLUSION
7.1. On Humanism, Ecology and Global Justice
I would like to conclude this project by reiterating Oruka’s commitment to humanism (or
humanness as he would sometimes call it), by which he means an endeavour to uphold the quality
and security of human life. Oruka’s humanism seems well captured in his essay Parental Earth
Ethics (1994), but it is also evident in other works that talk about justice, human rights, politics,
environment, etc. In fact, one would rightly argue that Oruka’s entire practical philosophy is
humanistic in nature - both in its approach and methodology (Graness and Kresse 1997, 14). This
is the point I tried to argue out in chapter two. His philosophy is primarily geared towards
upholding human survival, dignity, and security. His ethical commitment and thought, particularly
the concept of human minimum attests to that fact.
But Oruka’s humanism is unusual given that it also involves the natural world, that is, other
non-human beings as crucial (though not necessarily equal) members. Oruka was not wholly
satisfied with anthropocentric motivations for environmental preservation. He concurs with those
who consider animals and plants as moral patients, but he insists that they nonetheless deserve
moral concern since they can be recipients of cruelty and unjust treatment (Presbey 2000, 525). In
one of his essays on environmental ethics entitled Eco-philosophy, Oruka envisions a situation that
would liberate, appreciate and value the entire biotic and natural community. He writes:
As slaves and some races were once excluded from ethical consideration but were later
ethically liberated, so the time has come for the ethical liberation of soils, plants, trees,
waters, mountains and all beings of a biotic community. We are … to live as equals in a
community of biodiversity. Each member of this community, whether a human king or a
… tadpole, has an intrinsic value (Oruka 1997, 244).

203

That quotation, however, should be read in its proper context. It is meant to underscore the
intrinsic or the ontological goodness, value, and hence importance of every being on earth, each
according to its own mode of existence. As Aquinas would argue, every being, insofar as it is (i.e.,
exists), is ontologically good and hence valuable and important in itself. This is because goodness
and being are really the same; they only differ in idea (ST I Q.5 art. 1). That means every being is
intrinsically equal in goodness insofar as it participates in existence. The difference comes, of
course, in the mode or in the form of participation. The difference comes, in other words, in the
essence or the nature of a being in question. This is because “every being, as being, has actuality”
according to how it participates in existence. But every being, as being, “is in some way perfect;
since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies desirability and goodness”
(ST 1 Q. 5, art. 3). Hence, every being is intrinsically good in itself.
Likewise, Oruka would argue that every being insofar as it exists is intrinsically equal in
goodness. Thus, a mosquito or a viper is intrinsically as good, and hence valuable and important
as, say, a dog or a horse is. The same can be said (ontologically speaking) of a human king and a
tadpole. It is that intrinsic value, in my view, that Oruka wanted to underscore when he says all
beings in the world are “to live as equals in a community of biodiversity” (Oruka 1997, 244).
But we can also, of course, talk about other things being extrinsically good in relation to
us. Here, we see different things as “good” with regard to the scale of valuation and importance
that we humans often attach to them, depending on how they practically affect or benefit us. Thus,
in relation to our human life, a mosquito or a viper is extrinsically harmful and bad, and therefore
less valuable and important than, say, a dog or a horse. But this is simply because of the benefits
we often attach to the latter category. Cultures and religious inclinations, moreover, also tend to
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determine the scale of valuation and importance we attach to things. A pig to a Muslim or a Jew,
for instance, is less valuable and un-important because majority of them believe it is not suitable
for human consumption; yet, pork is often considered a delicacy by most Catholics. The question,
therefore, is: how ought we to determine the value and the importance of things in the world?
That question, in my view, could be unravelled using Oruka’s insight, which points to the
fact that every being in Nature is intrinsically good in itself. We may not easily recognize or
appreciate the intrinsic goodness, and hence the value and importance of some things that do not
directly benefit us as humans, but that should not be a reason to demean or to deny their goodness,
their value and importance. Oruka’s insight therefore arguably seems to challenge us to transcend
our human (i.e., socio-cultural, religious, political and perhaps even intellectual) cocoons so as to
see the intrinsic value and importance of every being in the world.
In any case, even those things that we tend to think as less valuable and un-important (such
as mosquitoes, vipers and tadpoles) are, nonetheless, good because they are part and parcel of
Nature; and Nature, as Aristotle argues, ultimately works for a good course (Aristotle Physics II.8).
That means every being in Nature is ipso facto good or moving towards “the good” (whatever that
might be). Hence, by virtue of being part of Nature as we humans are, even that which seems less
beneficial to us is good, meaning it might as well be valuable and important even to us now or in
the future, although perhaps in ways that we may never understand or appreciate. That, to me,
seems to be what inspired Odera Oruka’s “eco-philosophy” and hence his new kind of humanism.
Oruka’s humanism, and particularly his concern for environmental ethics appears holistic
and “liberative”. As he describes it, it does not follow the popular humanistic approach in the West
often shaped by “capitalist science and technology”; nor does it take the form of “socialist-cum-

205

Marxist critique” (Oruka 1997, 246). Instead, Oruka’s humanism is firmly grounded on a basic
sagacity that gives high regard to both human and non-human beings, albeit in different levels.
That sagacity, which is prevalent in most pre-colonial African societies, is characterized by such
humane values as solidarity, generosity, care, etc. It is part of what his philosophy aims at. I come
back to this point, but first, let me clarify how Oruka understands and applies the term humanism.
7.2. Defining the term Humanism
The term ‘humanism’ etymologically derives from Latin word humanitas, which denotes
such human values as benevolence, kindness and care. It is related to a Greek word φιλανθρωπία
(philanthropia) - from where we derive the English term philanthropy, which signifies human
kindness, generosity, care or a “friendly spirit” and “goodwill” (cf. Gellius, Attic Nights, XIII: 17).
Hence, ‘humanism’ denotes a commitment to being benevolent, kind, and caring; which all imply
a sense of being ethically responsible toward the wellbeing of other humans, especially the less
fortunate in society. This is one sense in which Oruka applies the term humanism in his philosophy.
But humanism can also be defined as a way of thinking and acting based on some set of
ethical principles and values that tend to give priority to human existence. And that priority, as
Oruka says, is measured by the quality and security of both individual and collective human
existential well-being (Oruka 1997, 138-139). Thus, humanism in this sense tends to promote not
only the good of humanity in general but also the good of individuals as the ultimate goal of human
actions; it means taking the quality and security of individual human life and general wellbeing
seriously. That is why Oruka would say humanism is or ought to be the ultimate standard of moral
good and moral action in every human society (Oruka 1997, 139).
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Humanism can also be understood as a kind of practical reasoning, i.e., a philosophy that
aims at finding the “existential purpose and meaning in human life” (Azenabor 2010, 123). In this
sense, it entails an active ethical commitment to socio-economic welfare of humanity, regardless
of their national, geographical, racial, or any other sectarian affiliation. As a sagacious normative
or practical dimension of philosophy, humanism then leads to humanness; it leads to an ethical
commitment that emphasizes centrality of human life and its non-negotiable dignity and unique
place in the world. Thus, genuine humanism, Oruka says, refers to that ethical commitment often
manifested in someone’s actions (e.g., philosophizing or writting), and is always directed towards
the betterment of the overall living conditions of people in the name of building a more humanized
global society (cf. Oruka 1997, 130; Kresse 2013, 31; and Nyarwath 2009, 248-50).
Now as we have tried to argue in this dissertation, Oruka’s philosophy clearly demonstrates
such a commitment. Matters pertaining to justice, human rights, liberty, politics, etc., are very
central to his philosophy. But even more important (though perhaps less known) is the fact that
ecological issues like pollution, consumerism, global warming, etc., form part of his philosophical
inquiry. Oruka considered human beings not as owners cum exploiters of the natural world but as
stewards to administer and hence take care of the earth and resources therein for a common good.
This is no doubt an important dimension that defines Oruka’s humanism.
Just like most humanists in Africa, therefore, Oruka insists that “humankind must be made
the central focus” (Azenabor 2010, 112), thereby upholding human dignity and security. However,
that should not be construed to mean giving license to exploit world resources unchecked - as most
modern liberalism inspired by Lockean philosophy, for instance, seems to do. Instead, it means
that human beings have a special mandate to use world resources more responsibly. They also
have an ethical duty to distribute or share resources more generously, thereby building a better life
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that is safe and secure for all. And that duty, Oruka says, flows from the fact that it is only humans
who presumably are rational, ethical, hence socio-political beings on earth (Oruka 1997, 126).78
In his endeavour to develop a philosophy that is humanistic in nature, Odera Oruka seems
convinced that human beings are by nature rational, ethical, and hence socio-political, besides their
being creative and conscientious. He was convinced that we have a natural tendency to relate and
“socialize” with each other despite our differences. That means we have a natural tendency to be
humane; to be ethically responsible: caring, loving, generous and kind to each other. And this is
what, I think, basic sagacity calls for. Of course, that natural tendency might sometimes or quite
often be overshadowed by some vicious inclination to greed or possessive individualism, pride,
prejudice and hate. But that does not mean the latter aspects should define the human nature.
7.3. Humanism in Pre-colonial Africa
I mentioned earlier that Oruka’s humanism is grounded on traditional value systems that
tend to give high regard to both humans and non-human beings, albeit in different ways and levels.
His humanism, in other words, seems to be guided by a simple but important maxim prevalent in
most pre-colonial Africa: “each for all and all for each.”79 It is such a sagacity that properly defines
what he we might call traditional African humanism or communalism (not communism): a way of
life that made every member feel “at home” with other members. It also made one feel fairly
treated – despite there being elaborate normative measures like taboos, customs and precepts because of such humanistic values as solidarity, generosity, respect, care, tolerance, etc.80
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Now Odera Oruka can be seen as applying such values to construct a kind of humanism
that would ensure possibility of enjoying justice at the global level. First, it is important to note
that in most pre-colonial African societies, resources were equitably distributed, each according to
their needs so that nobody would have exuberantly too much while another lacks in the basis of
sustaining life. Among the Akan in Ghana, for instance, just like among the Agikuyu in Kenya,
land (which is the most vital means of livelihood) traditionally belongs not to individuals but the
clan; and the clan consists of the living, the ancestors, and the unborn - all of whom have a sociopsychological reality that knits them together as community.81 Here, the driving principle, was
communalism properly defined in terms of striving to equitably share resources for the common
good, however meagre these resources were. And it is that spirit of communalism, informed by
the intuitive consciousness that human beings are interrelated and interdependent, that made the
majority in traditional African societies to be ethically responsible towards the wellbeing of each
other. It also led to a sort of “reciprocal justice”, which Oruka says is the basic “social ideal” for
establishing a more globally humanized society (Graness and Kresse 1997, 124).
Oruka’s humanism, furthermore, alludes to a traditional African wisdom on ecology, which
he says can offer “an eco-philosophy that throws some light on the problems that confront modern
civilization” (Oruka 1997, 251). Now according to that traditional African wisdom on ecology, the
world is conceived as divided into two related parts: the visible realm comprising of humans, trees,
soils, waters, animals, plants, etc., on the one hand and the invisible realm having the ancestors,
the unborn, the heavenly bodies, the spirits, etc., on the other. The two realms together form what
Oruka calls “the totality of environment or simply the reality of existence” (Oruka 1997, 252).
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Thus, while human beings might appear more privileged than any other member of the
visible realm (given that they can think and talk), that privilege, Oruka says, was nonetheless
understood simply as a matter of being lucky; it was a gratuitous gift from the invisible reality,
meaning they (humans) have no real right to hold absolute power, ownership or control over other
members of the visible world. Hence, plants and animals could not be carelessly destroyed at will.
In fact, some plants and animals couldn’t be touched or destroyed at all because of their
relationship to the invisible reality – the other part of the entire environment (Oruka 1997, 252).
Indeed, among the Agikuyu in Kenya where I belong, it was anathema to cut the Mugumo
(fig) tree, for instance. Of course, the folk sagacity given then was that Mugumo tree is sacred
because it is where sacrifices to Ngai (or God) were offered (Kenyatta 1953, 4). But the philosophic
sagacity behind this was really to preserve the environment. It must be remembered that the
Mugumo tree is so enormous, with widespread strong roots (to avoid soil erosion) and wide
supportive branches (to shelter birds and other animals). Similarly, no one was allowed to cultivate
along river banks for the same reason: to preserve the environment, although the explanation given
was that some Daimono (evil spirit) would make the farmer in question infertile. Other plants were
also jealously preserved because of their beauty and medicinal value. Each clan, moreover, was
named and associated with a specific wild animal, and it was anathema for people to kill their own
animal, even for food. The point here is that ecological conservation was highly regarded in most
traditional African cultures even when that did not offer direct material benefit to the people; they
understood that every being is intrinsically good and invaluable. Oruka explains why:
The belief is that the environment is a community whose members are both human beings
and non-human [beings]; and that although the humans have privileges, they have no right
to destroy any of the other visibles except on consultation with the members of the invisible
[reality] (Oruka 1997, 252 emphasis mine).
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Such “ecological wisdom” was based on the fact that the invisible reality has greater power
and knowledge than the visible world (humans included); hence, the fate of the latter was directly
dependent upon the prerogative of the former. That seems to explain why a traditional African, as
Mbiti observes, seems “notoriously religious” (Mbiti 1990, 1). No wonder nearly every human
activity in traditional Africa would be accompanied by prayer to invoke the divine power from the
invisible reality. And that also points to yet another dimension of traditional African way of life:
human existence is extended to and depends on the rest of the world. It also underscores the fact
that ecological balance (at least in the visible realm) is not a human creation; thus, it is sheer vanity
for humans to think or pretend to be owners or masters of the world (Oruka 1997, 252).
Odera Oruka’s humanism, therefore, seems to recapitulate the essence of African socialism
properly defined by the spirit of communalism.82 This is a way of life, a kind of ethics that tends
to appeal to the welfare of the ‘other’ as a guide to every human action (Masolo 2006). And behind
that ethics is the need to minimize socio-economic disparity between the haves and the have-nots
as its primary goal. Thus, Oruka’s humanism, which seems firmly grounded on (although critical
to some) traditional way of life in Africa can be seen as propagating a dynamic ethical shift: from
our unnatural human inclination to possessive individualism, greed, pride and prejudice back to
our natural (traditional) tendency to care for one another in an egalitarian-communal way.
Now that egalitarian/ communal ethics, the spirit of African Socialism, has also been
advanced by the Ubuntu philosophy that rests on a simple but philosophically rich humanistic
principle: “I am because you are.” 83 It helps us realize that humanity is inextricably bound up; that

82

For details regarding his own (Luo) community’s idea of communalism (as espoused by Paul M.
Akoko, one of the sages Oruka interviewed in his Sage philosophy project) see Oruka 1991a, 140-141.
83
See the “Foreword” to I am Because You are (Lief and Thompson 2015) by Desmond Tutu.
211

I am human to the extent that I belong to a community in which I ought to participate in building
by, among other things, sharing what I have with others. Thus, as Shutte observes, the Ubuntu
philosophy, albeit in its diverse interpretation, has recently become popular given that it basically
aims at socio-economic and political liberation, human rights defence, and hence the quest for
global justice (Shutte 1995, preface). It is also concerned about ecology and biodiversity.84
7.4. Humanism at the Heart of Philosophy
It is my hope that we can now understand how Oruka’s philosophy is humanistic in nature. It
seems primarily geared toward human existential wellbeing in their relations to each other and
with the natural world at the global level. As we tried to argue in chapters two and three, Oruka’s
practical philosophy was largely informed by some grave historical socio-economic injustice in
the world that he sought to address first. How could such human perils as poverty, war, hunger
and disease be reduced, if not eliminated in the world? This was one question that prompted Oruka
to develop a philosophy in search for a human minimum. As a philosopher of practical ilk, Oruka
sought to pursue the ultimate and most basic standard of moral good, which for him is or ought to
be humanism. He believed it is humanism that would lead to practice of justice at the global level.
Oruka saw humanism as the epicentre of philosophizing toward global justice. Apart from
adopting the etymological definition of philosophy as love of wisdom, he also defined philosophy
strictly as an “art of reasoning” that “provides a critical intellectual weapon and methodology for
analysing and synthesizing the basic problems of man (i.e., human) and society” (Oruka 1997,
140). For him, that is what qualifies to be moral philosophy, whose nature and mandate is to
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discern, analyse, safeguard and promote humanism, moral good and social order, thereby leading
to a possibility of establishing justice at the global level. He says:
The main function of moral philosophy is to apply rigorous analytic and synthetic reason
to the basic moral and social problems and help explain or define moral good, moral evil
and the requirements of a humanistic social order (Oruka 1997, 140).
It appears, then, that for Oruka, humanism (by which he means commitment to enhance
and improve the quality and security of human life) ought to be one of the inescapable functions
of philosophy. It is within its “natural mandate”, he says, for philosophy to call and search for
remedy where humanism seems to be in danger or in decline (Oruka 1997, 138). But as a caveat,
Oruka quickly point out that in saying that philosophy ultimately concerns or ought to concern
itself with humanism, he does not mean to confuse philosophy with other disciplines (religion,
politics, ideology, etc.) that also in a way concern themselves with humanism.85 It doesn’t mean
every philosophy is about searching for humanism and global justice either. What it means is that
humanism is one of the central and perhaps most important aspect of philosophizing.
Oruka’s philosophy, being humanistic in nature, therefore, aims at establishing some
ethical principles that would help ensure a genuine humanism, which in turn would see possibility
of establishing justice at the global level. Key among these ethical principles, we have said, is the
right to a human minimum. As chapter five tried to show, Oruka’s philosophy aims at upholding
the dignity of life in every human being by seeking the minimum egalitarian fairness with regards
to the enjoyment of at least some basic human needs: physical security, subsistence and health
care. It underscores the humanistic values of solidarity, generosity, care, and above all, the ethical

For ways in which philosophy not only relates but also differs from these disciplines, see “Philosophy
and Humanism in Africa” in Oruka 1997, 140-141. This point was also discussed in chapter one.
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duty that helps ensure a more genuine concern for the wellbeing of those who for some reasons
find their right to a human minimum denied or inaccessible.
Oruka’s philosophy might sound to be an exaggerated advocacy for the plights of the global
poor, clamouring for their rights without really challenging them to fulfil their civic duty. In other
words, the right to a human minimum seems to be working for the benefit of the poor; yet, moral
or philosophical principles ought to be universal. Oruka might also remotely be accused of inciting
violence as means to agitate for people’s rights. But that, I think, would be missing Oruka’s point.
In proposing the right to a human minimum as a normative principle towards global justice, Oruka
intends it to be universally biding: challenging both the rich and the poor for a common good.
As we tried to argue in chapter five, the human minimum is an ethical minimum and a universal
right; it is the minimum that any human being, by virtue of being human, can reasonably demand
from fellow human beings. But that does not amount to giving licence to the poor to forcefully
grab from others what they think is justifiably due, even though their natural inclination to survival
might force them to do so. Here, Oruka is cautioning the global society, especially the affluent,
that denying some members the right to a human minimum is not only ethically unfair but is also
a threat to global security. Similarly, even though he argues that denying someone the right to a
human minimum might adversely affect their capacity to function as a moral agent, Oruka is not
advocating for those below the human minimum to simply act as moral patients. Like everyone
else, they (the poor) ought to strive and abide by the ethical rules and legal precepts, though this
might be unfair to them. But on the other hand, the society ought to strive to ensure that no one
goes without their right to a human minimum fulfilled. The intention really is to enhance a global
responsibility towards the wellbeing of each other.
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We can therefore say that the fulfilment of what the right to a human minimum demands is
universally biding. It has a correlative necessary duty that bides everyone. It would be desirable to
have everyone in the world meet at least the basic needs through their own effort. But apparently
that seems not to be the case mainly due to some historical social, political and economic injustices,
among other factors. Thus, Oruka’s ethical thought seems to be challenging all those who have the
means, those who somehow have benefited from the current world order, to ensure that those who
have not or who cannot meet what the human minimum demands are assisted to do so.
That, however, does not mean that it is only the rich who have a duty towards the right to a
human minimum; neither is the argument meant to make the rich feel guilty of their genuine earning
or make them less industrious. The factt is: every human being in the world has a duty first to
oneself and, second to others. That means one ought to make reasonable demands on others only
after one has tried and failed to fulfil duty to oneself. The global poor, for instance, have a duty to
first try and improve their existential conditions; they must critically examine the possible causes
of their deprivation and work towards the removal of such causes as corruption, laziness and
complacency. They cannot sit back and simply put that duty upon the shoulders of the rich. Just as
much as the affluent have the duty to ensure that no one dies from starvation, disease or physical
violence in the world, so too the poor have equal duty to ensure not only their own survival but
also a much more dignified lifestyle for all, at least to the best their ability.
Perhaps it is important to reiterate, as I conclude, that by advancing the argument for the right
to a human minimum, Oruka was basicaly attempting to “humanize” or make better the world that
seems increasingly becoming de-humanized. He was trying, for instance, to reduce abject poverty
and other threate to humanity in the world. But that would involve, among other things, ensuring
responsible use of and equitable sharing of world resources. A question may, however, arise as to
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whether the world has got enough resources to sustain the right to a human minimum for every
person on earth. This is a question that requires further studies from other disciplines.
Nonetheless, considering the advances already made globally especially in science, technology
and economy, one can hope that it is practical possibility to make the world better, to reduce
poverty and other physical threats to human survival. What we need is proper ethics to regulate
our politics, trade and other human interactions. Paradoxically, though, the effort already made in
science, technology and economy seems to have led to yet another severe global challenge in terms
of environmental degradation. Issues of global warming due to carbon emissions and other toxic
industrial waste are threatening to cause more global havoc than before.
Now this is where Oruka’s eco-philosophy and humanism becomes handy. As chapter six tried
to argue, parental earth ethics is able to achieve what the ethical principle of human minimum
demands of us in two ways. First, it motivates in all of us (humans) the “spirit” of equitable sharing
of wealth and world resources irrespective of our sectarian affiliations, thereby underscoring the
concept of justice as egalitarian fairness. Second, it propagates a global environmental concern,
thereby advancing the idea of justice in terms of ensuring ecological fairness. Put differently,
parental earth ethics is a noble ethics that seeks to connect Nature as one organic or family unit.
It enables us see the world as a complex web of beings that are symbiotically related. It offers
possibilities of creating a global society that is not only egalitarian/ communitarian oriented but
also ecologically fair, thereby pointing to a possibility of establishing justice at the global level.
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